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Zusammenfassung (auf Deutsch) 
Unternehmensnachfolge kann ein kritischer Moment im Lebenszyklus eines jeden 
Familienunternehmens werden. Dies kann unterschiedliche Gründe haben, zum 
Beispiel die ungenügende Übergabefähigkeit des Unternehmens, unzureichende 
Planung oder den Mangel eines geeigneten oder gewillten Nachfolgers. Um dieser 
Situation entgegenzuwirken, ergeben sich im Vorfeld der Nachfolge 
Herausforderungen, wie die Notwendigkeit einer strukturierten Planung des 
Nachfolgeprozesses und die Auswahl und Integration eines passenden 
Nachfolgers. Diese Herausforderungen können, wenn sie von 
Familienunternehmen erfolgreich bewältigt werden, zu einer Erneuerung des 
Familienunternehmens führen. Sie können jedoch auch zu einer Krise werden, 
wenn Schritte übersprungen oder nicht beachtet werden. Informationen spielen 
hier eine entscheidende Rolle. So hängt der gelungene Austausch von 
Informationen zum Beispiel davon ab, ob die grundsätzliche Bereitschaft für 
einen offenen Informationsaustausch gegeben ist, ob genügend Zeit und 
Ressourcen dafür verfügbar sind und das Bewusstsein vorhanden ist, was 
(unternehmens-)relevante Informationen für einen gelungenen Nachfolgeprozess 
sind. Diese Informationen sind jedoch die Basis für zukünftige Entscheidungen 
von Übernehmern und damit von besonderer Relevanz. 
Verschiedene Modelle, die als Basis für einen erfolgreichen Unternehmens-
nachfolgeprozess herangezogen werden können, wurden in der Vergangenheit 
erstellt. Diese beinhalten möglichst umfassend Aspekte, die es in der 
Nachfolgesituation zu beachten gilt, wie zum Beispiel die Sensibilisierung für die 
Nachfolge allgemein, die Auswahl eines geeigneten Nachfolgers, finanzielle 
Aspekte, aber auch Kontextfaktoren wie das Familien- oder Unternehmensumfeld.  
Das übergeordnete Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, in diesem Zusammenhang ein 
tiefer gehendes Verständnis zu generieren, welche Rolle Informationen und vor 
allem der Informationsaustausch im Unternehmensnachfolgeprozess spielen. Der 
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Fokus der Arbeit liegt dabei auf der Individualebene, folglich auf dem Übergeber 
und Übernehmer. Dabei wird der Unternehmensnachfolgeprozess aus der 
Perspektive der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie betrachtet. Es wird davon 
ausgegangen, dass der Übergeber als Prinzipal und der (potenzielle) Übernehmer 
als Agent agieren und beide Informationen austauschen. In dieser Prinzipal-
Agenten-Situation treten Informationsasymmetrien auf, welche die erste 
empirische Studie genauer in den Blick nimmt. Unter Zuhilfenahme der 
Signaling-Theorie und der Sozialkapitaltheorie werden in den darauffolgenden 
Studien zwei weitere Bereiche untersucht, in denen Informationsaustausch eine 
Rolle spielt: Zum einen die Auswahl des Unternehmensnachfolgers und zum 
anderen der Transfer von Netzwerkkontakten. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation zeigen auf, dass in 
Familienunternehmen in der Unternehmensnachfolgesituation Informations-
asymmetrien vorhanden sind, die den Nachfolgeprozess gefährden können. Diese 
verändern sich jedoch über die Zeit, was darauf hinweist, dass 
Familienunternehmen Prozesse entwickeln, die einen Informationsaustausch 
fördern und Herausforderungen, die aus Informationsasymmetrien entstehen 
können, selbstständig abmildern.  
Die Signaling-Theorie wird in einer zweiten empirischen Studie als ein 
Erklärungsansatz für den Abbau von Informationsasymmetrien herangezogen. 
Hier zeigt sich, dass potenzielle Nachfolgekandidaten in Familienunternehmen 
durch die Wahl einer passenden Ausbildung oder durch ihr Engagement im 
Familienunternehmen Signale senden und diese vom Übergeber auch empfangen 
werden. Darüber hinaus geben die Ergebnisse Hinweise darauf, dass 
Familienunternehmen eigene Prozesse schaffen, um Nachfolger zu identifizieren, 
auszubilden und zu integrieren – sie folglich erfolgreich Informationsasymmetrien 
reduzieren. Familienunternehmen sind demnach professioneller bei der Prüfung 
und Auswahl geeigneter Übernahmekandidaten, als dies häufig in der Literatur 
angenommen wird. 
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Auf den Eintritt des Nachfolgers in das und den Austritt des Übergebers aus dem 
Familienunternehmen konzentriert sich die Analyse der dritten empirischen 
Studie. Der Transfer von Netzwerkkontakten, die Planung und Umsetzung sowie 
die Rollen der unterschiedlichen Akteure werden in dieser Studie detailliert 
betrachtet. Die Studie untermauert den Befund, dass bereits vorhandene Prozesse 
in Familienunternehmen die Basis für den nachhaltigen Übergabeerfolg schaffen.  
Die Zusammenführung der unterschiedlichen Studien, mit Fokus auf den 
Untersuchungsgegenstand Information bzw. Informationsaustausch, erlaubt eine 
Verortung der Ergebnisse in den Forschungsfeldern Familienunternehmen und 
Unternehmensnachfolge aus der theoretischen Perspektive der Prinzipal-Agenten-
Theorie. Damit zeigt diese Dissertation auf, dass auch in Familienunternehmen 
opportunistische Akteure agieren, jedoch eigenständig Prozesse entwickelt 
werden, mit denen Informationsasymmetrien abgemildert werden können. Diese 
Prozesse werden sowohl im Bereich der Nachfolgerauswahl als auch im Bereich 
des Transfers von Netzwerkkontakten schrittweise durchlaufen. Die 
Langfristigkeit dieser Prozesse eröffnet Familienunternehmen in der internen 
Nachfolge Möglichkeiten, sich auf zukünftige Entwicklungen vorzubereiten.  
Die abschließende Diskussion sowie die abgeleiteten Implikationen für Theorie 
und Praxis betonen, dass eine stärkere Sensibilisierung für den Umgang mit 
Informationsasymmetrien von Nöten ist. Ein strukturierter Prozess des 
Informationsaustauschs auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen (z.B. Nachfolgerauswahl, 
Transfer von Eigentum, Transfer von Netzwerkkontakten) trägt maßgeblich zum 
Gelingen der Unternehmensnachfolge bei. Im Ergebnis verdeutlicht die 
vorliegende Arbeit nachdrücklich, dass die Unternehmensnachfolge als ein 
langfristiger, strategisch durchdachter Prozess gestaltet werden sollte, wenn diese 
dem Familienunternehmen als Chance zur Erneuerung dienen soll. 
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Abstract (in English)  
Succession is a crucial moment in the life cycle of a family business. An effective 
succession requires taking a step-by-step approach, including structured planning, 
selection, and integration of the successor. Family firms behave differently than 
non-family firms due to risk aversity and the mixture of family and business 
logics. The overall purpose of this dissertation is to gain a deeper understanding of 
the role of information exchange in business succession. The succession process is 
examined from different angles, focusing on the broad individual perspectives of 
the predecessor and the successor. 
In family firms, potential successors enter the pool of candidates at birth. Various 
observable criteria are important when making the final selection. Despite the 
long time frame of the succession process, information asymmetries can arise 
because it is not always fully clear if the chosen candidate is willing to succeed 
the incumbent. This variable also influences the choice of selection criteria, which 
differ in nature. For example, existing social capital, which can influence the 
sustainability of succession, can be a selection criterion. An unstructured social 
capital transfer can, for instance, undermine the sustainability of success due to 
the ineffective usage of long-term network contacts. This situation is an example 
of how information asymmetries affect the overall business succession process 
and what types of information are exchanged during the process. 
The empirical studies in this dissertation shed light on the role of information in 
the succession process and the behavior of family business members who deal 
with the information. The empirical results of the first study show that 
information asymmetries in family firms change over time as firms develop their 
own processes to promote information exchange and handle the challenges 
resulting from information asymmetries. In the second empirical study, signaling 
is offered as an explanation. Successors send signals, for example, through 
choosing an education which fits to the family business. This behavior is 
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evaluated as a signal. In family firms, signaling takes place to identify the 
candidate who best fits the firm. This research also shows that family firms 
develop their own processes to identify potential candidates, organize educational 
programs and integrate candidates in a step-by-step approach to ensure sustainable 
success. These two empirical studies highlight the long-term orientation of family 
firms, the opportunity for potential candidates to implement new ideas, and the 
importance of knowledge about successors’ attributes, particularly their risk level 
and innovativeness. These studies show that family firms which develop their own 
processes are more professional than previously thought. They identify and screen 
candidates according to business needs and optimize the process of information 
exchange. The third empirical study focuses specifically on information about 
network contacts. The transfer of social capital during the business succession 
process is analyzed from the perspective of social capital theory. This study shows 
that network contacts are transferred during the succession process, and the 
successor adds personal social capital to the network, including various 
opportunities to use the succession situation to renew the existing network. 
The understanding of business succession as a time for renewal and of succession 
as an entrepreneurial process localizes this dissertation in the fields of family 
business and business succession in family firms from a principal agent 
perspective. Additionally, signaling theory and social capital theory are used to 
analyze how family businesses handle the principal agent situation between the 
incumbent and successor(s). Thus, this dissertation improves understanding of 
business succession from the principal agent perspective and synthesizes research 
and practice to emphasize the importance of every step of succession. A 
discussion of the findings and the implications for research and practice conclude 
this dissertation. This research raises family business owners’ awareness of 
information asymmetries and blind spots among family members. Information 
exchange and clearly structured transfers of knowledge and network contacts offer 
successors scope for decision-making and development, which help family firms 
making business succession a time for renewal instead of a time of struggle.  
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1 Introduction 
“My idea of good company, Mr. Eliot, is the company of clever, well-informed 
people who have a great deal of conversation; that is what I call good 
company.” 
Jane Austen, Persuasion 
The first word of a young child is usually “Mom” or “Dad”.1 Indeed, family 
members are the people we talk to most often, and while growing up we have a 
great deal of conversation. Accordingly, it can be presumed that firms in which 
family members are responsible for the daily business and strategic decisions have 
a good chance of being judged as a good company. In general, these firms in 
which family members have shares and strategic influence are called family 
businesses. Family businesses are the backbone of economies worldwide (Naldi, 
Cennamo, Corbetta, & Gómez-Mejía, 2013). In fact, the German Mittelstand is 
based on family businesses and serves as a role model for other economies. Some 
of these family businesses are market leaders in their niches and have been called 
‘Hidden Champions’ because they drive the economy (Simon, 2009). The 
inherent long-term orientation and the desire to preserve socioemotional wealth 
encourage family firms to introduce processes that enable them to survive in the 
market (Jaskiewicz, Combs, & Rau, 2015).  
A fundamental issue for family business is succession; all family businesses have 
to handle this challenge from time to time. Business succession demands attention 
and resources (Cabrera-Suárez, Saa-Perez, & Garcia-Almeida, 2001). Even at the 
present day, there remains a gap in knowledge as to why family firms fail before, 
during, or after business succession (Mussolino & Calabró, 2014). Many 
investigations on succession have treated it largely as a problem rather than a 
                                                 
1 To simplify matters, the use of the male gender in these regulations applies to both males and 
females. 
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chance for a renewal (Handler, 1994; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2004). 
These findings underline the widespread understanding that succession hinders 
the development of family firms (Handler, 1994; Poza & Daughtery, 2014; Ward, 
1987). Following this, there is a need for research on how family firms can handle 
the succession process, to preserve the family and the firm.  
A good company needs well-informed people. Accordingly, information and the 
exchange of information can be a success factor for family businesses (Handler, 
1994; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Therefore, conversation is one important tool 
for exchanging information between individuals and the fundament for 
information exchange. Information allows planning in a strategic way. It offers 
the possibility of estimating boundaries and enables actors to adapt their own 
behavior. In family business research, succession models exist. These models 
underline the importance of long-term planning for succession (Handler, 1994), 
recommend a nurturing and developmental phase for potential successors (Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2004), and illustrate that in family business succession, there 
is a time between the entry of the successor and the exit of the predecessor when 
both are working together (Nordqvist, Wennberg, Baú & Hellerstedt, 2013). In 
internal succession, it seems clear that family members generally know everything 
about each other, trust in each other, and following this, a smooth succession takes 
place. However, anybody who thinks about stories of their own youth – things 
parents should not know or things we do not want to know about our parents – 
realizes that there are also blind spots in close relationships. Moreover, in every 
parent-child relationship, conflicts exist. There are topics where parents and 
children are not of one mind. Besides personal experience, there is also abundant 
research about conflicts in family firms, which can result from unspoken 
information (Eddlestone & Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns & Eddlestone, 2004; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholz, 2001). 
Research based on agency theory indicates that conflicts and asymmetric 
information can hamper processes in family firms, for example, when parents are 
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overly generous to their children, these children may take advantage of this 
generosity by shirking or free-riding (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Madison, 
Holt, Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016; Schulze et al., 2001). Moreover, the succession 
process can be evaluated as a personnel selection process. There is somebody who 
owns the family firm and searches for the candidate with the best fit to overtake 
the firm. In most cases of family firms, management succession is the first step 
and ownership succession finalizes the whole process (Nordqvist et al., 2013). As 
a result, in the first step, a manager is sought with the potential to also become the 
final successor. There is a time during succession in which the family – 
respectively, the main decision-maker of the family firm – is busy with the 
selection of the candidate before the final decision is taken. This supports the 
argument of an agency relationship during this process in which the predecessor is 
the principal and the successor is the agent. Following this, there could be 
interests that are diametrically opposed, and it is not clear if these interests are 
totally revealed. In addition, in family businesses, there is a pool of candidates, 
and the person who fits best has to be identified and selected. Some studies offer 
initial hints about selection criteria (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 1998; 
Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014), but there is a gap in our knowledge of whether both 
parties are aware of these criteria and how they negotiate the fulfillment of 
expectations. Summarizing these explanations, it is not clear if there are well-
informed people who have a great deal of conversation to facilitate a successful 
succession.  
All these processes happen before the final decision about who will succeed takes 
place. There is a lot of information that has to be exchanged, and there is an 
assumption that both parties are not totally aware of this. During succession, when 
both parties are working together, concrete information has to be exchanged 
through continuous communication. For example, passwords for the safe or 
personnel computers, financial facts, periodical appointments with customers and 
suppliers, and knowledge about important network contacts in general. In the past, 
social capital – the knowledge about network contacts and the ability to handle 
 4 
 
these contacts – was identified as a success factor of family firms (Arregle, Hitt, 
Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Classen, van Gils, Bammens, & Caree, 2012; Gedajlovic, 
Honig, Moore, Payne, & Wright, 2013; Zahra, 2010). Networks have to be built 
so that information can flow. This is possible through a combination of strong and 
weak ties (Granovetter, 1983). Entrepreneurs often function as brokers between 
two networks (Burt, 1999, 2005). Through this function, they have advantages 
because they are able to use information from more than one network and share it 
in the different networks they are part of (Burt, 2005). This also allows them to 
gain a competitive advantage they can use for their business development. Family 
firms in the first generation are founded by entrepreneurs, but also the next 
generations have an entrepreneurial orientation and should be able to work as 
brokers as well (Zellweger, Nason, & Nordqvist, 2012). To enable the successor 
to use this entrepreneurial orientation and his own social capital, a structured 
transfer of network contacts is needed. There is a gap in current knowledge about 
whether the predecessor is aware of the need to exchange information about 
important network contacts or not, and also whether successors are able to 
integrate themselves in the existent network (Nordstrom & Steier, 2015). 
Furthermore, it is not clear if the network contacts are preserved, dropped, or 
expanded. Following this, information about network contacts is one example of 
information that has to be exchanged when the predecessor and successor are 
working together, and also after the final succession decision. 
This dissertation is based on the hypothesis that there is a need to investigate and 
ideally determine the role of information exchange during internal business 
succession. The research gaps mentioned in the introduction should be overcome 
through empirical investigation. This overall research goal is analyzed from the 
general to the specific. 
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1.1 Motivation and Research Goal of this Dissertation 
Although business succession is recognized as an important field for research, 
there remains a major gap in research on factors influencing the outcome and 
process of succession. Recent literature reviews underline the need for research to 
gain deeper insights into the phenomenon of transgenerational success of family 
firms (Baù, Hellerstedt, Norqvist, & Wennberg, 2014). Unfortunately, the current 
state of knowledge does not explain why there are two such strikingly distinct 
outcomes. On the one hand, very successful family firms are making major 
contributions to the strength of economies worldwide. The German Mittelstand is 
a particularly common example of family firms that contributes to a sustainable 
economy (Berghoff, 2006; Block & Spiegel, 2013). On the other hand, there are 
findings about the negative effects of business succession on family firms; it is 
even seen as responsible for the disappearance of lots of individual family firms 
(Handler, 1994).  
Business succession is more a process than a specific point in time (Handler, 
1994), so family firms need to focus on this process over a (long or short) period 
(Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). The identification, selection, and integration of a 
successor demands attention and resources (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Family businesses have to handle both family and 
business matters in a strategic and practical way (Jaskiewicz, Heinrichs, Rau, & 
Reay, 2015). As a result, both organizational and individual factors play important 
roles. Most previous studies attempting to explain succession focused on limited 
planning (Sharma, 2004), increased goal diversity between participating 
generations (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), conflicts (Eddleston, Otondo, & 
Kellermanns, 2008), and limited objectivity in the selection of successors 
(Chrisman et al., 1998; Salvato, Minichilli, & Piccarreta, 2012). However, 
different layers of analysis, the distinction between management and ownership 
succession, and a heterogeneous understanding of family firms led to widely 
divergent results. To gain a deeper understanding, this dissertation follows this 
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line of research to clarify how information exchange influences the family 
business succession process and to identify one crucial success factor, the 
moderating effect and its outcomes.  
To reach the overall aim of investigating the awareness of and handling of 
information exchange during succession, this dissertation focuses on the 
individual-level behavior from an agency perspective.  
To respond to the overall research question, the following secondary goals are 
addressed:  
1. Do information asymmetries exist during family internal 
business succession and which types can be identified? In 
addition, the analysis delves into how and when information 
asymmetries occur during the succession process. 
2. A structured selection process in family firms is needed when 
information asymmetries exist in this context. What kind of 
mechanisms do family firms use to overcome information 
asymmetries concerning the selection of internal candidates?  
3. How does information exchange take place in a concrete field 
of information? Network contacts and the transfer of these are 
analyzed to understand how family firms behave. 
 
In summary, the antecedents of selection, integration, and personal relations need 
to be identified in order to achieve the major research goal, assuming that 
information exchange has a major influence on that. Therefore, three qualitative 
empirical studies have been developed and integrated into this dissertation. 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation can be classified as theory-building research. Every qualitative 
study included in the dissertation uses a positivistic approach through deduction 
of propositions and/or conceptual models based on multiple case studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Neumann, 2000). Each study project within this thesis 
represents a self-contained project with differing research questions in each case. 
Table 1 shows the integrated research projects and outlines the contributions of 
the author to this thesis. 
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Table 1: Integrated studies 
Authorship Research Gap Main Theoretical 
Concepts 
Methodology 
and Sample 
Publication Status Contribution 
Paper 1: Information Asymmetries in Family Business 
Schell, Sabrina; 
Wolff, Sven; 
Moog, Petra 
Information 
Asymmetries in 
Family Business 
Agency Theory Qualitative,  
14 German Case 
Studies 
Submitted to Entrepreneurship Theory 
& Practice (1st round R&R) 
In this paper, I was in charge of 
collecting vast parts of the data, doing 
the literature review, analyzing the 
data, developing the overall model, and 
writing most parts of the paper. 
Paper 2: Successor Selection in Family Firms – A Signaling Game 
Schell, Sabrina; 
Fröhlich, Julia K.;  
Moog, Petra;  
Hack, Andreas 
Internal Selection 
in Family 
Business 
Agency Theory, 
Signaling Theory, 
Business 
Succession 
Qualitative,  
20 German Case 
Studies 
Presented at:  
Konferenz der deutschsprachigen 
Forschungszentren und Institute für 
Familienunternehmen 2015, März 
2015, Friedrichshafen, Germany (Best 
Paper Award) 
 
75. Annual Meeting of the Academy of 
Management Conference (AOM) 
Vancouver, Cananda. 
 
Submitted to Organization Science 
(under review) 
In this paper, I was in charge of 
collecting most of the data, doing the 
literature review, analyzing the data, 
developing the overall model, and 
writing large parts of the paper. 
 
Paper 3: Social Capital Transfer in Family Firms 
Schell, Sabrina; 
Hiepler, Miriam; 
Moog, Petra 
Social Capital 
Transfer during 
Business 
Succession in 
Family Firms 
Business 
Succession, 
Social Capital 
Theory 
Qualitative,  
4 German Case 
Studies 
Presented at: 
Babson College Entrepreneurship 
Research Conference, June 2014, 
London Ontario, Canada. 
 
4. Konferenz deutschsprachiger 
Zentren für Familienunternehmen, 
March 2014, Vienna, Austria. 
 
Working Paper 
In this paper, I was in charge of 
collecting most of the data, doing the 
literature review, analyzing the data, 
developing the overall model, and 
writing most parts of the paper. 
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To accomplish the research goal, this dissertation is organized as follows: the 
introduction is followed by the research goals and motivation as well as a brief 
overview of the relevant research on family firms. To illustrate the contribution of 
the dissertation, in this section, the main theories and constructs of family 
business research relevant to the thesis are described and briefly discussed. 
Chapter 3 and chapter 4 examine the selection of competent successors taking 
agency theory and signaling theory into account to explain these processes in 
family firms. Multiple case studies are used for theory building. Both research 
processes follow the suggestions of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1984). In chapter 
5, several case studies are used to analyze social capital transfer as an obstacle to 
business succession. Due to the intergenerational focus, the findings illustrate the 
results of effective and ineffective succession. Chapter 6 offers a concluding, 
general discussion of the research and implications for both theory and practice. 
Figure 1 depicts the structure of this dissertation outline.  
Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation 
Source: Own diagram. 
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2 A Brief Introduction of Family Firm Research 
This section gives a brief overview of the state-of-the-art theories that are relevant 
and predominantly used in this thesis. On the one hand, these theories underline 
the distinctions between family businesses and non-family businesses. On the 
other hand, they are useful to understand the research implications of this 
dissertation. Therefore, a brief introduction to family business research in general 
is needed. Chapter 2.1 discusses the problem of an overall definition of family 
business and illustrates some models that attempt to describe family firms and fix 
the definition for this dissertation. Furthermore, the research streams of 
stewardship versus agency theory are described to offer an overview of different 
ways of understanding family business behavior in chapter 2.2. Chapter 2.3 
focuses on business succession and offers an overview of common models of the 
business succession process. Social capital, particularly, family social capital is an 
interesting and important topic of family firm research. Thus, the social capital 
theory applied to family businesses is discussed in chapter 2.4. Closing the 
theoretical debate, a final theoretical model and an overview of current research 
on business succession from an agency perspective are given in chapter 2.5. 
2.1 Family Business as a Field of Interest 
Family business research has gained much attention in the last decade (Sharma, 
2004). Family businesses are economically important because they comprise a 
large share of businesses. Family businesses constitute 80–98% of all businesses 
in the world’s free economies and employ 50–75% of the working population 
around the world (Poza & Daughtery, 2014; Klein, 2008). One great goal for 
family firm researchers is to define family business in a general way, for example, 
to attain comparable results and generalizable models (Arregle et al., 2007; 
Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2005; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). It is well 
known that family businesses differ from non-family businesses especially 
because of behavioral distinctions (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012). Thus, 
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researchers in the last decades have been attempting to explain and define family 
businesses. 
The three-circle model of Tagiuri and Davis (1996) offers a systematic theoretical 
approach for understanding family business. This model explains the overlap 
between family, business, and ownership. According to this model, the family as a 
group of individuals connected by bloodlines has its own values, goals, and 
communication styles. The business circle could also be defined as a group of 
individuals connected by responsibilities for management and strategic decisions 
in family firms. The ownership circle can be defined as a group of individuals 
holding shares in the company (Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009). Therefore, most 
studies basically assume that in family business varying sub-systems exist, which 
have to be integrated into one core-system: the family business system 
(Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Due to the 
overlapping memberships in the sub-systems, family members can have three 
simultaneous roles, as relatives, as owners, and as managers (Tagiuri & Davis, 
1996). Following this argument, relatives can have simultaneous obligations to the 
family, to the company, and the shareholders. These multiple obligations might 
cause negative effects like conflicts or positive effects like efficient decision-
making to arise (Madison et al., 2016; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). However, the 
overlapping parts of the model have attracted the most attention in family firm 
research. Specifically, the overlaps of the family and the business system as well 
as the family and management system differentiate family business from non-
family business. The ownership system is influenced by the family system due to 
the dispersion of shares. The family system has an impact on the management 
system because of family members in the management board. As family members 
have their own communication style inside the family and their own family values 
and goals, these specifications have an influence on the other systems as well 
(Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). This influence can be positive, if the communication 
takes place in a structured, continuous, and cooperative way and supports the 
familiness effect.  
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Figure 2: Three-circle model and the overlaps as potential areas of conflict in 
family business 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. adapted from Tagiuri and Davis (1996). 
This influence of the family on the business is often called familiness. Habbershon 
and Williams define familiness as “the unique bundle of resources a particular 
firm has because of the systems interactions between the family, its individual 
members, and the business” (1999, p. 11). Frank, Lueger, Nosé, and Suche 
(2010), who analyzed familiness from a system theoretical point of view, define it 
as a result of the specific regulation of the interplay of different systems in an 
overall context with two different reference points: familiness and enterpriseness. 
From their point of view, it is more than identity, as Zellweger, Eddleston, and 
Kellermanns (2010) proposed. It can be described and reconstructed “as a 
manifest and latent rule system which focuses on the quality of structural coupling 
of family and enterprise and their specific, historically grown contents which are 
the expression of problem-solving and handling crises successfully” (Frank et al., 
2010, p. 128). Thus, familiness is one aspect of attempts to explain the distinction 
between family business and non-family business, especially regarding the 
overlapping systems. 
In addition to familiness, socioemotional wealth (SEW) as an umbrella construct 
has been established in family business research since 2007 (Berrone, Cruz, & 
Gómez-Mejía, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
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Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). The aim of this model was to extend behavioral agency 
theory, which also integrates elements of prospect theory and behavioral theory. 
Gómez-Mejía et al., (2007) tried to find a name for the non-economic utilities 
family members receive from their businesses (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). 
Additionally, there is the assumption included in the SEW concept that family 
members manage their business not to maximize financial returns but to preserve 
or increase the socioemotional endowments they derive from the business 
(Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2014). However, one of the main contributions of SEW research is the FIBER 
dimensions, which stands for: “Family control and influence, Identification of 
family members with the firm, Binding social ties, Emotional attachment of 
family members, and Renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic 
succession” (Berrone et al., 2012, p. 259). The FIBER dimensions possibly 
explain goal-setting processes and transgenerational control, for example.  
The concepts explained so far illustrate the soft side of family business and focus 
on the behavior. To make these concepts tangible and distinguish family 
businesses from non-family businesses, hard facts are also needed. The three 
circles of family businesses (family, business, and ownership) are, for example, 
measured by voting shares, family members in management, or self-evaluation as 
a family firm. One example of a measurement, which is used in two empirical 
studies in this dissertation, is the following definition of a family business: 
Businesses with regard to (1) an overlap between family, business, and ownership 
whereby at least 50% of the business must be owned by one family or several 
families, (2) involvement of one or more family members in management or with 
an influence on strategic decisions and development, and (3) a business 
succession process has already taken place, is taking place, or is at the planning 
stage (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996; Chua et al., 1999). 
Besides the objectification, this definition includes a depiction of the three circles 
through measurable facts, the willingness to pass on the family firm to the next 
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generation (Chua et al., 1999).2 A more complex system than the definition above 
is the F-PEC Scale, which captures various parts of family firms (Astrachan, 
Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). The F-PEC scale 
includes three subscales: power, experience, and culture, all of which illustrate the 
characteristics of family firms and familiness. Within the F-PEC scale, the 
percentage of family members holding shares and management roles is measured 
as well as the overlap of family and business values. Although every family 
business has another distribution of shares and some families try to separate their 
family goals from business goals, all of them could be described as family 
businesses. This knowledge highlights the heterogeneity of family businesses and 
could be an explanation for why it is challenging to find a definition (Sharma, 
Chrisman, & Chua, 1997; Chua et al., 2012). It is problematic that in the last 
decades, the heterogeneity of family business definitions has produced 
inconsistencies and conflicting observations (Chua et al., 2012; Melin & 
Nordqvist, 2007; Steward & Hitt, 2012).  
2.2 Stewardship versus Agency Theory  
Agency theory (Morck & Yeung, 2003; Schulze et al., 2001) and stewardship 
theory (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) are the main theories suitable to explain 
behavior in family firms (Madison et al., 2016) by integrating the views of other 
disciplines such as sociology and psychology (Verbeke & Kano, 2012).  
Originally, agency problems were not expected in family firms because the same 
people undertake ownership and management in most cases, but there are initial 
hints that principal-agent conflicts also exist in family businesses (Chua, 
Chrisman, & Steier, 2003; Gómez-Mejía, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; 
Madison et al., 2016; Schulze et al., 2001). The principal agency theory is based 
on the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who claim that rational actors seek to 
                                                 
2 For more information about succession in family firms, please see Chapter 2.3. 
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maximize their individual utility (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). To 
become principal owners, this means contracting with executives to manage their 
firms for them, which can also be family members who do not have shares. Thus, 
in family businesses, in the case of contracting between family business owners 
and other family members, principal-agent conflicts could also occur (Davis et al., 
1997; Schulze et al., 2001). In addition, the ultimate goal of family business 
owners is to improve company performance, and for this reason, increase the 
value of the ownership stake (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Sieger, Zellweger, & Aquino, 2013), and through this, to 
preserve the SEW (Berrone et al., 2012; Hauck & Prügel, 2015). Thus, as agents 
are also in favor of following self-interested goals, principals and agents will act 
in ways that advance their own interests through this opportunistic and self-
interested behavior (Sieger et al., 2013). The misalignment of interest implies goal 
conflicts and fosters information asymmetries between both parties (Ross, 1973).  
In general, asymmetric information may lead to an adverse selection problem, 
which was first noted by Akerlof (1970). Adverse selection describes a situation 
before contracting and can be illustrated as the situation in which the principal’s 
knowledge about the agent’s ability is limited. In this case, the agent knows his 
own specific ability better and is able to use this information in a self-interested 
way. Further consequences from information asymmetries could be moral hazard, 
which describes a situation after contracting as individuals’ actions cannot be 
observed, and hence, contracted upon (Holmström, 1979). It is a form of 
opportunism arising in agreements in which at least one party relies on the 
behavior of another and information about the behavior is costly (Alchian & 
Woodward, 1988). Reducing agency costs by imposing internal controls to keep 
the agent’s self-serving behavior in check and reducing information asymmetries 
is the overall objective of agency theory (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This is done to protect shareholders’ interests through various governance 
mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997). Procedures that could reduce these information 
asymmetries include monitoring or specific contracting (Holmström, 1979).  
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In family firms, family relations do occur, for example, parent-child relationships 
(Schultze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). In this relationship, parents can be overly 
generous to their children, who may take advantage of this generosity through 
shirking or free-riding (Chrisman et al., 2004; Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 
2008; Madison et al., 2016; Schulze et al., 2001). In addition, moral hazard can be 
observed through the family firm leader’s propensity to refrain from monitoring 
family members’ behavior (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, & Chua, 2010; Madison 
et al., 2016). Moreover, adverse selection can arise through asymmetric altruism 
when family members hire other family members although there are more 
qualified non-family members (Wright & Kellermans, 2011). Summarizing these 
explanations, it can be stated that there are particular theoretical ideas about 
principal-agent behavior in family businesses, but until today there has been no 
focused research on family business succession. The current considerations about 
principal-agent behavior offer initial hints about rising problems during the 
succession process. 
The stewardship theory was developed by researchers to examine situations in 
which executives are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In this case, these actors are called stewards (Davis et 
al., 1997). A steward’s behavior is collective and pro-organizational and 
organizationally centered (Davis et al., 1997). According to this theory, a steward 
protects and maximizes shareholders’ value through firm performance that follows 
when the steward’s utility functions are maximized (Davis et al., 1997). Also, 
stewards have an income to survive but realize the trade-off between personal 
needs and organizational objectives and believe that pro-organizational work, 
collective ends, and personal needs are met (Davis et al., 1997). In contrast to 
principal agency theory, there is a need for governance structures, which facilitate 
and empower executives more to act as stewards than monitoring and controlling 
them (Davis et al., 1997). Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997) summarize the 
main differences between agency theory and stewardship theory: “According to 
agency theory, people are individualistic, utility maximizers. According to 
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stewardship theory, people are collective self-actualizers who achieve utility 
through organizational achievement” (p. 38).  
Intrinsic motivation and identification are considered to facilitate steward behavior 
and are often found in family firms (Carmon, Miller, Raile, & Roers, 2010; Davis 
et al., 1997; Eddlestone & Kidwell, 2012; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). Thus, 
family firms foster trust and commitment among employees and family members 
who are employed in the firm, without or before they obtain shares, and in this 
way, a competitive advantage is created (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010).  
Table 2 shows the differences between principal agency theory and stewardship 
theory.  
Table 2: Comparison between principal agency theory and stewardship 
theory 
  Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Behavior Self-serving Collective serving 
Psychological Mechanisms     
Motivation 
Lower order/economic needs 
(physiological, security, 
economic) 
Higher order needs (growth, 
achievement, self-
actualization) 
  Extrinsic Intrinsic 
Social Comparison Other managers Principal 
Identification Low value commitment High value commitment 
Power Institutional (legitimate, coercive, reward) Personal (expert, referent) 
Situational Mechanisms     
Management Philosophy Control oriented Involvement oriented 
Risk Orientation Control mechanisms Trust 
Timeframe Short term Long term 
Objective Cost control Performance enhancement 
Cultural Differences Individualism Collectivism 
  High power distance Low power distance 
Source: Author’s illustration. adapted from Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997, p. 37). 
However, the question is, How do these theories explain behavior in family 
businesses? Both theories offer explanations for behavior in family firms. The 
principal agency theory in family business research offers the opportunity to 
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understand how and at what cost dysfunctional behaviors may be generated by 
family involvement (Chua, Chrisman, & Steier, 2003). Schulze et al., (2001) 
propose that family relations may make agency conflicts ´more difficult` to 
resolve (Schulze et al., 2001, p. 102, italics in original) because relations between 
principals (family owners) and agents (family-member managers) are based on 
emotions, sentiments, and informal linkages, resulting in less effective monitoring 
of family managers. For example, when successors in family firms gain more 
power over decisions and actions, they are able to use this and show their hidden 
intentions. Agency theory suggests that success stems from the principal hiring the 
most competent and skilled CEO to run the business (Blumentritt, Keyt, & 
Astrachan, 2007; Madison et al., 2016). Up until today, there is ambiguity about 
whether this happens in family firms and how the identification and selection of 
the perfect candidate occurs. To gain a deeper understanding of succession, 
selection, and integration of successors, this process is analyzed through the 
theoretical lenses of principal agency theory in this dissertation. Following this 
theoretical point of view, information is exchanged between a principal and an 
agent. As figure 3 illustrates, the successor acts as an agent and offers information 
to the principal. The predecessor is defined as the principal and also offers 
information to the successor. It can be assumed that both actors evaluate this 
information, and it is a continuous loop until the final decision about what they 
negotiate takes place. 
  
 19 
 
Figure 3: Information exchange between successor and predecessor from an 
agency perspective 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
2.3 Business Succession in Family Businesses 
Business succession is one of the most important processes in the family business 
lifecycle and is a long-term, step-by-step approach (Ahlers, Hack, & Kellermanns, 
2014; Handler, 1994; Churchill & Hatten, 1997). Family firms deal with two kinds 
of goals: business goals and family goals (McCann, Leon-Guerrero, & Haley, 
2001). One of the ultimate goals is to ensure the firm’s survival, especially 
through business succession (Cadieux, 2007; Royer, Simons, Boyd, & Rafferty, 
2008). In the business succession process, the firm deals with the challenge of 
transferring the specific family goals and values to the next generation. At the 
same time, the daily business, including operative work as well as strategic 
decisions for the survival of the company, has to be accomplished. The owner of 
the business needs to decide whether the family firm has to be transferred to a 
family member, an employee, an external person, or a combination of these 
options. As a result, the business succession process starts by thinking about the 
business’s future time after the current owner. Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier 
(2004) formulate two notions to define the success of a succession: first the 
subsequent performance of the firm and ultimate viability of the business; second 
the satisfaction of stakeholders with the business succession process. This 
dissertation follows the ideas of these authors that subsequent performance and the 
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satisfaction of stakeholders are requirements for successful succession. Nordqvist 
et al., (2013) highlight that most business succession studies focus on management 
succession. This is not in line with Le Breton-Miller et al.,’s (2004) study nor this 
dissertation. The business succession process in this study is defined as the full 
transfer of management and ownership.  
The business succession process can be classified into sequential phases (Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Nordqvist et al., 2013; Michel & Kammerlander, 
2015). In the first phase, the focus lies on preparation for the succession. Michel 
and Kammerlander (2015) call it the trigger phase; Norqvist et al., (2013) pre-
succession and in the model of Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier (2004) it is 
called setting of ground rules. During this time, initial ideas for succession come 
up. This could result from the age of the incumbent, career plans of potential 
successors, or a need of the company itself. The rules of the succession game have 
to be communicated early and clearly (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Ward, 1987) 
including the schedule of the succession, the selection of the successor, and the 
path for his development. The decision about whether or not the successor has to 
be a family member is imperative. Currently, family business research assumes 
that family businesses prefer internal successors and nepotism (Rutherford, 
Kuratko, & Holt, 2008; Salvato et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2001). For a successful 
business succession, it is important to have a firm pool of managerial talents and 
to have formulated selection and appraisal criteria (Aronoff, 1998; Le Breton-
Miller et al., 2004). The planning is very important as well, because of context 
factors like the burden of estate-related taxes (Lansberg, 1988).  
Lansberg (1988) elaborated: “Succession planning means making the preparations 
necessary to ensure harmony of the family and the continuity of the enterprise 
through the next generation” (p. 120). In contrast to that elaboration, there are 
many hints that in family business, (strategic) planning often falls short (e.g., 
Barach, Gantisky, Carson, & Doochin, 1988; De Massis, Chua, & Chrisman, 
2008; Gilding, Gregory, & Cosson, 2015), there is a lack of communication 
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between predecessor and successor (Gilding et al., 2015; Michael-Tsabari & 
Weiss, 2015), and selection criteria are not well documented (Chrisman et al., 
1998; Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014).  
Following Le Breton-Miller et al., (2004), the first phase of business succession 
includes many areas of conflict. The model they offer is a conceptual one. The 
results of the study suggest that in the first phase through communication and 
documentation, family businesses prepare themselves for the succession and use 
their time for planning.  
According to Le Breton-Miller et al., (2004) model, the second phase is called 
nurturing and development of the successor. In their understanding, a pool of 
candidates is trained to acquire knowledge, develop capabilities, and achieve 
credibility and legitimacy. Furthermore, a training program for potential 
candidates prepares them for joining the company. During this time, the 
interpersonal relationship between incumbent and potential candidate is expanded 
and could be important for the success of the process.  
In the third phase, the final selection is realized (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; 
Chittor & Das, 2007). The selection criteria should be defined in the first phase. 
The pool of candidates remaining after the training program and other fulfilled 
requirements builds the fundament for a final decision of the best candidate out of 
this pool. During this period, combining the family logic and the business logic is 
very important in order to maintain family harmony (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b).  
The fourth phase includes the transition process as well as the transfer of capital 
(Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). At this stage, management and ownership 
succession is realized. This implies that until the ownership succession is finished, 
the predecessor and other family members who are involved in the selection 
process could change their decision. This also includes the option that they may 
choose another form of succession (e.g., external or exit) (Wassermann, 2003). 
During this phase, the predecessor leaves the company. Meanwhile, the successor 
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phases in as the leader and owner of the family firm. Harvey and Evans (1995) 
revealed that after this management transfer, many conflicts can occur. Thus, the 
installation of the next generation of leaders needs to be confirmed by various 
important stakeholders like key employees, bankers, and suppliers. These network 
contacts have to be involved in the business succession process (Steier, 2001). 
There is a lack of knowledge about handling this process in a successful way 
(Nordqvist et al., 2013). The level of older-generation involvement after 
succession harms a precipitous change in the culture of family business. Cater and 
Justis (2009) offer a model of the changing roles of predecessor and successor, 
and recommend a step-by-step approach. This enables the incumbent to leave the 
family firm in a carefully arranged manner in order to prevent him from holding a 
negative feeling about leaving the firm (Brun de Ponent, Wrosch, & Gagne, 2007; 
Rothwell, 2010; Sharma, Chrisman, Pablo, & Chua, 2001).  
The whole process is embedded in a context. Thus, the model adds various family 
and social context factors (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Nordqvist et al., 2013). 
The family context includes the family influence on the process through family 
dynamics, familiness (Habbershon et al., 2003; Zellweger et al., 2010), and family 
communication systems (Jaffe & Lane, 2004). The social context describes the 
business succession process as a social and family process, which is heavily 
influenced by cultural norms, such as primogeniture and patriarchy (Ainsworth & 
Cox, 2003; Hamilton, 2006; Hollander & Bukowitz, 1990; Sharma & Irving, 
2005). The family owned context itself concentrates on the composition of the 
board of directors, the strategy of the family firm, previous business succession 
experiences, and the organization form of the family business. Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, and Lester (2011) propose that the quest for legitimacy manifests in 
strategies that conform to industry norms; thus, the industry context is also an 
important context factor, which has to be respected during the succession process. 
Furthermore, the relationship between incumbent and successor is included in this 
context factor. This relationship could be affected by commitment (Lansberg & 
Astrachan, 1994; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013; Sharma & Irving, 2005; Wiklund, 
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Nordqvist, Hellerstedt, & Bird, 2013), and through this, also influence the whole 
succession process. Figure 4 illustrates the understanding of the business 
succession process in this dissertation. 
Figure 4: Business succession process model 
 
Source: Author’s illustration adapted from Nordqvist et al., (2013) and Le Breton-
Miller, Miller, & Steier (2004). 
The model shows that many steps have to be fulfilled during the time of 
succession. This includes strategic and operative tasks, and stresses the family and 
the firm through an overload on tasks. Moreover, this period can be seen as an 
entrepreneurial process, which includes chances for renewal and change of the 
company (Nordqvist et al., 2013; Ward, 1997). An entrepreneurial entry of new 
owners and an entrepreneurial exit of old owners could foster the understanding 
that succession is associated with new business opportunities through adding new 
human, social, and/or financial capital and resources (DeTienne, 2010; Nordqvist 
et al., 2013; Wennberg, Wiklund, Hellerstedt, & Nordqvist, 2011). To use the 
opportunity to add new social capital, an understanding of social capital is needed. 
The next chapter offers an overview of social capital theory, which is also used as 
a theoretical framework in chapter 5. 
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2.4 Social Capital Theory 
Social capital theory has recently been used in family business research, for 
example, to explain dynamic capabilities, and following this, competitive 
advantages of family firms because of family (internal) social capital (Arregle et 
al., 2007; Bizri, 2016; Carr, Cole, Ring, & Blettner, 2011; Frank et al., 2010; 
Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008; Sanchez-Famoso, Iturralde, & Maseda 2015; Shi, 
Shepherd, & Schmidts 2015). It explains the importance of interaction and 
exchanging information between individuals in a social network. 
The first definition of social capital was offered by Bourdieu (1985). He defines 
social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (p. 248). Following this early 
definition, many other researchers, mainly sociologists, have dealt with this 
construct and developed it over the decades (Burt, 1980; Coleman, 1988, 1994; 
Granovetter, 1973; Putnam, 1993). This is because distinguishing between the 
market, hierarchical, and social relations is important in understanding and 
elaborating social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). These relations exchange 
different things like goods and services, obedience to authority, spiritual security, 
and favors and gifts. Granovetter (1973) distinguished between strong and weak 
ties measured by “the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy 
(mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services” (p. 1361). The distinction between 
external and internal ties includes a lengthy discussion and many attempts to 
define social capital. The internal “focuses primarily on social capital as a 
resource that inheres in the social network tying a focal actor to other actors. On 
this view, social capital can be the differential success of individuals and firms in 
their competitive rivalry: the actions of individuals and groups can be greatly 
facilitated by their direct and indirect links to other actors in social networks” 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 19). “In contrast to this view of social capital as a 
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resource located in the external linkages of a focal actor, bonding views focus on 
collective actors’ internal characteristics”(Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 21).  
The question of why individuals need social capital can be answered by the fact 
that social capital is a long-lived asset into which one has to invest with the 
expectation of a future return of benefits, for example, business deals and 
innovation creation (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Classen et al., 2012). According to 
Adler and Kwon (2002), “through investment in building their network of external 
relations, both individual and collective actors can augment their social capital 
and thereby gain benefits in the form of superior access to information, power, 
and solidarity; and by investing in the development of their internal relations, 
collective actors can strengthen their collective identity and augment their 
capacity for collective action” (p. 21). Following this, social capital could be used 
for different purposes and can substitute for or complement other resources. 
Nahapiet and Ghosal’s (1998) model, which suggests that social capital includes 
structural (network positions), relational (trust), and a cognitive dimension (shared 
vision), concludes the accomplishments of social capital. As a working definition 
for this dissertation: “Social capital is the sum of the actual and potential 
resources and the goodwill available to individuals embedded within, available 
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may 
be mobilized through that network or groups. Its effects flow from the information, 
influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” Adler and Kwon (2002, 
p. 23), Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998, p. 243), and Lin (2001, p. 3) is used. 
Networks create social capital through the allocation of actors, ties, and 
communication flows. Networks are based on an assumption of the importance of 
relationships among interacting individuals or larger units. The focus is on the 
individual’s view of the network structure environment as providing opportunities 
for or constraints on individual action, and structure (social and economic) is 
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conceptualized as lasting patterns of relations among actors (Wassermann & 
Faust, 1994).  
Social capital in family firms is developed over time and generations and is 
formed by the values and norms of the family (Arregle et al., 2007; Carr et al., 
2011; Frank et al., 2010). For this, it is important to understand that the family 
system is not separate from the organizational system, but works as a unit whose 
interactions result in social capital. Social capital theory involves a closer 
determination of family-firm resources and capabilities as components of 
familiness (Frank et al., 2010). Arregle et al. (2007) distinguish between family 
social capital and family firm organizational social capital. In their understanding, 
family social capital is the social capital developed among family members. The 
dimensions that determine family social capital are stability, interactions, 
interdependence, and closure. The organizational social capital is defined as “a 
resource reflecting the character of social relations within the firm” (Leana & Van 
Buren, 1999, p. 538). Due to the integration of family and business systems 
(Gersick, 1997), family social capital affects how the organizational social capital 
of a family firm is built and often vice versa (Arregle et al., 2007; Sorenson & 
Biermann, 2009). This could be a competitive advantage of a family firm because 
of the close connection between family social capital and organizational social 
capital (Arregle et al., 2007; Carr et al., 2011; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). This 
competitive advantage has to be preserved over generations. Information about 
network contacts, awareness of the importance of networks and social capital, and 
a structured way of integration in networks and transfer of network contacts 
during succession could be a way to preserve social capital in family firms (De 
Freyman, Richomme-Huet, & Paturel, 2006; Dou & Li, 2012). Moreover, 
according to Nordqvist et al. (2013), succession can be a chance for adding new 
social capital by integrating the network of the successor to the network of the 
family firm (Coleman, 1988). Social capital is inseperably linked with the 
individual and is an intangible asset (Luthans, Luthans, & Luthans, 2004). In 
networks, individuals could act as ‘brokers’. According to Burt (1999), opinion 
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brokers carry information across the social boundaries between groups. Following 
this understanding, brokers are ‘network entrepreneurs’. For this, specific social 
capital is needed to enable people to act as a broker. The successor as an 
individual creates his own individual social capital and is able to integrate this 
into the existing social capital of the family and the firm. Due to growing up in a 
family business environment, internal successors can also bring entrepreneurial 
intention with them and act as brokers in networks (Burt, 1980; Zellweger et al., 
2012). Hence, the individual social capital of the predecessor and the successor in 
an internal family business succession can be an important success factor for the 
long-term survival of the family firm. 
This dissertation follows the theoretical lenses of principal agency theory. From 
this point of view, two or more actors have to exchange their information about 
network contacts. Additionally, both of them have their own individual network. 
Moreover, it can be assumed that the predecessor has information about the 
family business network. Therefore, the predecessor is liable to exchange family 
business network information. This information exchange is also a loop, because 
the successor has to show that he receives the information, and moreover, is able 
to evaluate the information and adapt his behavior, for example, to integrate 
himself into the existing network. 
Figure 5: Network related information exchange from an agency perspective 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
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2.5 An Overall Theoretical Model of Business Succession 
from an Agency Theory Perspective 
This chapter tries to combine the theoretical considerations and develop an overall 
theoretical model of business succession from an agency perspective. The 
common understanding of business succession as a long-lasting, step-by-step 
process remains. In this thesis, the focus lies on family internal succession. The 
thesis attempts to integrate the understanding of succession as an entrepreneurial 
process from Nordqvist et al., (2013) into the general business succession model 
of Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier (2004). Following this, there is a 
predecessor who searches for an internal successor, who takes over the firm. 
Moreover, there is the basis assumption that a personnel selection process is 
inherent, until the final decision of who will be the candidate with the perfect fit. 
This is completed by the assumption that a principal (predecessor) and an agent 
(potential successor) act in the business succession process.  
A principal-agent situation occurs due to information asymmetries. Presently, 
there are initial insights that information asymmetries exist in family businesses 
(Madison et al., 2016) but there is no confirmed knowledge of whether 
asymmetries exist in family businesses, and if so, how they appear in detail. In the 
model explained here, it has to be assumed that information asymmetries do exist 
because of the personnel selection situation of successors by the predecessors and 
the possibility that the two parties could have diametrically opposed expectations 
regarding the takeover (i.e., regarding the intention of potential family internal 
successors to succeed in the business). Finally, at the end of the process, the 
selection of one successor has to take place. Therefore, it seems necessary that 
also in family businesses there is an inherent process to reduce information 
asymmetries over time between the parties and allow a final (best) decision. Thus, 
rich and valuable information has to be exchanged between the parties until the 
final selection to ease the problem of information asymmetries. 
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Moreover, after the management’s decision concerning succession in family firms 
as well as during the phase when both actors are working together or managing 
the succession through an active takeover, further information has to be 
exchanged. For example, this information may include financial issues concerning 
assets and liabilities, information on passwords of personnel computers and safes, 
information regarding important employees, and also the names and relationships 
of important customers and suppliers. This information exchange is important for 
the success of the process because it can be crucial for managing the firm. 
Moreover, it underlines that there could also be a principal-agent situation after 
the management selection regarding important information the predecessor 
obtains and the successor would need. 
The overall model in figure 6 offers an overview of the current theoretical 
understanding of the business succession process from a principal agency point of 
view. Furthermore, the model offers a conclusion of different theoretical 
approaches by explaining the succession process and positive outcomes.  
Figure 6: Theoretical model of business succession from an agency 
perspective 
Source: Author’s illustration based on Nordqvist et al., (2013) and Le Breton-
Miller, Miller and Steier (2004). 
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The theoretical model builds the fundament for all following qualitative empirical 
studies in the thesis. The first two qualitative analyses (chapter 3 and chapter 4) 
focus on the first information exchange loop, as illustrated in the model. First, 
there is a need for clarification of whether the actors are aware of the need for an 
information exchange. This is analyzed by focusing on information asymmetries 
and attempting to understand if there are processes in family firms to overcome 
these information asymmetries over time. The first study deals with this issue. The 
second study also focuses on the first loop but from another perspective – it deals 
especially with the selection process of internal candidates. Finally, the third study 
focuses on the second information exchange loop by shedding light on network 
related information. It is assumed that most of the network related information is 
exchanged during the time when the predecessor and successor are working 
together. 
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3 It happens even in the best Families: Information 
Asymmetries and internal Business Succession  
ABSTRACT 
We follow the general extension of agency theory discussion regarding family 
business to gain deeper insights into the underlying information asymmetries in 
family business. Doing so, we observe and analyze in depth 14 case studies 
delivering new insights on information asymmetries occurring in every phase of 
the succession process. We observe and investigate numerous role changes 
between the normal assignment of principals and agents and develop a business 
succession model. Furthermore, we observe a lack of awareness of information 
asymmetries and can identify the first indications of the inherent processes used to 
handle information asymmetries.  
 
Keywords: Business Succession, Information Asymmetries, Family Firms 
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3.1 Introduction 
When you ask yourself whether your parents know everything or should know 
everything you have done in your youth, you come quite quickly to the conclusion 
that even in the relationship between parents and their children, there are some 
secrets. However, we do not mean only secrets about “bad things” we have done 
but also other things in this relationship, such as motivations or intentions for 
things we do and our behavior in the one or the other way. Additionally, parents 
sometimes have the opinion that not everything is destined for the ears of their 
kids. Thus, not everything in this relationship is clearly said to one another, even 
when the intention is to avoid to do harm to the other person. So, why should 
there not be secrets between parents and children when they talk about family 
business succession? The hierarchic relationship, even if it is less distinct, 
between a father and his son, father and his daughter or mother and her children, 
remains. It is even reflected in the wording: the predecessor and the successor. 
Thus, it can be asked, if there is the possibility that the same situation could come 
up in a business succession process. 
Because of the major role of family businesses in economics, there is a large area 
of research on these types of businesses. One of the most important streams in this 
field is business succession, because it is a critical moment in the lifecycle of a 
business (Ward, 1988). Often, the right successor cannot be found or there is no 
potential successor in the family, and ultimately, there is the possibility that the 
succession will fail and the business will die or get sold.  
The literature differentiates between internal and external family business 
succession (Sardeshmukh & Corbett, 2011), and following this idea, there are 
several types of succession models that differentiate between various types of 
succession modes. We will build upon the model of Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & 
Steier (2004), which gives, in our point of view, the best practical advice for the 
succession process and provides an accepted framework (Sharma, 2004). A 
successful succession according to Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier (2004) is 
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fulfilled if the stakeholders are satisfied with the succession. The subsequent 
positive performance of the firm and the viability of the business are also needed.  
In the last few decades, research about succession has concentrated on 
management succession (Nordqvist et al., 2013). In family firms, management 
and ownership are transferred, and both transfers have to be planned and realized. 
We observe formal or informal contracts regarding the handover of the family 
business. There can be different expectations about the succession mode between 
predecessor and successor because there are various possible exit strategies 
(Dehlen, Zellweger, Kammerlander & Halter, 2014). The differing expectations 
about the succession mode have to be matched, and the predecessor and successor 
should agree upon the solution to close the contract. For this purpose, an exchange 
of information between the contract parties has to be realized. There are two kinds 
of information that have to be exchanged: information on the family side and 
information on the business side. Both information exchanges are goal oriented: 
satisfaction in the family and long-term survival in the business field (Jaskiewicz 
et al., 2015b; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004) to generate a contract for the 
succession in general. Thus, we assume that there is one contract based on the 
social interactions and liabilities that addresses the goals of the family members 
(Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano & Mitchel, 2005; Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). For 
example, the expectation of the father, that the son will overtake the family firm, 
is an unwritten contract, which we label as the family contract. In addition to this 
family contract, there is another, probably formal contract addressing the 
succession aspects of management and ownership. We label this contract the 
business contract. Following this understanding of behavior between predecessors 
and successors, it is obvious that there could be many information asymmetries. 
These are information asymmetries in the daily family relationship, but they could 
even be more difficult to overcome in this context of family business compared to 
non-family business because of the tight relationship between predecessor and 
successor. The information asymmetries could even multiply if we consider that 
there are often more-complex constructions in the succession process as a two-
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person relationship, for example when there are more than one predecessor or 
more potential successors or family members being interested in the business. At 
this stage of the research we conclude that information asymmetries during 
succession in family business exist and can be a problem for family and business 
(Schulze et al., 2001). 
This understanding is based on an agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Schulze et al., 2001). Following Jensen & Meckling (1976), an agency 
relationship is a “contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” (p: 308). In 
business succession situations, the predecessor plays the role of a principal, and 
the successor plays the role of an agent. This results from the fact that the 
predecessor has a need to identify the candidate who best fits the family and the 
firm in the position or role of a manager and owner. This is a personnel selection 
situation that occurs before the final business succession contract takes place. In 
this environment, the successor is the person most informed about his or her own 
abilities and motivations. Under the assumption that both parties are utility 
maximizers, there are good reasons why the agent will not always act in the best 
interest of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This agency relationship 
creates information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970, Schulze et al., 2001), making it 
possible for agents to engage in activities that harm the welfare of the current 
owner(s) or potential successors and encourage the agent’s motivation. To 
overcome this negative outcome, agency costs occur. Agency costs are defined as 
the sum of “the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding 
expenditures by the agent and the residual loss” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: p.6). 
Schulze et al., (2001) underline that various conflicts and challenges occur from 
the agency relationship in family firms. 
Currently, only a few studies offer theoretical assumptions of information 
asymmetries and agency costs in family firms (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; 
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Madison et al., 2016). Dehlen and colleagues (2014) elaborate four different types 
of information asymmetries that can occur in family business succession. First, 
the succession candidate lacks information about the ‘quality’ of the transaction 
goods; second, the succession candidate is unaware of the incumbent's intentions 
and planned post-succession behavior. Third, the incumbent has inferior 
information about the successor's abilities. Fourth, the incumbent is unable to 
determine or predict the successor's intentions and post-succession behavior. 
Michel & Kammerlander (2015) stress existing information asymmetries in 
family firms that could be reduced or increased by trusted advisors. They do not 
work out concrete types of information asymmetries, so it could be asked how 
family firms and trusted advisors should reduce information asymmetries if they 
do not know which kind exist. Zellweger & Kammerlander (2015) offer first 
theoretical assumptions about why different governance structures foster agency 
costs in family firms in general but do not offer insights about information 
asymmetries during succession. All of these studies mention general types of 
information asymmetries and give important hints that information asymmetries 
do exist even in family firms. We built our study on these first results, realizing 
that there is a lack of understanding how these information asymmetries occur and 
develop in reality and provide case evidence to give proof for these phenomena. 
We want to contribute to this discussion by delivering examples of information 
asymmetries. Moreover, the mentioned studies focus on potential information 
asymmetries in the pre-contracting phase that means prior to the decision 
regarding the succession mode – the handover of the management and ownerships 
position; however, information asymmetries can also come up in later phases. 
Thus, we want to contribute to this discussion by underlying that there is a need to 
clarify whether there are information asymmetries and what kind of potential 
information asymmetries exist, especially in which phase of the succession 
process. Thus, this paper examines in depth the phenomenon of information 
asymmetries in family internal business succession from different perspectives. 
We will investigate the existence of these information asymmetries, structure 
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them into types and analyze how and when they occur in the process of family 
internal business succession. The overall research question of this study is: Which 
kinds of information asymmetries exist in family firms before, during and after the 
succession process? In answering this question, we contribute to the existing 
literature by providing new insights into information asymmetries in the family 
internal business succession process.  
The first contribution of this paper is a new theoretical view on information 
asymmetries in family internal business succession. This view can help develop 
the research field and lead to a better understanding of problems in family internal 
business succession. Internal successors would be able to search for information 
on their own to reduce information asymmetries that hinder their motivation to 
succeed. By including the social exchange theory and clarifying the different roles 
of actors, implications for researchers and practitioners can be offered. The results 
will influence current research about selection criteria, the business succession 
process and the knowledge-based view of business succession.  
The second contribution of this paper is that it examines the bidirectional form of 
information asymmetries and the process-oriented analyses of them. Through 
gaining deeper insights into the contract between the two parties of predecessor 
and successor, it is possible to determine different areas of conflict during the 
business succession process. The negotiation of the succession mode between 
closely related actors is the basis of this research. In clarifying changes in 
information asymmetries over time, the study can help practitioners identify 
problems related to information asymmetries and help overcome them.  
This paper starts with the theoretical background, that is, the differentiation and 
explanation of information asymmetries and the principal agent theory. We also 
discuss the process of business succession to embed our view within the existing 
literature. Following this, we explain our methods. Afterward, we show results 
from our analysis, illustrate our results with quotations from our interviews and 
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develop an overall model. Finally, we discuss our findings, explain the 
implications for research and practice and end with our conclusions. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier (2004) describe succession as a long-lasting 
process. The predecessor has to set ground rules and perform the first steps of 
planning succession. The development and nurturing of the successor is the time 
when potential successors join the family business and have to fulfill various 
requirements, for example, an internal education program. We call this the pre- 
phase. Commonly, the transfer of shares is a step-by-step approach (Wiklund, et 
al., 2013). Until the final ownership transfer, successors do not have shares or 
have only restricted shares, but they already have some or get step by step large(r) 
management competencies. We label this phase the durante-phase. After the 
selection, the transition starts, the predecessor leaves the family business, and the 
succession is finalized through transferring ownership. The exit of the predecessor 
concludes the time the predecessor and successor worked together in the family 
business. But at the end, the predecessor is responsible for making the final 
decision about the candidate who is the best fit for the family and the firm and to 
whom he will transfer the family business. The ownership and the final decision 
regarding competency lies with the predecessor.  
The model illustrates that succession is a long-term process in which predecessor 
and successor have to address various areas of conflict. Moreover, it shows that a 
personnel selection situation is inherent. The predecessor has to identify the 
candidate who is the best fit for the family and the firm. There are contracting 
situations, which include on the one hand agreements about educational 
development and on the other hand the legal and financial conditions of the 
succession mode (Nordqvist et al., 2013; Wiklund et al., 2013). The succession 
process takes place over several years, during which various agency situations 
may occur (Madison et al., 2016; Schulze et al., 2001; Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 
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2003). Both actors have to align their interests over time, and the development of 
the family business may require adjustments of initial expectations and 
agreements (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). 
Following this, we differentiate between two contracts and focus on the 
management succession. First, there is the family contract among the family 
members. Both actors can ask who wants what from whom. This question is a 
fundament for a contract. There are more than legal contracts (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2001). According to the social exchange theory, psychological contracts also 
exist. Family heads in their double role as family member and predecessor would 
like to have a family member as successor. Expectations about the willingness and 
motivation to succeed are part of the psychological contract. This is connected 
with the role as family head, which also would preserve the economic fundament 
of the subsequent generations through transferring a family firm (DeTienne & 
Chirico, 2013; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013; Naldi et al., 2013). There 
are also first findings that in the case of family business, psychological contracts 
between predecessor and successor are inherent (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; 
Rousseau, 1995). It is assumed that this psychological contract starts with every 
birth of a potential successor. Children would like to have the chance to succeed 
as well as the chance to opt out. Through joining the company with the aim to 
become successor of the firm and starting a structured development and nurturing 
process, the contract between both parties is closed, because one family member 
makes the decision to succeed and fulfills the expectations of the other family 
members. Upon fulfilling the expectation that there is willingness to succeed, the 
after-phase starts. Second, there is the business contract between the predecessor 
and the successor. This contract is a written one that includes legal, financial and 
organizational conditions. We define the starting point of the succession 
contracting phase as this point in time, when the successor decides to join the 
company and obtains a position that enables him to become successor. The point 
in time when the predecessor leaves the management board of the family business 
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upon implementing the successor as the one and only leader of the company is the 
point in time that closes the contracting phase and starts the after-phase. 
Keeping in mind the different phases and the two contracts, we can conclude that 
there is an overlap between the two contracts. The phase between joining the 
company to become the successor of the firm and the day of the final conclusion 
of contract we label as the durante-phase. Both parties could have different 
expectations and different motivational factors that can influence the contracts. In 
the family contract, emotions can blind both parties, and in the business contract, 
business goals can influence decisions (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). As a result, 
during this time, different types of information asymmetries can come up. 
Figure 7: Business succession phase model and contract definition 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Different contracts could imply a principal-agent-situation. In the case of business 
succession, the principal is searching for someone who is willing to overtake the 
business, and the agent is the person who would like to succeed. Thus, there are 
some hints that agency conflicts and agency costs could also occur in family 
businesses (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2001). Asymmetric altruism, 
nepotism and lack of self-control (Bergstrom, 1989; Bernheim & Stark, 1988; 
Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, et al., 2003) could promote shirking and free riding 
in two ways. First, “asymmetric altruism and lack of self-control can together 
make it difficult to enforce the explicit and implicit contracts between family 
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owners and family members working in the business when the latter engage in 
opportunistic behavior” (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009, p. 357). Second, 
altruism can color performance evaluations. The premise that asymmetric altruism 
can have a significant impact on the behavior and performance of family firms is 
already analyzed (e.g., Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns & Chang, 2007; Chua et al., 
2009; Karra, Tracey & Philipps, 2006; Madison et al., 2016; Schulze et al., 2001, 
Schulze et al., 2003). “Although the interests of family owners and managers may 
overlap to a greater extent than the interests of owners and managers in nonfamily 
firms, asymmetric altruism could promote economic agency costs through the 
difficulty in enforcing contracts and biased evaluations of managers’ contributions 
to firm performance” (Chua et al., 2009, p. 357; Schulze et al., 2001). 
The principal agent theory implies the following problems that could negatively 
influence the contracting phase and, as a result, the success of the succession. All 
of these problems derive from information asymmetries. Prior to business 
succession, adverse selection can emerge. Adverse selection results from 
asymmetrically distributed knowledge about potential-successor abilities 
(Akerlof, 1970; Greenwald, 1986).  
The moral hazard and hold-up phenomenon could take place after (ex post) the 
contracting phase. In this study, there is the assumption that after the selection of a 
successor and giving him a management position in the family firm, this 
phenomenon could come up. Moral hazard results from an “asymmetry of 
information among individuals because individual actions cannot be observed and 
hence contracted upon” (Holmström, 1979, p.74). It is a form of opportunism 
arising in agreements in which at least one party relies on the behavior of another 
and information about the behavior is costly (Alchian & Woodward, 1988). 
Procedures that could reduce these information asymmetries include monitoring 
or a specific type of contracting (Holmström, 1979). Both would also be possible 
in the durante-phase of business succession. The holdup phenomenon could 
simply be described as a purely bilateral relationship in which there are no other 
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potential employees for the firm, no alternative jobs for the employee and where 
information is entirely symmetric so that both firm and employee know as much 
as the other (Malcomson, 1997). The agent is able to use the free spaces in 
contracts for his or her own advantage. When successors in family firms have 
more space for decisions and actions, they are able to use this space in a durante-
phase and show their hidden intentions. Schulze et al., (2001) find that family 
relations may make agency conflicts ‘more difficult’ to resolve because relations 
between principals (family owners) and agents (family-member managers) are 
based on emotions, sentiments and informal linkages, resulting in less-effective 
monitoring of family managers (p. 122, italics in original). 
The current state of knowledge about agency relationships in family firms is far 
from perfect. Furthermore, research in the last decade has focused more on agency 
costs than on the causes, the information asymmetry itself (e.g., Cruz, Gómez-
Mejia & Becerra, 2010; Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015). Based on the 
theoretical understanding of information asymmetries in family business, this 
study takes a step backward and defines the following research questions: Which 
kinds of information asymmetries exist in family businesses before, during and 
after the succession process? Do the information asymmetries change over time?  
3.3 Data and Method 
Our general aim is to provide in-depth insights into the information asymmetries 
in family businesses. Because we want to describe the phenomenon in a real-life 
context - information asymmetries during the business succession process - we 
selected the multiple-case study method (Yin, 1984). In our research, we address 
research questions that try to explain how and why a phenomenon takes place 
(Yin, 1984). To answer these questions, we chose an exploratory descriptive 
multiple-case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989). Another reason for using a 
multiple-case study is that it offers the possibility to create a more robust base for 
this explorative approach (Yin, 1984) with an inductive research design.  
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To be part of the case study sample, certain requirements for being a family firm 
had to be fulfilled. According to Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma (1999), we define a 
family business if the following criteria are fulfilled: First, at least 50 % of the 
business must be owned by one or more families. Second, one or more family 
members have to be involved in management or have an influence on strategic 
decisions and development. Third, a business succession process must have 
already taken place, be taking place or be at the planning stage. In addition to the 
criteria we investigated before every interview, every interviewee was asked for 
his or her evaluation of whether the company is a family firm.  
We gathered information through semi-structured interviews. Two of the authors 
interviewed 49 family members in 14 family firms from 2009 to 2014. The 
interviews with the family members yielded 882 1.5-spaced pages of text. The 
interviews took an average of 51 minutes, ranging from 23 to 95 minutes. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests a limited sample to gain deep insights in processes. 
Following this recommendation, in the first step, we chose six case studies with 
21 interviews. In this sample, for every succession stage (planned, started and 
completed), two cases should be included. During the process of crafting 
instruments and protocols and entering the field, further questions came up 
regarding, e.g., firm size and age of the successor. For this reason, we gathered 
eight more case studies to address these open questions. This is in line with 
Eisenhardt (1989) because overlapping data analysis with data collection allows 
adjustments during the data collection process. To gain deep insights and to be 
able to compare the different statements, we concentrate on interview questions 
related to selection criteria, time frame of the selection process, the pool of 
candidates, external education and training prior to the business succession 
process. We were able to talk with at least two persons from every family 
business (predecessor and successor), but in most cases, we also talked to the 
spouse of the predecessor, other potential candidates or core employees. 
Therefore, we are able to consider several views in the selection process. The final 
sample of firms is shown in table 3. 
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Table 3: Overview case studies 
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In line with Eisenhardt´s (1989) eight-step process, we iteratively analyzed the 
qualitative data, following the theoretical and empirical evidence of principal 
agent theory. The authors coded and analyzed the data in the following way: First, 
we summarized the findings of the data-collection process through detailed case 
descriptions. Through the orientation to the theoretical model, we created an 
initial coding scheme for the higher-order constructs. The additional subcategories 
were built by open coding because of the specific situations in different family 
firms and the specific characteristic of the information asymmetries. To show how 
the coding of primary to secondary codes and, finally, to categories progressed, 
we used a format by Gioia, Corley & Hamilton (2013). Figure 8 illustrates the 
coding for the pre-phase. We used the MAXQDA and Excel computer programs 
to organize our data and code interviews. A subsequent cross-case analysis 
enabled us to establish overall categories as a database for developing 
propositions. After data reduction and data contextualization, we were also able to 
distinguish between deductive and inductive generated information. After 
gathering the independent perspectives of the individual coders, we discussed any 
remaining discrepancies with the third author until consensus was reached. 
Arranging the categories chronologically in connection with the theoretical model 
enabled us to develop an information asymmetry model for family firms. We 
presented the preliminary results to experts and interviewees and used their 
feedback (Flick, 2014). 
3.4 Analysis and Results 
The iterative process of data analysis, literature review and writing resulted in 
propositions and an overall model that explains information asymmetries in 
family businesses. Following the theoretical understanding of two contracts 
during the business succession process, we describe our findings chronologically, 
from the phase before integrating the potential successor into the firm until the 
departure of the predecessor. In this section, we illustrate every phase of the 
process and display the results from our case analysis with quotes from our 
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interviews. To reduce complexity in the first step, we focus on the following 
question: Are there information asymmetries or not? The analyzed categories in 
the phases are sorted in descending order to illustrate the number of cases in 
which these information asymmetries occurred and the frequency of citations in 
each category. Furthermore, after analyzing the existence of information 
asymmetries, we asked what kinds of information asymmetries were we able to 
identify and what happens with these information asymmetries over time. Thus, in 
the next sections we present our findings regarding information symmetries at the 
different stages of succession. 
3.4.1 Information Asymmetries in the pre-Phase of Business Succession 
For the pre-phase of succession, we separated our coding into six categories of 
information asymmetries. To analyze the pre-phase of business succession, we 
had material from six cases, with a total of 113 codings. The data structure for the 
pre-phase is illustrated in figure 8. The first category, legal/financial succession, 
combines the information asymmetries between predecessor and successor 
regarding the design of management transfer, financial succession and the pension 
plans of the predecessor. The second category contains the educational 
requirements the predecessor expects from the successor. For example we found 
indications that educational requirements are often not known by the successor.  
12.pre: Uh, I would say so, the education was a necessity. 
12.int_suc: Yes. I do not know if I would have said: "I do not want to 
study." Whether he would have said: "Yes, without studying, you can 
forget that." 
In some cases, it is instead clear that these requirements would not be fulfilled by 
the successor. The possible resulting conflicts can be traced back to these basic 
information asymmetries. Additionally, we can observe that in most cases, 
predecessors do not require hard proof of the successor’s education. Thus, 
successors do not have to show their reports and certificates.  
 46 
 
The following category (succession decision) combines the information 
asymmetries regarding the decision of who will succeed, alternative plans for the 
succession that neither party to the negotiation knows and other related 
asymmetries. In the fourth category (finance), we found information asymmetries 
about the financial situation of the enterprise. In the following example, the 
predecessor did not know how he held back investments before succession, or he 
did not want to realize it. However, this is not the point. The interesting 
phenomenon is that the successor explicitly mentioned that they had the 
opportunity to obtain this information before the succession by “going with open 
eyes through the company”, but they did not do so. 
When it was not really clear that your son would take over the company, 
were some investments restrained? 
11.pre: No. I say sometimes, like when I talk to a farmer: “Why are you 
doing this, because you’ve got no successor?” “I just go on doing so,” he 
says. You cannot simply stop when the engine is running. You have to 
continue on in your current direction. 
11.suc: No, I’m not blind. You only have to open your eyes and go once 
through the company. Then you’ll know where investments have been held 
back and where not. 
Other asymmetries in this category show that the successor often does not know 
the company’s value, its financial situation or its strategy. These are key 
information about the company that are known by the predecessor and should be 
important for a potential successor in making his succession decision. The fifth 
category (teamwork) includes information asymmetries on the expected 
cooperation between the predecessor and the successor while they work together 
until the exit of the predecessor, such as the kind of cooperation and the decision 
making process. The last category consists of asymmetries about the expected 
duration of succession. Figure 8 provides a detailed overview of the structure of 
the data in the pre-phase. 
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Figure 8: Data structure 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
During the analyses, we observed that the information asymmetries do not solely 
occur in the classical manner of the principal-agent theory. According to the 
classical theory, the predecessor should be the principal and the successor should 
be the agent, with the known problem of limited information about the successor. 
Instead, we found that these roles can switch between predecessor and successor. 
We had to recognize that it is not just the successor holding back information by 
not appropriately communicating with the predecessor. More often, the 
predecessor does not detail all of his plans, thoughts and appropriate information 
to the successor. The successor is also in the situation that he or she needs to 
know as much as possible from the predecessor about the enterprise because 
successors will take on financial burdens and liabilities. In figure 9, the categories 
are sorted by their cross-case frequency in a descending order with their observed 
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direction of information asymmetries. In most cases, the lack of information goes 
from the predecessor to the successor, and in some categories, the information 
asymmetries occur in both directions. 
For example, in the first and most outstanding category, legal/financial 
succession, it can be observed that in most cases, the potential successor does not 
have all of the necessary information. On the one hand, many successors do not 
know enough about their future role in the enterprise. For example, they may not 
have a plan for how the management shares will be divided or they may not know 
at which stage the predecessor’s planning is or how their siblings will be involved. 
The following statement is characteristic of these problems.  
Will you then - in the case of management succession or during the 
succession process - be in an employment relationship or will you get 
shares of the enterprise?  
2.suc: I don’t know. I have no idea. 
On the other hand, many successors do not know how the ownership will finally 
be transferred, whether it will be bequeathed or given away or if they will have to 
pay for it, as in the following example: 
Will your parents at first keep shares or transfer them all?  
1.suc: It is difficult to tell for me. Maybe they will keep a few shares, but 
maybe they will transfer 100% to us. I don’t know yet. 
Another major problem is that the successor often does not know enough about 
the pension plans of the predecessor even though the pension can be a critical 
problem in the succession process because it can weigh heavily on the company’s 
or the successor’s financial situation and determine the financial succession. It can 
be assumed that the predecessor, when he makes considerations for his 
succession, already has a plan for his pension. A clear arrangement is lacking 
between the two parties. 
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Do you know how your parent’s retirement is financed? 
3.suc: The retirement of my parents? Yes, by me I guess. 
Summarizing the current findings, it could be proposed that there are information 
asymmetries regarding the financial situation and the consequences of this 
situation for further development of the company as well as the family situation. 
The complexity of the category succession decision with bidirectional information 
asymmetries illustrates the different conflicts that can come up. There are 
different information asymmetries that have many interdependencies. Close to the 
unknown expectations of educational requirements, the predecessor often does 
not know if and why potential candidates are willing to succeed. The normal case 
instead is that the predecessor decides who will succeed without concrete 
information about the factors of motivation. Additionally, the potential candidates 
are sometimes unsure if and why they will be chosen. If they have the feeling of 
high personal or organizational commitment, they are unsure whether they are in a 
situation to say that they are unwilling to succeed. In these cases, they do not 
communicate their real intention. All of these information asymmetries take place 
during the time of selection. In addition to internal family information 
asymmetries, the situation can become more complicated because of the 
possibility that, next to the internal pool of candidates, external options may be 
seen by the predecessor but not the successor. Among the asymmetries in this 
category is that successors often do not know that various exit strategies can be 
envisioned by the predecessor, and some have no clue about emergency plans 
when, for example, the succession has to occur suddenly or the intended successor 
fails.  
Predecessors and successors have their own expectations about teamwork, and 
here, bidirectional information asymmetries can be also observed. Some 
predecessors think the successor wants them to stay out, but they do not know 
what the successor’s opinion is. 
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Can you imagine which expectations your successor could provide 
specifically to you? 
3.pre.: Perhaps, that we should not interfere here in everything.  
Another case shows from the third person view a lack of communication between 
the two parties about their cooperation in this transition phase. 
7.pot.suc.: I would say my father thinks he has released quite a lot. My 
brother thinks, “Oh God, he has not yet released at all,” and I think they 
are meeting at the moment on a good middle way. I think they don’t really 
know the opinion of each other. 
In other cases, the successor does not know who will make the operative and 
strategic decisions for the company, or the successor wants more decisive power. 
Moreover, in the case of the duration of the succession, bidirectional information 
asymmetries can again be observed because both parties have their own ideas of 
this duration. The emerging problem seems to be a lack of communication about 
these plans. 
1.int.suc: For the introductory training, at least one year; for the whole 
succession, at least two years. 
Has there been any negotiations about it? 
1.int_suc_1: No. 
In most cases, both parties have an idea about the timeframe, but their ideas are 
not the same. 
9.pre.: (…) for me, the most important thing is: “learning by doing”. 
Because of that, the early succession, you need to grow organically. 
9.suc.: As we practically started this transfer process, I have to honestly 
say now, it was not already clear to me that this will take such a long time 
and how complex it is in the proper sense, so this was actually not so clear 
to me. 
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Figure 9: Information asymmetries in the pre-phase of succession 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
In addition to the categories we illustrated above, we found hints of information 
asymmetries according to changes in the company, knowledge transfer, networks 
and commitment. However, the database was too small to build up categories for 
these findings. We can propose that prior to business succession, questions about 
structural processes and selection criteria are greatly affected by information 
asymmetries. 
3.4.2 Information Asymmetries in the durante-Phase of Business 
Succession. 
The overlap between the two contracts we defined in the theoretical section of this 
study results in a durante-phase. This phase is the time between joining the 
company to become the successor of the firm and the day of the final conclusion 
of the contract. During this time, different types of information asymmetries may 
come up. For analyzing the durante-phase of business succession, we had material 
from six cases and a total of 119 codings. In addition to the categories mentioned 
in the pre-phase of succession, other categories came up. As in the section on the 
phase before the first contract, we ordered the types of information asymmetries 
in figure 10 in the previously mentioned way to identify the most important 
asymmetries.  
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There are new identified information asymmetries about future-oriented planning 
requiring strategic decisions in the enterprise. In this category (changes in the 
enterprise), we observe that with more leeway in decision making, responsibility 
and the outlook of becoming the successor, successors start to think about changes 
in the organization, product portfolio or strategy. Additionally, the leadership 
style is a very important change. The dimensions of differences in decision-
making and leadership styles are identified as information asymmetries. In some 
cases, the successors communicate openly that they will strategically delay some 
changes until they gain more ownership or the predecessor has left the company. 
The successor knows that the decision that he plans to make is not the same 
decision that the predecessor would. In addition to the view of the successor, the 
predecessor does not communicate his expectations of important changes needed 
to stay innovative. As a result, the successor is unable to react to these 
expectations, which could provoke a conflict. 
The second new category we label knowledge transfer. Both parties are sensitized 
to the fact that knowledge has to be transferred. However, some asymmetries 
could be identified in the durante-phase as well. On the one hand, the expectation 
of the predecessor regarding the level of knowledge transfer does not coincide 
with the level of knowledge the successor has. We could observe that in most 
cases, special explicit knowledge is transferred, but general implicit knowledge - 
for example, names of network contacts of the pass or code words for personal 
computers and other important IT or bank accounts - are not transferred. On the 
other hand, the expectations about knowledge transfer processes are not the same. 
Most of the time, they are close to the thinking about what kind of knowledge is 
transferred. This limited knowledge transfer results in some of the previously 
mentioned information asymmetries, such as legal/financial decisions. 
Additionally, in the categories that come up in the duration phase of succession, 
various directions and influencing factors of different types of information 
asymmetries arise. These are visualized in figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Information asymmetries in the durante-phase of succession 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
We identified a change in importance of information asymmetries. Whereas in the 
pre-phase of business succession, legal and financial succession planning is 
identified as the most important, in the durante-phase, the expectation of 
teamwork becomes the most important. In Case 9, the perceptions about the roles 
of actors are extremely different. In a situation where both actors told the 
interviewers that they are working together and are both responsible for important 
decisions, the predecessor stated:  
9.pre.: Yes, I am able to outstrip the company. For real, I do not have any 
decision-making authority in quotation marks. 
At the same time, the successor stated:  
9.suc.: Sometimes he takes a back seat, but sometimes he comes to the 
front and decides on his own, like ordering important engines. He does it 
on his own account, without asking me for my opinion. 
Other characteristics of teamwork information asymmetries are the influence of 
the predecessor in general and the different types of leadership. As the 
predecessor starts to transfer management power, he starts to lose his own. As a 
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result, conflicts come up that are often the result of different kinds of information, 
which we can evaluate as information asymmetries. The style and frequency of 
communication are other factors influencing this type of information asymmetry. 
Often, there are misconceptions because of different styles of communication and 
a different understanding of the information the other person has or needs. 
Therefore, we evaluate these information asymmetries as one, and it is influenced 
or produced by both actors.  
Information asymmetries about the financial situation are more often identified in 
the durante-phase than in the pre-phase. It can be observed that successors may 
not know the key performance indices of company, the company’s value or the 
concrete debt-to-equity ratio. The predecessors are, in most cases, sure that the 
successors are “informed enough” about important financial influencing factors. 
In this type of information asymmetry, it is clear that the predecessor is 
responsible for knowledge sharing. The successor could not obtain important 
information without the support of the predecessor. Thus, the direction of 
information asymmetry is from predecessor to successor. 
14.suc: We were quite shocked at the beginning because the enterprise 
was financially poorly guided. (…) So, we first had to clean up quite 
strongly. (…) When we had a little insight, we also considered whether it 
is the correct decision, because the financial side was very much in 
disorder. So, we had to take on a lot of burdens. 
The information asymmetry, which is about the succession decision, is in same 
order as the pre-phase. Also, the characteristics are not really different. Only the 
possible situation where the family firm could be sold, although one or two 
potential candidates are identified and integrated in the company, could be 
underlined.  
8.pre: “I would try to sell the company, so that it could be developed by 
using synergies. (…) I would also decide this against the volition of my 
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children. But I do not believe that they would be against this decision, 
because they are realistic enough to see this situation like myself.”  
An interesting finding is that the type and duration of teamwork have to be 
analyzed independently. Sometimes, predecessors do not disclose their plans 
about when they will finally exit the family firm and transfer full management 
competence and ownership shares to the potential candidates. In this part of the 
analysis, it is interesting that the predecessor often only gives vague information 
about his plans. Successors have plans in mind that include the final exit of the 
predecessor, but in most cases, these plans do not overlap with the plans of the 
predecessors. The wishes or expectations of successors that the predecessor 
should leave the company are unknown in most of the cases because of the need 
for more leeway in decision making. Also, the motivations of both parties, which 
are linked to an expanded or limited time frame of succession, are shrouded under 
silence. We could also state this finding in the section below, but in the phase of 
working together and impending end of teamwork in management, the duration of 
teamwork becomes more important. In five of six cases, we can identify 
information asymmetries of this kind.  
Close to this finding is the category we labeled legal/financial succession. The 
most important category in the pre-phase is not that important in the durante-
phase. We could observe that some parts of information asymmetries are already 
reduced at this point in time. The type of ownership transfer is, in most cases, 
more often discussed, and sometimes the first parts of shares have already been 
transferred. The important information asymmetry during this phase is the final 
point in time of full ownership transfer as well as the retirement arrangement of 
their parents. Summarizing the current findings, we could propose that there are 
different kinds of information asymmetries in family businesses in the durante-
phase of business succession. In addition to the above mentioned issues, we can 
identify conflicts and divergent expectations on education and engagement as well 
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as unknown network contacts but with less importance or less cases, so we do not 
put them into the framing in this stage.  
3.4.3 Information Asymmetries in the after-Phase of Business 
Succession 
In the after-phase of business succession, we could only identify two cases that 
complied with the requirements. During the analysis of these two cases, we found 
that both actors, retrospectively as well as in the current situation, do not realize 
information asymmetries and are unable to identify them. One additional category 
was discovered: differing views. This category includes information asymmetries 
about the meaning of the family firm for the individuals, the family and the firm. 
For example, the family firm is evaluated as the life work of the predecessor by 
the successor, but the predecessor him- or herself evaluates it in another way.  
12.suc: Of course it is, so to speak, his lifework. 
12.pre: I would not say, “It was my lifework.” It was just the intention to 
work longer. 
According to the categories we observed in the phases before, there are hints that 
the successor obtained financial information after the predecessor left the 
company. Thus, during the transfer of full management competence and the first 
steps of ownership transfer, the successor did not know the financial situation at 
all.  
11.suc: Many financial burdens of which I knew nothing. 
The successor calls it financial burden because he has to handle the following 
results of this information asymmetry. He overtakes the business with 
expectations that do not correspond to the real situation of the family firm. The 
financial situation was not as good as he had expected, so restructuring steps were 
needed.  
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We have to underline that our analysis shows that because of social expectancy as 
well as cognitive complexity reduction, the interviewees were unable to mention 
and evaluate information asymmetries. Because the predecessor had already left 
the company, a comparison of both statements in many parts was hard to get or 
not possible.  
Summarizing the current findings, we are able to propose that there exist less but 
still some information asymmetries. On the one hand, both parties are unable to 
identify and evaluate them, and on the other hand, we are able to propose that in 
the cases we were able to observe, the long time frame of succession allows them 
to reduce information asymmetries.  
3.4.4 Information Asymmetries in Family internal Business Succession - 
an overall Model 
Concluding the findings of our analysis, figure 11 summarizes our results in an 
overall model. Our theoretical model at the beginning of the paper, including the 
two different contracts in family business, remains. The data analysis also shows 
that there are two different contracts and divergent expectations of both actors. 
The contracts could be observed in different intensities, but in every case, there 
are hints of both. We found that information asymmetries exist in family internal 
business succession. It can be shown that these information asymmetries can be 
assigned to thematic categories, fit into the model of family business succession 
and ordered by their importance through their frequency of mentions. 
Furthermore, we show that information asymmetries exist during the entire period 
of succession. Moreover, information asymmetries increase over time and 
decrease after the durante-phase. Additionally, it can be shown that the 
importance of the thematic kinds of information asymmetries changes between the 
phases. Thus, we can show that in family firms, there are dynamics as well as 
processes that address information asymmetries. This study offers the first 
indications that family firms have their own processes for reducing information 
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asymmetries at all stages of the succession process. We also offer deeper insights 
into the nurturing phase. The theoretical model illustrates a structured step-by-step 
planned management advancement. Of course, in our case studies, it is more or 
less a step-by-step approach, but there is a process. Successors have to fulfill 
requirements and, through them, obtain more free space for decision making over 
time.  
Figure 11: Overall model of information asymmetries in the family internal 
business succession 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
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3.5 Discussion 
Business succession is a major topic in research due to its critical role in the 
lifecycle of an enterprise. There are many problems associated with succession, 
and the aim of this study was to gain a better understanding of these problems, 
their reasons and the whole process of family internal business succession 
focusing on information asymmetries at different stages of the process and in 
different areas – family and business. Thus, the emerging question was which 
kinds of information asymmetries exist in family business internal succession. 
Previous research suggests that there are information asymmetries in family 
business and that, following this, agency costs can occur (Zellweger & 
Kammerlander, 2015). However, it remained unclear what kinds of information 
asymmetries in family firms exist and what happens during the succession 
process. Following this, our study offers several contributions: 
First, existing studies show information asymmetries about exit strategies (Dehlen 
et al., 2014), but information asymmetries inside successful internal succession 
remained unstudied. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first 
empirical study that looks for concrete information asymmetries in internal 
business succession. Furthermore, the study sheds light on the kinds of 
information asymmetries, the roles of different actors and, finally, the changes 
over time. This study supports the assumptions of former studies as well as 
conceptual considerations, that principal agent behavior in family firms exists 
(Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007; Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003; 
Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015). The results match the first suggestions in the 
literature that agency conflicts and agency costs could occur in family businesses 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001), and it reinforces the view that asymmetric altruism, 
nepotism and lack of self-control exist (Bergstrom 1989; Bernheim & Stark, 1988; 
Schulze et al., 2001). However, our findings show that there are much more and 
thematically broader information asymmetries than explained by the existing 
theories. Moreover, we found bidirectional information asymmetries in every 
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phase of succession. These bidirectional information asymmetries are in line with 
the theoretical assumptions of Zellweger & Kammerlander (2015). However, 
governance structures that overcome these information asymmetries, during 
succession but also in general, can only be implemented when it is clear what kind 
of information asymmetries exist in family firms. It is important to conduct 
research about the reduction of agency behavior, for example, through trusted 
advisors (Michel & Kammerlander, 2015), or the reduction of agency costs 
(Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015) but before we have to know more about the 
information asymmetries in family internal business succession. 
Our second contribution to the literature is the development of a business 
succession contracting model. In our study, we propose that two different 
contracts are inherent in family internal business succession: the family contract 
and the business contract. Based on social exchange theory and legal and financial 
knowledge about business succession, we developed a conceptual model 
(Cropanzano & Mitchel, 2005; Handler, 1994; Nordqvist et al., 2013). However, 
the empirical investigation also underlines the existence of both contracts. Parts of 
the built categories are in the business context, and others are in the family 
context. Beyond the common belief that family firms follow a family first 
approach (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b; Schulze et al., 2003), we can show that 
information asymmetries exist in both, the family contract and the business 
contract and either are able to hinder a successful succession.  
The third contribution is linked to the change in information asymmetries over 
time. Furthermore, the existing models of family internal business succession 
already imply mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries. The model of Le-
Breton-Miller and colleagues (2004) structures the processes and explicitly 
mentions mechanisms to reduce the information asymmetries we found in our 
study. For example, it mentions early planning and communication, a structured 
analysis and development of the successor’s abilities and training programs or 
apprenticeship with explicit and tacit knowledge and social capital transfer (Le-
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Breton-Miller et al., 2004), all of which can reduce some information 
asymmetries. We are able to identify several information asymmetries in family 
business and can show that these information asymmetries increase and decrease 
over time. This offers the first indications of inherent internal processes in family 
firms, which may aid the handling of information asymmetries. First measures to 
reduce the information asymmetries could be observed in analysis as well. 
Particularly in the transition phase, many people said that a long period of 
collaboration between successor and predecessor helps them reduce information 
asymmetries. In another case, the successor mentioned that he had the problem of 
obtaining all information from his father, and he decided to make some kind of 
trade with his father. He taught his father how to work with the PC and has in 
return received know-how and information about the firm. Additionally, the 
information asymmetries, which still exist after the pre-phase, and in the durante-
phase, offer some interesting hints for a general understanding of family business 
succession. The expectation about teamwork during the durante-phase is 
important in the pre-phase, but it is the most important in the durante-phase. 
These information asymmetries are particularly linked to teamwork at the time 
when the predecessor starts leaving the family firm, but also the time after the 
final exit. These information asymmetries shed light on the behavior of 
predecessors who maintain a hold on the family business. Furthermore, finance is 
the only information asymmetry that exists in every phase. This results from the 
long-lasting process and the step-by-step approach of transferring shares and 
information that come up after succession and is realized by the successor in the 
after-phase. This also offers hints for former information asymmetries that are not 
realized. 
The fourth contribution is about the awareness of information asymmetries in 
family firms. In most of the cases, the family members are unaware of the 
existence of information asymmetries. Following this, they are also unaware of 
the consequences of information asymmetries. For example, a consequence could 
be that there is no conclusion to the contract if there is too much of an information 
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asymmetry in the pre-phase. Another possibility is that because of a too 
significant information asymmetry, i.e., about the financial situation in the family 
firm, the succession fails. The successor is unable to overcome financial 
challenges and preserves the family and firm because of the missing information. 
Following this, our study contributes to the initial ideas of governance structures 
or the inclusion of trusted advisors to overcome or balance information 
asymmetries. 
Fifth, we contribute to the literature through a renewal of understanding of 
principal agent roles in family business succession. Usually, the predecessor is 
seen as the principal and the successor as the agent. This results from the final 
decision-making competence of the predecessor about the personal selection and 
the power of decision making because of holding shares over a long time. 
However, we investigate numerous role changes. In our study, more often, the 
successor is in the role of the principal, and the predecessor is the agent. One 
explanation of this phenomenon could be the high dependence of an internal 
succession for preserving the socioemotional wealth of the family (Berrone et al., 
2012). Furthermore, in a limited pool of internal candidates, the predecessor is 
unable to choose whether the selection criterion is to be a family member 
(Chrisman et al., 1998). Following this, the dependence is imbalanced and 
changes the roles. The results from this power imbalance and the resulting 
information asymmetries are not part of this study and remain for further research. 
3.6 Conclusion and Outlook  
Our study comes with limitations that offer opportunities for further research. 
First, we did not have the possibility to analyze interviews regarding failed 
successions, which could be very profitable for the research of information 
asymmetries in the succession process. However, it is almost impossible to get 
both parties of a failed succession to participate in an interview about their 
conflicts. The second limitation is that we found that repeated interviews in every 
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phase of the succession could be better for the analysis of the information 
asymmetries because people undervalue the asymmetries, conflicts, and problems 
in retrospect. For a deeper understanding and assignment of the types and 
consequences of information asymmetries, interviews with a deeper and closer 
relationship between the interview partners and with repeating interviews before, 
during, and after the succession would be needed. Thus, a qualitative (or 
quantitative) panel study is recommended for the future. Furthermore, longitudinal 
studies, including observations, can offer more hints about the strategies of family 
firms in overcoming information asymmetries. Moreover, opportunistic behavior 
and the results of such behavior could be analyzed more thoroughly. The 
awareness of information asymmetries in family internal business succession also 
enables a better understanding of the processes and difficulties that can occur. 
This can be helpful for predecessors and successors as well as for practitioners and 
consultants in this field.  
To date, the principal agency theory has been under-represented in family internal 
succession research. We have shown that this theory can help explain problems, 
conflicts, and perhaps failed successions in this context. In the next step, an 
attempt should be made to more precisely typecast information asymmetries 
according to the classical types of the principal agency theory. Examples for the 
assignment of these themes were found in the interviews, such as in the case of the 
duration of cooperation between successor and predecessor. The information 
asymmetries in this category can be classified as a hidden characteristic due to the 
successor’s unawareness of this duration, or they can be classified as a hidden 
intention because of a planned behavior of the predecessor or successor, or as 
hidden information from one or both. According to the principal agency theory, in 
the next step, the consequences of these types of information asymmetries, such as 
‘adverse selection’, ‘moral hazard’, and ‘hold-up’, have to be identified. 
Identifying consequences and evaluating them in a scheme that is related to the 
theory was not possible. Nevertheless, some mentions of conflicts between 
predecessor and successor were found, and a few of them can also be connected 
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with information asymmetries in the later stages of the succession process. In line 
with this, we found many possible information asymmetries in the interviews, 
especially in cases when the successor underestimates the financial obligations of 
the enterprise, which can be described as a hidden characteristic of the enterprise 
and, consequently, as an adverse selection – regarding the takeover of the business 
in worse conditions than expected. In other cases, the (potential) successor intends 
to undertake measures and changes in the family business that the predecessor 
would never appreciate (under any circumstances) – this could be interpreted as a 
hidden intention that will lead to moral hazard. This example shows that we would 
need more detailed information from the interviewees regarding their intentions 
and motivations for a closer assignment of these classical types of information 
asymmetries.  
In further research, the identification and evaluation of the consequences of these 
information asymmetries could provide deeper insights into business succession 
processes and consequences. Finally, the research about the mechanisms to reduce 
information asymmetries in this framing should be analyzed based on the now 
better-known information asymmetries. 
To conclude, our study shows that information asymmetries in family internal 
successions do exist and that different types at different stages in the process can 
be observed. The identified information asymmetries vary thematically and in 
their respective frequencies between the phases of succession. Our findings 
provide a new perspective, offer a better understanding of family internal business 
succession, and complement the existing theories. 
The study shows that there are information asymmetries in family firms and it 
seems that there are inherent processes to overcome these information 
asymmetries. The presented study differentiates between different categories and 
underlines that there are categories of information asymmetries that can be located 
in the family business and information asymmetries that are closer to the family. 
Moreover, the study underlines the change of information asymmetries over time. 
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The pre-phase and the during-phase describe the time until the predecessor leaves 
the management of the family firm; the management succession takes place as a 
caesura. This time can be evaluated as a personnel selection process, because until 
this time, the potential successor has the option to leave the pool of candidates and 
then there is no further need for exchanging information.  
The next chapter of this dissertation focuses on this process and attempts to 
answer the call for research about the mechanisms to reduce information 
asymmetries in this framework. The study focuses on management succession and 
the selection process of family firms before and during the succession process. 
The understanding that there is a principal-agent situation in family business 
internal succession remains. Signaling theory is used to explain the behavior of 
family firms in overcoming the existing information asymmetries. The exchange 
of information through signaling includes sending signals, getting feedback, and 
the possibility to adapt behavior and signals according to expectations in order to 
align the interests of both actors. 
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4 Advancing Signaling Theory: New Insights from 
Successor Selection in Family Businesses  
ABSTRACT 
Signaling theory has been used widely to explain phenomena in personnel 
selection processes. The present study adds to this perspective by applying 
signaling theory to personnel selection processes in family businesses, focusing 
on the selection of family internal successors for top management positions. We 
apply a multiple case study approach using interview data from twenty German 
family businesses. We find that the specific circumstances of the signaling game 
that we identified in family businesses, i.e., a longer timeframe, a private and a 
business context as signaling environment, and the presence of close personal 
relationships between receiver and sender, influence the signaling game. We 
contribute to signaling theory by investigating the context of personnel selection 
processes in which closely related actors are part of the signaling game.  
 
Keywords: Family Business; Business Succession; Signaling Theory 
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4.1 Introduction 
Scholars have extensively investigated the role of signaling in the context of 
personnel selection decisions (Bangerter, Roulin, & König, 2012; Bergh, 
Connelly, Ketchen & Shannon 2014; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). 
Information asymmetries exist in personnel selection decisions and must be 
reduced through signaling, screening and self-selection (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1973; Stiglitz, 1975). To identify the candidate who best matches the 
requirements of the position, one or several candidates are evaluated. To provide 
more information regarding their productivity and qualities, job applicants send 
signals to the job-offering organization. These signals must reach the recipient and 
must be evaluated and interpreted. By choosing an individual for further rounds in 
the selection process or finally offering the position, individuals understand if 
signals work or do not work (are successful or not). If both parties remain in the 
signaling game and the final decision has not been made, the signaler can adapt 
his signaling strategy after having received feedback that implies earning other or 
more signals to specify the signal or to quit the game. The context of these actions 
is referred to as the signaling environment. In addition to signaling, there exist 
other instruments to select the best-matched candidates for a job position, e.g., 
screening refers to actions taken by the organization to resolve information 
asymmetries. For example, organizations could offer job candidates a menu of 
contracts or one specific contract; the choice of a specific contract reveals the 
candidate’s self-assessment of his or her own productivity and, thus, helps to 
check out the tacit information of candidates and to decrease the adverse selection 
problem. Keeping in mind these other instruments, the paper focuses on signaling 
because it is one of the most common instruments in general personnel economics 
and one of the least analyzed concepts regarding family business to fit the 
successor position. 
Selecting a family internal successor for a top management position is a personnel 
selection decision. Nevertheless, the situation in family businesses when selecting 
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a successor differs strongly from other personnel selection processes. First, the 
selection process is influenced by business goals and family goals (Jaskiewicz et 
al., 2015b). Second, the preference for family members limits the pool of 
candidates (Habbershon, 2006; Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013; 
Memili, Welsh, & Luthans, 2013; Salvato et al., 2012; Zellweger, Nason, 
Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013). Third, the time frame of selection is not limited to a 
few months, beginning with a job advertisement and ending with the selection 
decision, but can take months or years. Hence, because of the focus on family 
internal candidates for successor positions and, thus, a specific recruiting 
environment, the process requires specific selection instruments.  
Family internal succession3 is preferred in family businesses (Wiklund et al., 
2013), but currently, it is not clear how family firms address the situation of 
selecting a family internal successor. It is obvious that family candidates have a 
very close relationship with the people who select them and that a long time frame 
for selection is inherent. As a result, there is a very specific and long-term-
oriented situation that could offer new insights about signaling in general. As a 
result, we ask, how does signaling proceed in family internal successor selection 
in family firms? What can we learn from signaling during the family internal 
succession process for signaling theory in general? 
We used interview data from twenty heterogeneous German family businesses to 
address this research gap by investigating whether and how signaling occurs in the 
process of internal successor selection. Analyzing the selection process in family 
businesses through the theoretical lens of signaling theory offers the opportunity 
to systematically investigate internal processes and develop insights into 
recruiting practices in family businesses. The present research seeks to shed light 
on these processes that have been regarded as inherently unprofessional by 
scholars (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013).  
                                                 
3 In the remainder of the paper we understand family internal succession by internal succession 
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The present paper contributes to different streams of literature. First, we 
contribute to the literature focusing on signaling in personnel selection processes. 
Bangerter, Roulin, and König (2012) have defined personnel selection processes 
as a signaling game. In their conceptual work, they highlight the role of adaptive 
processes between applicants and organizations. We add to this work by 
examining the consequences imposed on the process by the specific situation that 
occurs when personal bonds are present between applicants and the selecting 
organization, which does not occur only in family businesses (e.g., selection 
decisions in non-family firms where the applicant and the selecting manager also 
have a private relationship, for example, as friends or relatives). As we will show, 
consequences of these personal relationships are the longer time frame of the 
signaling game, candidates becoming part of the pool against their will, and a 
change of meaning and value of specific types of signals. Analyzing these 
pecularities and their consequences offers a new perspective on signaling in 
personnel selection processes.  
Second, we contribute to the family business literature by shedding more light on 
the family internal successor selection processes. The assumption that successor 
selection is based primarily on mechanisms such as nepotism (Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Collin & Ahlberg, 2012; Salvato et al., 2012) has 
hindered the development of research on how the selection process occurs in 
family business practice. By systematically applying signaling theory to the 
successor selection process in family businesses, we provide insights into not only 
the selection process as a whole but also into its constituent components. 
According to signaling theory, different types of signals exist that play different 
roles in the signaling game. The present study distinguishes among these signals 
within family businesses and shows how the signals are sent and perceived.  
This paper is structured in the following manner: First, we describe the 
methodological approach and data analysis. Because of the nature of the research 
question, attempting to explain a new phenomenon in family business, we chose a 
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qualitative approach (Eisenhardt, 1989). Specifically, we conducted multiple case 
studies in a set of family businesses using data from 20 firms and 57 interviews. 
As a result, we offer two types of findings: a process model of signaling of 
internal successor selection in family businesses and theoretical implications for 
signaling theory in general that can be derived from investigating signaling 
processes in the context of family businesses. The paper closes with a discussion 
of the study’s implications, limitations and avenues for future research. 
4.2 Method 
Our goal is to gain in-depth insights into the selection process of family internal 
successors to provide new insights for signaling theory and family business 
research. We chose to use an inductive, qualitative research design because we 
describe a phenomenon in a real-life context – the recruiting and selection process 
– and aim to explain how this phenomenon evolves. We selected an exploratory 
multiple case study design following Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1984). 
Only family businesses were included in the sample. We define family business 
according to the definition and criteria of Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999): 
First, at least 50% of a business must be owned by one or several families. 
Second, one or more family members must be involved in management or have 
influence on strategic decisions and development. Third, a business succession 
process must have previously occurred, is occurring or is in the planning stage. 
Additionally, before every interview, the interviewee was asked whether the firm 
was a family firm. All interviewees stated that the firm was a family firm.  
We gathered information in semi-structured interviews, which were transliterated, 
coded and analyzed with MAXQDA, a software for analyzing qualitative data. 
Two of the authors conducted the interviews from 2009 to 2013. The interviews 
with the family members yielded 823 pages of text, 1.5 spaced. The interviews 
took an average of 55 minutes, ranging from 35 to 105 minutes.  
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After beginning with an a priori definition of the research questions, we selected 
cases for this study. Eisenhardt (1989) suggested a limited sample to develop deep 
insights into processes. Following this recommendation in the first step, we 
conducted 12 case studies with 39 interviews. We chose various cases regarding 
the stage of succession and the generation stage and focused on different 
industries to obtain broad insight into different stages and situations in family 
businesses. During this process of crafting instruments and protocols and entering 
the field by conducting interviews, further questions arose regarding the 
generation, stage of succession and legal structure. For this reason, we gathered 
more case studies (8 Cases) to integrate these context factors in our research. 
Because only 13% of family businesses survive until the third generation, the 
second generation dominated the dataset. We decided to omit an industry bias and 
analyze signaling in general. This approach is consistent with Eisenhardt (1989) 
because overlapping data analysis and data collection allows flexible data 
collection, and Eisenhardt (1989) emphasized “a key feature of theory-building 
case research is the freedom to make adjustments during the data collection 
process” (p. 539). In each case included in the study, at least two individuals 
(predecessor and successor) were interviewed. In most cases, more than two 
interviews were conducted. In addition to the predecessor and successors, we 
interviewed spouses of predecessors, other potential candidates and core 
employees to include different perspectives on the selection process in our 
analysis. 
All interviews began with clarification of the roles of the interviewees in the 
succession process. Further interview questions were related to selection criteria, 
the time frame of the selection process, the pool of candidates, and education and 
training prior to the business succession process. Table 4 presents an overview of 
the cases included in the present study. 
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Table 4: Overview case studies 
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The data were analyzed after conducting 12 of the cases. In this way, we could 
shape the interviews and were able to decide what kind of additional cases we 
needed for our sample of 20 cases. We also reanalyzed the data based on our 
cumulative learning at the end of the collection process. We followed a three-
stage analysis process: first, a within-case analysis, second, a cross-case 
comparison and, finally, a theory-building stage. 
We iteratively analyzed the qualitative data based on the basic assumptions and 
concepts of signaling theory and the theoretical understanding of family internal 
succession and considering all conceptual components of the signaling process. 
Our first-order concepts follow the language of the participants (e.g., 
“communication at the kitchen table”). After this, we analyzed the different first-
order categories and identified links between the different categories, for example, 
“communication at the kitchen table,” “communication during lunch” and 
“periodically jour fix,” offer information about the signaling context. We group 
the categories together into second-order themes following the example above: 
“signaling in family context” and “signaling in business context.” All these 
inductive categories and themes were organized following the elements of 
signaling theory and the result in the overarching categories Signaling 
Environment (including the time frame), Signaler, Receiver, Feedback and 
Signals.  
In the first stage, two of the authors analyzed every case autonomously to become 
intimately familiar with each case. This process was a result of the need to 
identify information asymmetries, individual feedback situations and industry- or 
size-related needs for different signals. In addition, family cohesion can always 
influence the signaling game. To exceed initial impressions, a subsequent cross-
case analysis was conducted, enabling us to develop overall categories as a basis 
for developing propositions. During this process, the overall categories and some 
anchor coding were continuously discussed with the other authors. This 
discussion resulted in the third stage of analysis: the theory-building stage. The 
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iterative process between data and theory showed that the present data provide 
insights on signaling in family businesses, which can also be partly applied to a 
more general context by contributing to signaling theory in general. An overall 
model of signaling in family business is derived from the data and is presented in 
figure 12. A section follows presenting the implications of the findings for the 
application of signaling theory in personnel selection situations beyond the family 
business context. 
4.3 Signaling in Family Businesses 
The first finding results in an overall model of signaling in family businesses. The 
first step clarifies whether signaling theory fits to family business internal 
succession. Although the interests of family owners and applicants internal or 
external to the family may overlap to a greater degree than the interests of owners 
and managers in non-family businesses, asymmetric altruism could promote 
economic agency costs through the difficulty of enforcing contracts and biased 
evaluations of managers’ contributions to firm performance (Schulze et al., 2001). 
Agency problems are observable in family businesses (Lubatkin et al., 2007; 
Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester 2011; 
Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003), different forms of goal setting exist 
(Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b) and, hence, information asymmetries occur (Schulze et 
al., 2001; Dehlen et al., 2014).  
The basic assumption of the present study is that information asymmetries exist in 
family businesses. We based our analysis on the findings of Dehlen, Zellweger, 
Kammerlander, and Halter (2014), who identified four different types of 
information asymmetries that can occur in family business succession. According 
to these findings, information asymmetries are inherent to the selection processes. 
Signaling and a related, relatively structured selection process could be a way to 
reduce these asymmetries and select a successor.  
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For the overall model, the actors in the signaling game should be clarified. In the 
tradition of signaling research in the context of personnel selection, the applicant 
is the signaler having more information on his or her productivity and qualities, 
and the organization/predecessor is the receiver (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; 
Stiglitz, 1975). Following this convention, we define the potential successor as the 
signaler and the predecessor as the receiver.  
4.3.1 Signals 
Signals must be observable; however, beyond mere observability, the fit of signals 
plays an important role. Connelly et al., (2011) defined the signal fit as “the extent 
to which the signal is correlated with unobservable quality” (p 53). Scholars 
differentiate between costly signals and hard-to-fake signals (Bangerter et al., 
2012). Hard-to-fake signals are beyond conscious control. Work samples and the 
results of ability tests are examples of this type of signal (Bangerter et al., 2012). 
Although ability tests, such as intelligence tests, may be problematic in family 
businesses, work samples can be obtained easily. For example, potential internal 
successors could send positive, hard-to-fake signals by working in the family 
business in their free time at a young age.  
In the interviews, we identified different types of signals sent by the potential 
successors. Figure 12 provides an overview of how different categories of signals 
were derived from the interview data. In the following, we present our insights 
first for costly and hard-to-fake signals and, then, for negative and positive 
signals. 
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Figure 12: Overview of categories used to identify different types of signals 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
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4.3.2 Costly and Hard-to-Fake Signals 
Costly signals such as education or job experience require applicants to invest 
resources to acquire and display such signals (Bangerter et al., 2012). Other 
potential successors may not have the ability to acquire these signals, leading to 
higher costs to earn the signal or leading to the successor not being able to earn 
the costly signals at all. In family businesses, costs may also include engagement 
during childhood and abandoning prospects for personal growth. The fit of 
education to the company, the abandoning of career options, and the willingness 
to undertake an internal training program are the most significant costly signals 
that we identified. 
Successor 8: “After my training as a retail salesman, I also did training as 
a butcher, as well as a certified business management specialist and, 
finally, the master butcher training. Currently, I have held all possible 
management positions in the company. First, store manager, then dispatch 
manager to works manager. I did anything and was promoted step by 
step.” 
Predecessor 1 explains that the first son chose a technical education and the 
second son chose business administration. Following this, he states, 
Predecessor 1: “Both my sons are qualified because they know the 
company. Beyond that, they are qualified because of their theoretical 
knowledge, which they acquired during their current studies.” 
Formal education plays a particularly important role in signaling the will and the 
qualifications to succeed.  
Predecessor 194: “Our daughter is a nutrition scientist. Our company 
specializes in nutrition. So she has the ideal education.” 
Successor 19: “My relationship to the company (qualifies me for 
                                                 
4 Numbers in front of the quotes refer to the identifying numbers of the cases presented in Table 1. 
 78 
 
succession). Furthermore, my professional qualifications are health-
oriented, and my studies in nutrition science fit the company, as well as my 
work experience in another company in which I also had personnel 
responsibility.” 
Additionally, in other interviews, predecessor 19 and successor 19 underline that 
the process of choosing this education and the results of the education (e.g., 
grades, opportunities in the industry) were relevant for the selection and the 
integration process.  
Hard-to-fake signals are beyond conscious control. Work samples and the results 
of ability tests are examples of this type of signal (Bangerter et al., 2012). To 
identify hard-to-fake signals, we screened our twenty case studies for active 
reports and observations of signals. In the following, the categories of hard-to-
fake signals are arranged according to the frequency of their occurrence.  
Table 5 shows categories of hard-to-fake signals, which we have identified most 
frequently in our dataset. 
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Table 5: Overview of hard-to-fake categories 
Number of 
Codings Category Anchor 
23 
Personality traits  
Assertiveness 
Readiness to assume risks 
Sense of responsibility 
Predecessor 11: "Reliability in, definitely. I am looking for fundamental traits, which result from 
upbringing. These are the basics you need, also as an employee. Punctuality, reliability, honesty, 
something like this. Everything else will come in the end. I can observe this in my son." 
 
Predecessor 69: "Sometimes, we take risks. We decided on and introduced a new process. I was not 
100% convinced. But we tried, and surprisingly, after seven months, we earned money with it. For me, it 
was a surprise. For him, it was always clear." 
22 
Commitment 
Knowledge of family 
stories 
Cooperation with 
predecessor 
Why do you think your daughter is qualified to succeed?  
Predecessor 60: "Because she is willing to do it." 
 
Predecessor 8: "My son asked me at one time. He had the chance to start a career in another company 
and asked me what will happen with the family firm, with the family, how we think about the future. 
Because he would like to know if I think it would be better that he integrates himself in the family firm 
to grow with the company and take the chance to work with me and my wife. This is how it was at that 
time when he started working in the company." 
19 Employee acceptance 
Predecessor 10: "16, 17, 18 years old, running around here, and well, he has, of course, now, I would 
say, gotten started as CEO, which of course was announced, no question about that, but here and there 
was an acceptance problem. But I think that has now neutralized on the time axis." 
 
Predecessor 8: "I think it is normal that the junior needs a little time to be accepted by everybody. But it 
was no big deal because we regulated the process. There was no power struggle between us. So it was 
easier." 
18 Innovativeness Predecessor 2: "Son #1 is innovative and has new ideas. He is permanently searching for extensions of 
our product portfolio." 
 
10 Similarity 
Do you think that you and your successor have the same vision for the future of the company?  
Predecessor 76: "Yes, this is what I think. We are living the same future, and we know where we want to 
go." 
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Personality traits (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & Ter Weel, 2008; Goldberg 
1993) may be regarded as indices according Spence (1973) because they refer to 
the unalterable characteristics of an individual. In our case, we do not refer to 
inalterable traits, but rather to observable actions that provide information 
regarding unobservable attributes and likely outcomes (Bergh et al., 2014; Spence 
1973), which indicate these underlying personality traits. We focus on the 
voluntary display of actions that can be influenced and changed by individuals 
instead of focusing directly on the underlying unalterable traits; thus, we interpret 
the display of personality traits as important hard-to-fake signals.  
Predecessors observe the potential successor’s behavior and interpret it in terms of 
personality traits. When receivers told stories regarding previous decisions, the 
successor interpreted those stories as important for selection. Within this cluster of 
signals, demonstrating assertiveness, readiness to assume risks and a sense of 
responsibility appear to be the most important subcategories. The second category 
we developed is commitment. Family business research observed that commitment 
to family and the family business is an important attribute of potential successors 
(Sharma & Irving, 2005). We integrated observations of told family stories and 
the actively desired cooperation with the predecessor. Potential successors 
demonstrate their commitment and willingness to succeed by questioning the 
predecessor about the business and being engaged within the business. Potential 
successors often disclaim higher salaries in different situations during the 
succession process: when beginning hands-on training in the firm, when moving 
through different positions within the company and during the negotiation process 
for the job conditions within the family business.  
Interviewer: “Do you have any idea how much you would like to earn?” 
Successor 1: “How high or low our salaries will be depends on the 
circumstances. But, compared to the industry average, we will start with a 
lower salary.” 
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This behavior could also be interpreted as opportunity costs. In this case, 
disclaiming higher salaries had to be interpreted as a costly signal. We observed 
that in cases in which internal successors displayed this type of signal, the signal 
was interpreted as an indicator of commitment to the firm and, hence, may have 
been regarded as a hard-to-fake signal. This abandonment of higher wages is 
understood as a prerequisite for the sustainability of the family business. By 
disclaiming higher wages, potential successors assure not only their own income 
but also the income of other family members in the company and the 
sustainability of the company in general. Hence, disclaiming higher wages is 
regarded as a sign of commitment to the family business, which goes beyond the 
individual costs linked to disclaiming higher wages. As a result of this context 
analysis, we rank commitment higher than opportunity costs and define 
commitment as a hard-to-fake signal. 
We did not identify subcategories for the category of employee acceptance. In the 
majority of the interviews, the interviewer actively asked questions related to the 
acceptance of the potential successor by the employees. Nearly all predecessors 
are able to evaluate the situation in the company, which provides further evidence 
that predecessors actively search for this type of signal and use this type of signal 
in making their decisions. 
Integrating new processes and products shows innovativeness. Most predecessors 
evaluate ideas or measures to improve the company by the potential successor as 
positive signals. Particularly when the business model requires innovation to 
remain successful, predecessors are actively informed of a successor’s new ideas 
during the succession process. 
Similarity is also a significant hard-to-fake signal. Particularly in cases of 
management succession, similarity in management decisions is important. 
Potential successors seek to manage the company in the same manner as the 
predecessor did. In this case, they voluntarily limit their field of possible 
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decisions. This manner of showing commitment often includes the potential 
successor accepting important strategic decisions by the predecessor.  
Interviewer: “What do you think, which kind of goals does your father 
have regarding the succession?”  
Successor 3: “I think that we are doing it in the same way or better than 
he did it.” 
Interviewer: “Who has the last word when it comes to strategic and 
important operative decisions?”  
Successor 12: “The boss (refers to the predecessor). Yes, it is.” (smiles) 
Predecessor 12: “My strategic goal is to become the technological world 
market leader. We are on our way. Our image in the market has changed, 
and I think my kids have the same intention. I think they have exactly the 
same idea of our future.” 
Work samples are hard-to-fake signals that can be used to assess the abilities and 
commitment of employees (Bangerter et al., 2012), which is also true for family 
businesses. However, the time frame in which this type of signal is sent is much 
less restricted than in other constellations. In most cases, potential internal 
successors send those signals by working in the company in their free time and 
beginning at a young age. Potential successors perform internships in the family 
firm or in firms in the same industry, often join network parties and are interested 
in network partners of the family business.  
4.3.3 Positive and negative Signals 
To become part of the pool of potential successors, individuals simply have to be 
born into the family that owns the firm. To remain in the pool is more 
challenging. Positive signals can open the door to becoming part of the pool, to 
remaining in the pool and to becoming the final successor. However, negative 
signals also exist. Negative signals can be sent passively, indicating that the 
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potential successor is not able to succeed. Additionally, they can be sent actively 
to communicate that the potential successor is not willing to succeed. Choosing an 
education that obviously has no fit with the family business was the negative 
signal we identified most often within the case studies. Becoming educated in 
areas that do not fit with the company and limited or no engagement in the family 
business are the most common negative signals we identified. For example, one of 
three potential successors of a car dealer chose to study journalism. The internal 
successor and the predecessor reported that this was the time when it became 
obvious that this daughter was not interested in succession. 
Signaling negative information, i.e., signaling low quality or a low level of ability, 
is generally not a focus of research on signaling in personnel selection processes. 
In succession processes, sending negative signals may play an important role. 
Potential successors who are not willing and able to succeed may send signals 
hoping to be excluded from the pool of candidates. In the case of a potential 
successor who is able but not willing to succeed, cheating negative signals may 
occur. Potential successors could send signals indicating that they are not able to 
succeed (Steier & Miller, 2010) even though they are. In Case 6, for example, the 
oldest son began to study business administration in the 1990s and interrupted his 
studies to become a professional poker player. By doing so, he made clear that he 
was not interested in succession. After his time as a professional poker player, he 
began to receive an education in an industry similar to the industry of the family 
firm. Currently, he argues that he has to finish this education and start a career in 
this industry and that his younger brother is closer to the family firm. For this 
reason, the younger brother fits better and should succeed. However, the older son 
states that he would succeed if an emergency occurred. Therefore, in this case the 
older son would be able to succeed but sent signals that he is not able to do so 
from his point of view at different times. As a result, the family decided that the 
younger son would become the successor. 
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Additionally, some potential candidates explicitly communicate quite early that 
they are not interested in succession.  
Predecessor 15: “I had my son A on the list for this, but, then, he said, 
‘Hmmm, actually I feel more comfortable at company B.’ And then, I said, 
‘So then stay there, and this is wonderful.’” 
Another behavior in family firms we identified and categorized as negative signal 
is the active support of another sibling who is willing to succeed. In other cases, 
potential successors who are not willing to succeed show gratitude to the ultimate 
successor for succeeding. This actively communicated gratitude and the support 
of this candidate can be evaluated as a negative signal for themselves as 
successors. In addition, these actors show that they do not have insights in the 
family firm or an overview about the future strategic direction. Also a negative 
signal is the spatial distance between potential candidates in the family firm. 
Candidates who were interested come back to the region where the family firm is 
located; candidates who were not interested in succession stay further away or 
prefer to remain in different regions. 
Successor 6: The most logical case would be that my brother succeeds 
because his abilities will be matured up to this point in way that he could 
do it. I couldn’t. I couldn’t at the moment. Leading the  company would 
ask too much of me at the moment. I do not have the experience that I 
would need  to lead the company. 
Interviewer: “Do you have any other children who could be potential 
successors?” 
Predecessor 4: “Yes, my oldest son works as a tax consultant. My 
daughter has nothing to do with these things. She lives away also. She 
lives in X.”  
Interviewer: “So she doesn’t want to?” 
Predecessor 4: “No, not at all. She works in healthcare and has really 
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nothing to do with these kinds of things.”  
Successor 4: “If they (his sisters) had been involved, I would not have 
done it. The one sister wanted to study architecture but then moved to 
healthcare. I think, due to her nature, she also would not have been able to 
do it.” 
4.3.4 The Signaling Environment 
There has to be a place where signaling takes place, that is, where signals are sent 
and received. According to signaling theory, this place is the signaling 
environment. The signaling environment affects the extent to which signaling can 
reduce information asymmetries (Connelly et al., 2011; Rynes, Bretz, & Gerhart, 
1991). In family businesses, there are two systems in which the predecessor and 
the successor operate: the family system and the business system (Tagiuri & 
Davis, 1996). Together, the systems build the signaling environment. We 
observed that, in every case, a pool of potential candidates existed, including 
relatives and candidates who were not in the direct bloodline.  
Analyzing the stories predecessors told about the childhood of potential 
successors enabled us to identify several major themes. Stories were told about 
the early childhood of potential successors with reference to potential succession 
in the family business. Predecessors reported talking with the potential successors 
regarding the family business, the role the family business played within the 
family, and how the potential successors showed interest in the family business. 
There were also stories regarding children who filled boxes with candy as 
advertising giveaways or teenagers who washed firm cars in their leisure time. In 
the majority of our cases, we could observe stories and anecdotes regarding the 
childhood of every potential candidate.  
Predecessor 3: “My daughter is a type of a salesperson. She impressed me 
once. When she was a little girl, eleven years old, she went on a stage and 
said, ‘Ladies and Gentlemen,’ and the audience was quiet. When I do such 
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things, people will continue chatting. This is the truth. But there are people 
who are able to fascinate other people. And my daughter is able to do 
this.” 
Successor 14: “When I was a child, I filled boxes with candy as 
advertising giveaways for Christmas.” 
Successor 5: “When I was a child, they told me that I could have my 
father’s job in the future.” 
Because predecessor and potential successors have generally known one another 
since the birth of the potential successor, signals can be sent and received from 
that early point in time. However, during (early) childhood, it is quite likely that 
the family roles (e.g., parent and child) dominate the relationship and that 
potential successors are not part of the business context. Moreover, at this young 
age, successors cannot send signals actively; only unintendedly. To explain the 
relevance of this early phase of the potential successor’s life within the signaling 
game, we focused on the signaling environment. Within family businesses, there 
is an overlap between family and business contexts (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). 
Hence, predecessors and potential successors interact in both environments and 
may potentially use both environments to exchange signals. Therefore, we asked 
the interviewees about the context of selection, the places in which discussions 
regarding potential candidates occurred and the points in time when signals could 
be sent and received. 
In the early years of a potential successor’s life, the potential successor and 
predecessor interact more frequently within the family than within the business 
environment. Predecessors spoke about the hobbies of their children that fit the 
company. In addition, grades in school (e.g., math in technology-driven 
companies) were mentioned and interpreted as signals. Predecessors compare 
potential successors based on these types of signals when assessing their 
qualifications and willingness to succeed. Furthermore, we conclude that 
predecessors identify signals in both environments and that the focus moves from 
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the family context to the business context over time, even when their children 
produced these signals mostly without intention. However, these activities or 
grades were interpreted as signals by the predecessors.  
As a result of these findings, we were interested in whether the business system 
replaces the family system as the signaling environment over time. We observed 
that this phenomenon does not occur; through discussions at the kitchen table, 
discussions with spouses regarding the business and potential successors, and 
through business contacts at family parties, both systems constantly overlap. 
Thus, it is possible to send and receive signals in both contexts.  
Predecessor 10: “We talk. Most of the time, we sit together in the evening 
or in the early morning before the workday starts and talk about the things 
we have to do this day and where conflicts could arise. And we also do a 
short wrap-up session in the evenings.” 
Successor 12: “I started working in the company occasionally when I was 
15. During the first four years, I fetched brochures from a shelf and put 
them together. That was it. After those four years, I was allowed to 
perforate them.” 
Predecessor 12: “He worked in the company and earned his pocket money 
there during school and university studies. He worked in storage, as well 
as the office. He passed through different areas of the company, and he 
suffered the pressure of the company during childhood, and I think he 
acquired knowledge during this time.” 
A developmental process turns a potential successor from a family member into a 
business member as the information flow expands. The signaling environment is 
larger than other signaling games in the context of personnel selection decisions.  
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4.3.5 The Time Frame of Signaling  
Next to the definition of where signaling takes place, the definition of when 
signaling takes place is important. In this study, we ask when the signaling game 
in a family business begins and when it ends. It ends when the personnel selection 
decision of the predecessor regarding the successor in the management position is 
made. In family business succession, management transfer is an important step in 
the succession process (Handler, 1994; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Nordqvist et 
al., 2013). It affects the business, including strategic decisions, and is an important 
signal to external stakeholders (Barach et al., 1988). The decision of who will 
succeed in management and, most likely, in ownership is an important sign of 
confidence in the chosen successor (Dunn, 1999). In the present study, we 
therefore define the point in time at which a decision regarding management 
transfer is made as the end of the signaling game. Interviewees described 
situations in which the predecessor told every family member at the kitchen table 
that his offspring would be the successor. In other situations, decisions were 
disclosed by communicating the name of the successor to key employees.  
The selection event can be initialized in different ways. The predecessor may be 
the main (or the only) force initiating this event. Our data show that although the 
predecessor is in a position to dominate this component of the selection process, 
other forces nevertheless play important roles. In several cases investigated, the 
potential successors were the drivers initiating the selection event. We observed 
different motivations of potential successors to accelerate the selection decision, 
including the goal of being better able to plan their educations, careers, and 
personal lives.  
Successor 12: “I know that the transfer from the first to the second 
generation passed with a lot of controversy. Also with an ultimatum: ‘If 
you don’t give it to me now, I will leave.’” 
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The power potential successors have in accelerating the selection process results 
from a reduced pool of internal candidates. If there is a preference for internal 
candidates for succession, the pool is limited anyway. Furthermore, we observed 
that if a family business has an internal pool, this pool is reduced over time by 
both potential successors and predecessors. Several candidates are actively 
integrated into the business context, whereas others leave the pool either of their 
own will or because of their not being perceived as qualified successors.  
Hence, if there is the wish to choose an internal successor and the pool is reduced 
over time, the pressure to arrive at a decision increases. The predecessor depends 
increasingly on the candidates left in the pool who are willing to succeed. By not 
deciding who will succeed, the predecessor runs the risk that qualified candidates 
will voluntarily leave the pool, e.g., by taking on other career opportunities, and in 
the end, no candidates are left. This situation works as an ultimatum. On one 
hand, this situation forces potential successors to signal; conversely, potential 
successors are offered the opportunity to initiate the selection event individually. 
In addition to individuals, the company itself can initiate the selection event. This 
results primarily from a specific need imposed by external factors, e.g., a staff 
shortage in the company.  
Successor 4: “Then, there were problems in the company. My father had 
conflicts with his general manager. The general manager had a heart 
attack or several heart attacks. I am not sure what exactly happened. After 
this, my father also fell ill. In these situations, mothers call to come back.” 
In cases of a lack of key employees in the company, potential successors are 
asked to join the firm earlier than they had planned.  
Successor 13: “In my case, I would have preferred to join the company 
later because I had the job of my dreams. I earned more money, I had 
opportunities to develop my own career, I was happy. Until today, I am 
talking about us, when I talk about this company. I had so much fun at this 
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firm. So I did not come back with a good feeling when my father asked me 
to because I was happy where I was.”  
Unplanned successions because of the death or illness of the predecessor are also 
situations in which there is no direct and active decision of the predecessor. The 
decision arises from necessity rather than from the free will of an individual or 
group of individuals. In this case, the company initiates the selection event.  
Successor 4: “To be honest, I didn’t see a big challenge. The challenge 
was when he was in the hospital and said, ‘I cannot come back in the 
company.’ I left the room and said to my girlfriend, ‘Now I will go the 
whole hog; you will have to get used to it. I will now have to take over the 
firm.’ This is when the decision was made, within minutes. There was no 
choice. And if he had stayed in the company until now, I would not be here 
anymore. I am nearly sure of that.’” 
4.4 A Process Model of Signaling in Successor Selection in 
Family Businesses 
After having identified the signals sent during the selection process and its time 
frame, we analyzed how the signaling game evolves during the selection process. 
To do so, we identified different types of signals, the environment where signaling 
takes place, and the starting point and the endpoint of signaling. These factors 
together constitute the signaling game in family businesses.  
During this game, an additional factor is important. Feedback from the receiver, 
or information on whether the signaler sends the “right” signals, is quite 
important. When using feedback loops, the parties work together to decrease 
information asymmetry. Consequently, the signaler learns which signals he should 
send and is able to adapt his signaling strategy if he is able und willing to invest in 
receiving this signal due to his underlying productivity or commitment (Connelly 
et al., 2011). Family business research shows that, in some cases, potential 
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successors are pressured, and expectations are directly communicated (Jaskiewicz 
et al., 2013; Parada, Nordqvist, & Gimeno, 2010). These mechanisms can be 
interpreted as a manner of giving feedback to potential successors. Signal 
frequency and the point in time at which signals are sent affect the success of the 
signaling game (Bergh et al., 2015; Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003). The signals 
the receiver is looking for and the signals the signaler sends can change over time. 
In signaling theory, these changes are referred to as the cycle of reciprocal 
adaptation (Bangerter et al., 2012). In family businesses, a step-by-step approach 
to business succession is realized (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). This process 
includes educational requirements and hands-on-training (co-habitation), which 
requires time and offers possibilities for exchanging information. This time span 
can offer opportunities to use signaling to exchange information, and cycles of 
reciprocal adaption may foster this exchange. 
During their childhood, potential successors occasionally show organizational 
commitment to the family firm, for example, through internships, being present at 
firm parties or during conversations with the predecessor regarding the firm. 
Furthermore, predecessors observe personality characteristics (e.g., “My daughter 
is a salesperson”) and personal preferences and talents (e.g., potential successors’ 
hobbies, grades in school) in the family context. However, the frequency of 
signals we observed during this time is rather low. During the childhood of 
potential successors, we observed only hard- to-fake signals. Children do not 
deliberately invest in costly signals because children do not make strategic 
decisions. In adolescence, the frequency of signals increases and potential 
successors send not only hard-to-fake but also costly signals as a result of the 
pressure to select a successor increasing over time and career planning becoming 
more important for potential successors at that age. The education process of 
potential successors is the starting point from which the business system and 
family system overlap increasingly often. The increased attention of the 
predecessor offers the successor more opportunities to signal his and willingness 
to succeed. The potential successors join the business context increasingly more, 
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for example, through free time activities in the company, holiday work, or hands-
on training. We observed that potential successors often perform internships in the 
family business itself or internships in companies that are connected to the family 
firm. We also observed that potential candidates attempt to join the internal 
network of the family business.  
Overall, we observed that in the early phases of the signaling game (the childhood 
of the potential successors), hard-to-fake signals dominate the game, and signaling 
frequency is rather low. From adolescence and adulthood until the selection event, 
signaling becomes intensified, and costly signals develop more importance in the 
signaling game. All these findings result in an overall model of signaling in family 
business, which is illustrated in figure 13. 
Figure 13: An overall model on family business internal succession 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
4.5 Implications for Signaling Theory 
The present study shows that whereas the basic concepts of signaling theory can 
be identified in the process of family business and family internal successor 
selection, differences exist that influence the overall signaling game. A major 
difference is the signaling environment and the time frame in which signaling can 
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occur. Furthermore, different types of signals appear to play different roles from 
the roles they play in other environments in which signaling games have been 
studied. These differences offer the opportunity to advance signaling theory in 
general because, in a non-family business context, these differences could, in 
certain circumstances, occur and are likely to yield identical consequences. In 
non-family firms, a situation is similar if signaler and receiver know one another 
outside the business context and the signaling timeframe is enlarged, such as 
when someone plans to start a business and recruits co-founders from his 
personnel network or in the case of internal and external candidates being part of 
the pool of candidates for a vacancy. These circumstances have implications for 
the occurrence and use of feedback loops and the meaning conveyed by specific 
signals. We define three major implications of signaling theory. 
 First, the differences in the signaling frame influence how feedback loops 
are included in the signaling game. Generally, signaling games are investigated in 
terms of a one-shot game. If signalers send signals in different signaling 
environments, they can adapt their signaling strategies in both contexts. Signalers 
become familiar with the selection criteria and preferences over time and can 
adjust their strategies. Family internal potential successors have a great deal of 
time to understand the family logic behind the selection process and, thus, will be 
better able to adjust their signaling strategy to this logic than external candidates 
will (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). In a non-family context, a private logic may co-
exist with a business logic. In the case of the receiver knowing the candidates over 
a longer period of time, these criteria may come into play. Hence, internal 
candidates have not only an advantage because they have more time to adapt to 
the selection criteria but also the opportunity to understand both types of selection 
logic.  
Second, signals that are sent in the private context and not in the business context 
grow in importance. In a context in which individuals are recruited from the 
personnel network or from inside the company, signals may also have different 
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meanings, and hard-to-fake signals are likely to grow in importance because they 
can be observed more closely. Typically, in a personnel selection process, costly 
signals can more easily be assessed and, hence, should play a more prominent role 
in the selection. We observed that predecessors place more importance on 
personality traits and free-time activities than would generally occur in a selection 
process. This phenomenon implies that with the enhanced signaling frame, hard-
to-fake signals become more important than general costly signals. Furthermore, 
not only the importance placed on different types of signals changes with the 
enhanced environment but also the potential meaning/interpretation behind the 
identical signal may change. The role hobbies and other free-time activities play 
in the selection process is another example of how the value and meaning of 
signals changes with the signaling environment, that is, when it is interrelating a 
private and a business environment. Hobbies and other free-time activities were 
often mentioned by the interviewees in our study and frequently play a role in 
prototypical personnel selection processes.  
Third, internal candidates can involuntarily become part of the pool; therefore, 
negative signals grow in importance, as potential candidates may want to be 
excluded. Most studies on signaling do not focus on negative signals. Therefore, 
an understanding of sending negative signals provides important insights into an 
under-researched aspect of signaling. According to our findings, in the family 
business context, the signaling game begins with the birth of a potential successor; 
hence, from birth on, individuals are part of the pool of candidates, regardless of 
whether they want to be. Therefore, if a potential successor is not willing to 
succeed, he must send appropriate signals to be excluded from the pool. 
Furthermore, in this setting, the probability of faking negative signals may 
increase because potential successors may be expecting negative reactions from 
the predecessor due to family bonds if the potential successors signal that they are 
not willing to succeed but appear able to do so. One reason for sending negative 
signals to be excluded from the pool of candidates may be to preserve harmony 
within the family. We observed that in situations in which a larger number of 
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potential candidates are in the pool, candidates support other potential successors 
by consciously sending negative signals. In this case, the decision-making process 
and the legitimization of the selected successor become easier. In this situation, 
candidates who do not want to be selected can preserve the socioemotional wealth 
of the family and the firm. Sending and faking negative signals can be expected to 
be quite important in other contexts in which candidates involuntarily become part 
of the pool. If a personal relationship exists between parties, sending negative 
signals may be used to be excluded from the pool while preserving harmony 
between parties. This phenomenon also can take place in the non-family business 
context, for example, if a project group is searching for a group leader and parts of 
the group are friends. In addition, in schools, not every teacher is interested in 
being part of the pool of candidates for the dean position.  
Summarizing our findings in the context of non-family firms, the current study 
emphasizes that, in particular, the long time frame and the overlap between 
business and private contexts exist outside the family environment and, therefore, 
the findings of the present study can be applied to enrich signaling theory in 
general. Furthermore, long-term development or education programs within a 
company offer the opportunity to adopt learning and signaling strategies that are 
typically observed in family firms. The opportunity to observe potential 
candidates for internal management positions over a long time enables decision 
makers to evaluate private activities and emphasize education more strongly. The 
evaluation of different signals is promoted, and the value of specific signals 
changes.   
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4.6 Discussion 
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to apply signaling theory to the 
selection process of family internal successors in family businesses. We propose 
that the signaling game begins with the birth of potential successors and ends with 
a selection event for the management position, which is initiated either by the 
predecessor, by the successor, or by necessity. This long time frame allows the 
potential successors to send signals, which are perceived by the successor. The 
signaling game changes over time: whereas during the childhood of potential 
successors, only hard-to-fake signals are (unintendedly) sent and the signaling 
frequency is low, the signaling frequency increases from adolescence onward 
until the selection event, and hard-to-fake signals increase in importance. 
The application of selection criteria and the development of the successor are key 
success factors for business successions (Chrisman et al., 1998; Le Breton-Miller 
et al., 2004). Family businesses often miss out on the opportunity to apply these 
criteria. However, the results of the present study show that selection criteria are 
present in most of the companies in our dataset, following the findings of 
Schlepphorst and Moog (2014). Predecessors evaluate different types of selection 
criteria. The results show that formal education that suits the requirements of the 
company is a significant criterion. Beyond that, personality traits and commitment 
to the company are criteria that form the basis for successor selection. 
Furthermore, the present findings are consistent with findings from Chrisman et 
al., (1998), Wiklund et al., (2013), and Verbeke and Kano (2012). These authors 
noted several important attributes of successors in family businesses and 
emphasized the combination of attributes required for success, the prominent role 
of fit with the family and the need for professional skills. An enhanced signaling 
environment enables predecessors to identify and perceive signals related to 
different types of attributes and their combination. In the majority of the cases we 
analyzed, potential successors spent a great deal of time in the company before 
finally being announced as the successor. By doing so, they developed deep 
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insights into the company, which is hardly possible when external managers are 
hired. Furthermore, internal successors know the entire family and, hence, not 
only have extensive specific business knowledge but also family knowledge; this 
can be interpreted as an advantage over hiring external managers who have not 
previously been employed in the company.  
The present study not only clarifies the selection processes of internal successors 
in family businesses but also shows the selection process in a different light, 
contributing to the current debate on professionalization in family businesses. As 
discussed above, some of the peculiarities of these processes can be regarded as 
advantageous instead of disadvantageous, as they have been mostly regarded so 
far. Hiring and integrating an external manager in the family business is generally 
regarded as an indicator of professionalization (Chittoor & Das, 2007; Dekker, 
Lybaert, Steijvers, Depaire, & Mercken, 2012; Steward & Hitt, 2012) and often 
may be the only way to reach professionalization in selection processes. Hall and 
Nordqvist (2008) argued that selecting managers from the pool of family 
members is inherently unprofessional as a result of disregarding their education 
and professional background. However, as we can explain with our data, the 
opportunity to observe hard-to-fake signals from early childhood is unique. 
Furthermore, it has often been assumed that no information asymmetries exist and 
that there is no pool of successors: only birth determines who will be the 
successor (nepotism) (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013; Salvato et al., 2012). In the cases 
analyzed in the present study, we observed that not to be true. In all cases, more 
than one potential successor was present in the pool of candidates. However, it 
must be noted that some of the peculiarities of the environment in family business 
are likely to add noise to the signaling game. Although a pool of candidates exists, 
that pool is restricted. Even more importantly, the relationships within the family 
will influence how signals are perceived when being sent by potential successors. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, when a potential successor does not objectively 
meet the criteria, measures are often taken to render him or her fit. Beyond taking 
certain measures such as putting pressure on a potential successor to perhaps 
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choose the right education or attend training, signals may be construed in 
hindsight to legitimize the decision that has, in fact, been made without 
considering relevant signals. In this case, the perceived signals would represent a 
cognitive bias rather than a way to reduce the adverse selection problem. All these 
aspects can be regarded as hindrances in the signaling game and in professional 
successor selection. We thus conclude that, from a signaling perspective, selecting 
internal successors is not necessarily less professional than selecting an external 
candidate; it can be professional in a different manner. 
4.7 Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has several limitations, some of which are inherent to 
qualitative research. First, in the majority of the cases we analyzed, the interviews 
were retrospective. Because the content of the interviews refers to the past, sense-
making processes likely lead to complexity reduction. Furthermore, social 
expectancy and awareness that the other actor could receive information on the 
statements made during the interview could bias the data. We took measures to 
counteract these effects. Whenever possible, we interviewed more than two 
people regarding the selection process, important signals and selection criteria and 
compared the educational background of the successors with the conventional 
requirements for similar jobs. However, we encourage future researchers to apply 
a longitudinal approach and collect data at several points in time during the 
selection process.  
Second, in qualitative research, we must be aware of alternative explanations for 
the observed phenomena and take measures to exclude those alternatives (Yin, 
1984). In the present study, differences in firm size, the pool of potential 
candidates, and governance structures regarding successor selection could limit 
the explanatory power of our data. Aware of these factors when conducting 
interviews and analyzing the data, we attempted to minimize these limiting 
effects. Nevertheless, future research should control for these factors.  
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Third, in the present study, we defined the decision of to whom management 
power will be transferred as the end of the signaling game. Although this 
restriction is appropriate when analyzing the selection process, it is nevertheless 
likely that signaling in some form continues after that point. In many family 
businesses, there is no abrupt transition of management power, and the 
predecessor often remains within the company (e.g., on the advisory board). 
Although ownership transfer is generally initiated by management transfer, 
signaling may nevertheless occur between these stages, and decisions can be 
revised. We therefore encourage future research to investigate whether and how 
the signaling game develops between the management transfer and the finalizing 
of an ownership transfer.  
4.8 Managerial Implications 
In addition to its theoretical implications, the present study also offers managerial 
implications. As the findings show, selecting family internal successors in family 
businesses is not necessarily unprofessional, and the peculiarities of family 
businesses can also be regarded as opportunities to optimize this process. 
Although the findings show that selection criteria exist in most family businesses, 
the results also show that these criteria are not often transparent to all individuals 
involved and may evolve implicitly rather than being explicitly established with 
regard to strategic goals. Consciously establishing selection criteria and 
communicating those criteria to potential successors could help to render the 
selection process more transparent and efficient.  
The limited pool of internal candidates may hinder a successful succession. 
Because internal candidates are observed from early childhood, potential 
weaknesses can be identified early in the process. Training and strategic personnel 
development of potential successors can be a way to balance the disadvantages 
related to a limited pool of candidates. The family environment not only offers 
signaling opportunities but also introduces noise into the signaling process. These 
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effects cannot be fully excluded. However, being aware of potential biases 
stemming from interpersonal relationships within the family may be an important 
first step in counteracting these effects. Including external advisors from the 
process could also help overcome these biases and lead to a more professional 
selection process.  
These applications can also be applied to non-family firms in the case of 
situations that are comparable to the situation of selecting internal successors. In 
situations with a long period of exchanging signals and/or a close personal 
relationship between actors, similar implications for personnel selection can be 
expected. In this case as well, candidates might be part of the pool even though 
they do not want to be, which emphasizes the importance of the often-neglected 
negative signals. Furthermore, more feedback loops exist and can be used to 
improve the professionalization of the signaling game, even when long-term 
relationships exist between actors. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Our study shows that family businesses use signaling as a selection instrument 
when recruiting family internal successors. Our findings provide a signaling 
perspective that improves the understanding of internal selection processes in 
family firms and helps to explain how the signaling game and the selection 
process evolve over time. Furthermore, our findings contribute to signaling theory 
by demonstrating how an expanded timeframe and environment, including a 
business and a private context, may affect signaling games. These considerations 
render the insights of the present study transferable to contexts beyond family 
businesses, namely, contexts in which a long-term private or business relationship 
is involved (e.g., signaling between relatives bound by blood, spouses, friends, or 
employees who have been members of the organization for a long period of time). 
Inherent in the expanded environment are private contexts, the various qualities of 
signals and the transferability of the blood-related selection process to selection 
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processes in which a close relationship such as friendship or marriage is present. 
The long timeframe of signaling offers advantages for family firms, advantages 
that can also be adapted in non-family firms. Although the present study took 
important steps toward a better understanding of this field of investigation, gaps 
remain. We therefore encourage future studies to fill these gaps. 
This study focuses on the management succession decision. Thus, from this 
understanding, the exchange of information is finished when the final decision of 
the management is taken. According to the theoretical model developed in chapter 
2.5, there is a time when the predecessor and successor are working together also 
after the management succession, and the process will run further on until the final 
transfer of ownership. Moreover, there is information that is transferred when it is 
clear who the final successor will be. This behavior can result because it is more 
efficient to transfer this kind of information only to the final candidate. 
Furthermore, there could also be information that is so critical that it can only be 
transferred to the final candidate. There is a lack in our knowledge about what 
happens in detail after the management succession until the final ownership 
handover, especially in relation to information exchange. As previously 
mentioned, most of the research on business succession focuses on the 
management succession (Nordqvist et al., 2013). To fill this gap, the next chapter 
focuses on social capital transfer. The knowledge about network contacts and the 
ability to handle these networks can be a crucial succession factor for the long-
term survival of a family firm. The potential successor needs information about 
existing network contacts of the predecessor and the business. Then, he has to 
decide whether to explore these network contacts and build them as his social 
capital or to quit some contacts due to time restrictions or other reasons. Through 
deep investigation into the social capital transfer during internal business 
succession, this research contributes to increase the understanding of a concrete 
aspect of information exchange behavior between the predecessor and successor. 
Moreover, the study provides more in-depth insights on the outcomes of this 
behavior in the succession process.  
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5 It’s All About Who You Know: Intergenerational 
Social Capital Transfer in Family Businesses  
ABSTRACT 
For most companies, social capital is a key issue in gaining strategic advantage. 
Not surprisingly, this is also known to hold true for family businesses. In this 
context, succession is a major strategic process, in which intangible assets like 
social capital have to be transferred along with shares and management positions. 
However, little is known about how family businesses deal with this strategic 
challenge. The present research contributes to a better understanding of how 
social capital is managed during the internal family handover from predecessors 
to successors. Exploratory qualitative multiple case-study research involving 
sixteen interviews at four family firms generated insights into awareness of social 
capital as a key success factor, and into when and in what increments it is 
transferred. The findings also show how networks change over time and underline 
the strategic and operative challenges in dealing with social capital transfer. 
Finally, a conceptual model was developed of intergenerational social capital 
transfer.  
 
Keywords: Family Business, Business Succession, Social Capital  
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5.1 Introduction 
As most family businesses progress despite the financial crisis and other general 
economic challenges of recent years, research interest in family firms has 
increased (Debicki, Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009; Sharma, 
Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012). To understand why family businesses survive or die 
over time, studies have focused on various success factors such as socioemotional 
wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Naldi et al., 2013); familiness (Frank et al., 
2010; Zellweger et al., 2010); or entrepreneurial orientation (Cruz & Nordqvist, 
2012; Sciascia, Mazzola, & Chirico, 2013), as well as processes and models of 
succession and associated behaviors (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Nordqvist et 
al., 2013). In many of these studies, the social capital of families or family 
businesses has been mentioned as an important resource (Bizri, 2016; Pearson, 
Carr, & Shaw, 2008; Sanchez-Famoso, Iturralde, & Maseda 2015; Shi, Shepherd, 
& Schmidts 2015), and exploiting this social capital - especially family social 
capital (Arregle et al., 2007; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Pearson et al., 2008; 
Sanchez-Famoso, Maseda, & Iturralde, 2014; Sorenson, Goodpaster, Hedberg, & 
Yu, 2009) - has been seen as an important resource in generating positive 
performance (Chrisman et al., 2012; Coeurderoy & Lwango, 2012; Sanchez-
Famoso et al., 2015). To explore how best to extract maximum value from the 
social capital held by family members and the family business (Chrisman et al., 
2012), the influence of general family social capital on other kinds of social 
capital has also been discussed, including organizational social capital in family 
firms (Arregle et al., 2007; Uhlaner, Matser, Berent-Braun, & Flören, 2015); non-
family social capital (Gudmonson & Danes, 2013; Sanchez-Famoso et al., 2015); 
and innovation (Classen et al., 2012). 
In seeking to understand how family social capital is built and how it influences 
performance, an increasing number of studies have attempted to capture the 
specific effects of social capital in family businesses and to demonstrate its 
importance (Chrisman et al., 2012; Coeurderoy & Lwango, 2012; Sanchez-
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Famoso et al., 2015; Uhlaner et al., 2015). Given that social capital in general 
refers to opportunities arising from the knowledge of others - that is, members of 
a social network (Burt, 2009) - social capital augments opportunity identification 
and recognition capabilities. Additionally, it provides access to “loci of 
resources,” offers timing advantages, and constitutes a source of status and 
referrals (Nicolaou & Birley, 2003). For these reasons, social capital is thought to 
reduce the amount of time and money spent on gathering information and 
resources, so lowering transaction costs. As Nahapiet and Ghoshal put it: “Who 
you know affects what you know” (1998, p. 252).  
Social capital also equips individuals to sustain and enhance their competitive 
advantage through new ideas (Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003). Participation 
and investment in personal networks or contacts are thought to produce positive 
returns for both individuals and organizations. In the context of family businesses, 
the mobilization and use of individual social capital attracts benefits such as easier 
and broader access to information (Adler & Kwon, 2002), an improved 
knowledge base for (family) firms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), easier and faster 
access to innovation (Zheng, 2010), and improved company output (Westlund & 
Adam, 2010).  
Despite the advances and excellent insights of these recent studies, knowledge 
about intergenerational social capital transfer remains scarce. Several scholars in 
the field of family business research have suggested a need to focus on 
understanding the impact of intergenerational transmission - that is, the succession 
and transfer process of family businesses to the next generation - and what 
happens to social capital in this context (Chrisman et al., 2012; Miller, Steier, & 
Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Rutherford et al., 2008; Sharma, 2008; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Zamudio, Anokhin, & Kellermanns, 2014). Some studies have 
already attempted a deeper analysis of intergenerational processes of growth and 
succession to learn more about the relationship between family involvement and 
company performance (Chrisman et al., 2012). To date, however, few studies 
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have focused on the transfer of social capital in the succession process (Bizri, 
2016; De Freyman et al., 2006; Dou & Li, 2012; Steier, 2001), even where it is 
obvious that the transfer of crucial contacts to the next generation of owners and 
managers is a key success factor for sustainable performance and survival. It is 
therefore important to know more about how family businesses seek to organize 
this transfer, and how they might do so more efficiently and effectively. 
According to Zamundio et al., (2014), many aspects of social capital are of 
interest to family business research, including the nature of ties and emotional 
aspects of the relationship, the contagion of this emotion to the network, and how 
family firms’ networks (e.g., with their suppliers) differ from non-family firms.  
In following this line of research, the aim of this paper is to deepen understanding 
of social capital within the family and the family business, as well as the transfer 
of social capital during the process of internal business succession. To these ends, 
a qualitative case study approach was adopted to look at a number of family-
owned firms, using semi-structured interviews as well as secondary data to 
generate exploratory multiple-case studies for theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
As a first step, we explored awareness among predecessors and successors in 
family businesses of the importance of social capital for success, based on their 
respective networks. In identifying the mechanisms underlying the 
intergenerational transfer of social capital, we sought to expand existing 
theoretical insights to find the “missing link” in the literature. The propositions 
derived from the case studies suggest a model of the transfer of social capital, 
enabling further theory building.  
This paper makes a number of contributions to the family business literature. 
First, it explores the existing structures of social capital in family businesses at 
different stages in the succession process. A key insight that emerges is that the 
social capital structure of predecessors and successors changes over time during 
that process. To deepen knowledge of social capital transfer in the succession 
process, we develop a model of contact over time, showing when and how 
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contacts are transferred, and who is responsible for contact at which stage of the 
process. In this way, the paper clarifies the changing roles of predecessors and 
successors over time in relation to important social capital assets or resources. The 
paper further extends family business scholarship by proposing a coherent 
framework in which to understand the transfer of social capital in family firms in 
terms of such facets as weak and strong ties, handover timelines, and how 
handover of contacts depends on their importance for the family and the company. 
Among other concepts, we introduce the renewal of network effect and the 
generation gap effect to describe how the succession situation can enhance social 
capital at the levels of individual, family, and firm. 
The study is structured as follows. An account of the theoretical background is 
followed by a description of data collection and analysis. A summary of the main 
empirical findings then provides a context for the proposed model of social capital 
transfer in family firms. Finally, the implications of any predictions are discussed, 
along with the study’s limitations and directions for further research. 
5.2 Social Capital in Family Businesses and the Business 
Succession Process 
Our definition of social capital at an individual level follows the ideas of authors 
such as Coleman (1988). Social capital is inseparably linked to the individual and 
is an intangible asset (Luthans, Luthans, & Luthans, 2004). An individual can 
create social capital as a private good (Coleman, 1988) by extending and 
improving social and business relationships (Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 
2001) or by participating in social relations and creating a personal network 
(Coleman, 1988). In this context, one’s stock of social capital is defined as an 
important economic asset (Lin, 2001), and social capital and networking are 
universal key factors in business success. One important point for decision makers 
is that every network is unique, and it is important to distinguish between market, 
hierarchical, and social relations (Adler & Kwon, 2002). These involve different 
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forms of exchange, including goods and services, obedience to authority, spiritual 
security, favors, and gifts. Additionally, the type of exchange may be either 
explicit or implicit, and ties may be weak or strong as well as external or internal. 
Granovetter (1973) distinguished between strong and weak ties, measured by “the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the 
reciprocal services” (p. 1361). Differentiation of external and internal ties is part 
of a wider discussion, informed by various definitions of social capital. According 
to Adler and Kwon, the internal tie “focuses primarily on social capital as a 
resource that inheres in the social network tying a focal actor to other actors” 
(2002, p. 19). Through this, social capital can used to understand success of 
individuals and organizations in their competitive rivalry. “In contrast to this view 
of social capital as a resource located in the external linkages of a focal actor, 
bonding views focus instead on actors’ collective internal characteristics” (Adler 
& Kwon, 2002, p. 21). 
Burt’s (2009) structural holes theory offers interesting insights into 
entrepreneurial family firms, in which entrepreneurs are understood as players 
who use their position in network to pursue benefits from structural holes. In this 
context, social capital can be used for different purposes, substituting for or 
complementing other resources.  
Nahapiet and Ghosal’s (1998) model suggests that social capital includes 
structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions. The structural dimension refers to 
the connections between actors and their network positions - that is, who actors 
can reach, and how. The relational dimension focuses on relationships between 
actors developed through interactions over time. The cognitive dimension 
includes resources that are an outgrowth of relations between actors with “shared 
representations, interpretations and systems of meanings” (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 
1998, p. 244).  
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On that basis, following Adler and Kwon (2002, p. 23), Nahapiet and Ghosal 
(1998, p. 243), and Lin (2001, p. 3), we define social capital for present purposes 
as  
“… the sum of the actual and potential resources and the goodwill available 
to individuals embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual. Investments in social 
capital will affect returns in the marketplace and as such are very important 
for business success. Its effects flow from the information, influence, and 
solidarity it makes available to the actor.”  
In family business research, family social capital is also assumed to exist (Arregle 
et al., 2007; Danes, Stafford, Haynes, & Amarapurkar, 2009). Among the 
different approaches in the literature, some define family social capital as the 
relationships that exist between family members (Arregle et al., 2007). A broader 
definition of family social capital refers to relationships between family members 
and families; for instance, Danes et al., (2009) described it as “goodwill among 
family members and between families and their community members that can be 
input to the owning family and their firm to facilitate action” (p. 202). Similarly, 
Sorenson and Bierman (2009) argued that family social capital includes network 
structures between the family and the family firm, and that it is an important asset 
for the success of family businesses. One essential aspect of family social capital 
is that it cannot be imported or hired and is therefore an attribute (competitive 
advantage) that fundamentally differentiates family businesses from non-family 
businesses (Sorenson & Bierman, 2009).  
The current literature has focused mainly on this kind of social capital (Nordstrom 
& Steier, 2015; Zamudio et al., 2014). This network perspective on family 
business concentrates on network structures inside the family firm and the family 
itself, (e.g., kinship effects and nepotism) (Carnes & Ireland, 2013; Chittoor & 
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Das, 2007; Verbeke & Kano, 2012) and on the distinction between family and 
business (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Pearson et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). In addition, the family is seen as a pivotal, 
intangible, and difficult to imitate resource, with strong internal ties that influence 
the family business culture. This is important in accounting for the entrepreneurial 
orientation of family members in relation to innovation and performance 
(Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2009; Zellweger et al., 2012). There is 
evidence of the importance of family business networks for innovation, finance, 
and exchange of information (e.g., Classen et al., 2012; Zahra, 2010). Another 
kind of social capital is organizational social capital, defined as “a resource 
reflecting the character of social relations within the organization, realized 
through members’ levels of collective goal orientation and shared trust” (Leana & 
van Buren, 1999, p. 540).  
Because family business deals with both family and business, it is important to 
differentiate and confine one’s attention to one kind of tie. To reduce complexity, 
it was decided to focus here on an analysis of the transgenerational transfer of 
social capital. The question of why an individual needs social capital might be 
answered by suggesting that social capital is a long-lived asset to be invested in, 
with the expectation of a future flow of benefits such as business deals and 
innovation creation (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Classen et al., 2012). Building and 
transferring social capital requires the expertise to identify key ties, to maintain 
strong and weak ties, and to handle the network with maximum efficiency. To 
remain successful, family firms must also face these challenges in transferring 
social capital during the business succession process. How they view and handle 
these challenges is the main research question of the present study, following 
Steier’s (2001) assertion that it is important to develop an accurate map of the 
firm´s network structure and of how these intangible assets are transferred and 
managed.  
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On the basis of this theoretical discussion, we conclude that, as networks entail 
relations between different actors, and network contacts have to be transferred 
from one person to another during the succession process, some inherent social 
capital competence is needed. As a special kind of break in the life cycle of a 
family business, succession may interrupt solid external network contacts. Among 
the first studies of the link between business succession and social capital, Steier 
(2001) noted that this succession may take a number of forms: unplanned, sudden, 
rushed, natural immersion, or planned (Steier, 2001). Following this line of 
inquiry, based on 18 interviews with successors, Steier identified seven methods 
of managing social capital in these situations. As well as developing initial 
insights into awareness of social capital in a family business, he began to form a 
view of social capital transfer. De Freyman, Richomme-Huet, & Paturel (2006) 
examined the links between internal business succession and social capital 
transfer. Using semi-structured in-depth interviews, their main objective was to 
explore the conditions of transfer of social capital. Based on three elementary 
conditions (the successor must agree to integrate social network in place; the 
actual leader must agree to create a positive environment; stakeholders must agree 
to substitute these two generations) they developed an exploratory model of 
different zones for the transfer of social capital during business succession; these 
were the social distrust zone, the cognitive dissonance zone, the generational 
conflict zone, and the optimal transferability zone.  
Another study dealing with social capital and the succession process analyzed the 
role of a special kind of social capital called guanxi (Dou & Li, 2012) - a network 
of personal contacts that influences almost all individual decisions in family 
business succession in China. Identifying four phases - preheating, triggering, 
readjusting, and reconstructing - Dou and Li (2012) showed how business 
succession affects the business network, which parties are affected, and how the 
guanxis of different actors overlap. Granted that such network structures do not 
exist in other countries, personal networks of family and friends are nevertheless 
likely to impact on individual decisions and behavior. In a case study of twelve 
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family businesses in different industries and of different sizes, Bizri (2016) looked 
at drivers influencing the choice of successor and the impact of this choice on 
sibling entrepreneurial behavior. Bizri (2016) examined these selection drivers in 
terms of their structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions, confirming that all 
had an impact.  
Nevertheless, many questions remain to be answered—for instance, at what stage 
of the succession process is what kind of social capital to be transferred, which 
contacts are most important to transfer at what stage, and how is social capital 
transferred between parties to the succession? As most family business owners 
worldwide still prefer to hand over to daughters or sons (Dehlen et al., 2014; 
Salvato & Aldrich, 2012), and given that prior research has emphasized the 
centrality of intra-family succession (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; Sharma et al., 
2001), it makes sense to focus only on cases of internal family succession to 
generate results that will be of relevance to other family businesses. In particular, 
the external ties of the family firm owner are important because of the founder-
centricity of small and medium family businesses (as well as those larger firms 
with a high founder-centric culture).  
It is also known that many family businesses have persisting networks with other 
family businesses (Arregle et al., 2007; Classen et al., 2012). If all network 
partners are involved in the business succession process but attention is focused 
on internal changes, there is a high risk of overlooking the structured transfer of 
external contacts, and strong ties may turn into weak ones. Additionally, network 
partners may not be sensitized if only one family business is immediately 
involved in the succession process, or because the age distribution of network 
partners differs, again making the transfer more complex. In all such cases, the 
transfer of network contacts is difficult, and predecessors and successors may not 
be sufficiently aware of these issues in transferring social capital or sufficiently 
active in integrating successors into existing networks. As business succession 
increases the complexity of social capital exploitation, Zamudio et al., (2014) 
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suggested that qualitative methods may prove fruitful for researchers in this area. 
The overall research question of this qualitative study is: How do family 
businesses deal with the transfer of social capital during the succession process?  
5.3 Method 
The general aim here was to provide an in-depth insight into the status quo, as 
well as the behavior of predecessors and successors in relation to the transfer of 
social capital. As mentioned above, few studies have examined the transfer of 
social capital in relation to business succession processes (Bizri, 2016; De 
Freyman et al., 2006; Dou & Li, 2012; Steier, 2001). Given the complexity of 
social interactions in this context (De Freyman et al., 2006) and the lack of any 
comprehensive analysis, it is considered preferable to adopt an explorative 
qualitative approach. As a means of describing a phenomenon in its real-life 
context, we selected the multiple-case study method (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
1984) in pursuit of deeper insights in each case. The research questions seek to 
explain how a phenomenon takes place - in this instance, the transfer of social 
capital in a family business context - and what kinds of process can be identified 
and described, making the exploratory multiple-case study an appropriate choice 
(De Massis & Kotlar, 2014). This approach also provides a more robust base for 
theory building (Yin, 1984), and the analysis can be expected to yield more 
deeply grounded propositions (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
To generate results of general relevance to family business or to other domains 
such non-family business, the selection approach focused on small- and medium-
sized companies that were family-owned. In the interests of building generalizable 
theory, businesses of different generations and size were chosen from one specific 
industry (the distribution sector), based on a theoretical sampling approach 
(Siggelkow, 2007). To begin, we defined family businesses as characterized by 
(1) an overlap between family, business, and ownership (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996), 
in which at least 50% of the business must be owned by one family or several 
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families; (2) involvement or influence of one or more family members in 
management or strategic decisions and development; and (3) past, present, or 
planned involvement in a business succession process (Chua, Chrisman, & 
Sharma, 1999). Each of the case businesses complied with these criteria.  
To achieve a broad insight into different kinds of family business and to assess 
similarities or differences in handling of social capital issues, we interviewed 
members of four German family firms of very small, small, and medium size. We 
excluded large family firms at this stage, as an overwhelming majority of family 
businesses (95%) are SMEs, and we wanted to focus on how those firms organize 
the succession process. Large companies may act in similar ways, but the results 
and insights would be less transferable. To ensure comparable results, the sample 
was also confined to a single industry, in which networks involving both long- 
and short-term customers or suppliers are crucial. While these data might be 
transferable to other family businesses and to other industries, our first concern 
was to generate ideas about the processes in this particular environment. All of 
our cases, then, related to different kinds of distribution firms, all of which were 
family firms, working as intermediaries in this business context. In the 
distribution sector, social capital is very important and indeed central to business 
success and survival.  
To understand the process of social capital transfer, it was important to examine 
different stages of the succession process, and the selected firms were at the time 
in different phases of that process. All had commenced the process a few years 
previously. In three of the four cases, (CASE 2, 6 years; CASE 3, 10 years; CASE 
4, 14 years), the predecessor had already transferred the daily business to a great 
extent to the successor; the remaining firm was at an earlier stage and as yet 
unconcerned (CASE 1, SUC_2). By framing the sample in that way, we hoped to 
obtain specific information about how family members deal with the transfer of 
social capital at different stages in the succession process, and about any 
differences or similarities at the various stages, as well as about the likely timing 
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of social capital transfer. After analysing the first interview, it seemed interesting 
to look for further insights among the sub-groups (e.g. customers, suppliers, car-
dealer), and it was decided to conduct the next interviews with those groups to 
better understand the social capital structure and the handling of the process. 
Ultimately, then, we conducted four interviews with predecessors, five interviews 
with successors, and seven interviews with important employees and important 
network contacts outside the businesses (e.g., additional car dealer CASE 1; key 
employees (CFO) in the lumber company CASE 3). Starting from the core 
interviews and cases led on to other family firms or network contacts that helped 
to clarify the dyadic relationship (Gooty & Yammarino, 2011). Table 6 presents 
an overview of the data. 
Table 6: Overview case studies 
Source: Author’s illustration adapted from Tagiuri & Davis (1996) 
All the data collected from one-to-one interviews were transliterated, coded, and 
finally analyzed using MAXQDA (software for qualitative analysis). For in-depth 
insights, the semi-structured interviews included key questions related to existing 
social networks, the construction and extension of social network structures, and 
the transfer of social network relationships during the business succession process 
(see the semi-structured interview guide in the Appendix). Secondary data were 
used to extend and review the data from personal interviews, including firm 
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homepages and historical records such as chronicles and periodicals. Additionally, 
several industry reports were screened to ensure that data were representative and 
to subject the investigated businesses to cross-sectoral comparison. To be sure that 
we were dealing with family businesses, we asked interviewees (predecessors and 
successors) to answer some questions regarding F-PEC values. This provided 
further information regarding the family influence on the business and their 
thoughts and culture in relation to “power, experience and culture” (Astrachan et 
al., 2002). In so doing, we were able to gather more information about ownership, 
management structure, and business relations to enrich and support the analysis. 
5.4 Analyses and Results  
In this exploratory study, we adopted a two-step approach. In the first step, we 
analyzed and described the existing network of predecessors and successors. Most 
of the dataset referred to family firms that chose a planned succession, where 
predecessor and successor were likely to work together. Such firms have a 
realistic chance of transferring network contacts in a more or less organized and 
planned way. As mentioned above, it was assumed that important external 
network contacts must be known and transferred if a family business is to transfer 
successfully to the next generation for long-term survival. For those who did this 
in an organized way, we wanted to know how and when; for those who were less 
well organized, it was even more interesting to see how a transfer happens (or 
fails to happen). To analyze explicit and implicit known network contacts, we 
compared the statements of participants to identify overlapping network contacts. 
According to Steier (2001), graphics can be drawn to clarify and reveal 
transparent network contacts. In addition, we explicated one further important 
item of information: the current position of successors inside the company at a 
specific stage in the succession process. Taguiri and Davis’s (1996) three-circle 
model was used to determine whether the successor was in the family sphere only 
or already active in the business or ownership/management sphere.  
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To get a general idea of how they worked together, the answers of predecessors 
and successors were compared, first in single cases and then across cases. In this 
step of the research, the material was reduced to key aspects to represent those in 
figures for each case study. Without articulating any specific definition of social 
capital, all participants argued that important network contacts were defined as the 
key people or companies with whom they had the longest relationship, who were 
trusted and had trust in their mutual relationship. The following section provides 
examples of networks from the different cases.  
5.4.1 Case Study Network Structures 
Figure 14: Case study 1 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Figure 14 shows the actual network structure of the car dealer (CASE 1). In this 
case, there is high dependence on manufacturers, as well as interdependency on 
the bank because of a high debt ratio. While other network partners are very 
important, the relationships are mainly optional. Because of the long product life 
cycle, customers are less relevant as network partners. This assumption was also 
confirmed by our interviewees. As successor 1 (SUC_1) has been in the family 
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business for four years, they have more relationships with a number of actors than 
successor 2 (SUC_2). 
Figure 15: Case study 2 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
The network structure of the bicycle wholesaler and manufacturer (CASE 2) is 
shown in figure 15. In this case, there is also a subcase with a business succession 
process. To reduce complexity, it was decided to show only aspects of relevance 
to the main case in figure 15. As this is a smaller business than CASE 1 and 
CASE 3, there are also fewer main actors in the network. One interesting aspect is 
the significant network distance to the bank, as the business is completely self-
financed. Although the successor has worked for six years in the family business, 
and the predecessor knows that some network partners are waiting for the 
succession, most relationships are with the predecessor. This is a special situation 
in that the successor is studying at university while working in the family 
business. 
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Figure 16: Case study 3 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Figure 16 shows the supplier of lumber (CASE 3). In this case, predecessor and 
successor have been working together for ten years and are equal-share owners. 
The predecessor has to a great extent successfully transferred his contacts to 
network actors; this can be inferred from both actors’ confirmation that former 
business partners of the predecessor now contact the successor. The successor’s 
new network is also important, as he has not only adopted the existing network 
but has also built up a new one. Only the bank and subsidiary company are part of 
his connections within the business network. 
The final case study (CASE 4) is shown in figure 17. Here, the predecessor and 
successor have already been working together for fifteen years, which is the 
longest timeframe for business succession among the observed cases. For this 
reason, as in CASE 3, most network contacts have already been transferred. One 
interesting point of difference from the other cases is that a second important bank 
was mentioned as a network partner. As the successor has an existing relationship 
with one bank, there is no contact with the second bank—a relationship that is still 
maintained by the predecessor.  
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Figure 17: Case Study 4 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
Based on our observations, these family business networks and their ties are 
illustrated in the graphs by lines of different strengths and by the distances 
between network contacts. To elucidate social capital structures during business 
succession processes, we reflected on two initial points. First, we thought about 
plotting the different actors and their importance to the respective businesses. We 
also wanted to characterize how predecessors and successors are linked to each 
other’s networks. To this end, we analyzed where they are similarly linked or 
where relationships are held only by one of them to establish the extent to which 
social capital has already been transferred. From our analysis of the interviews, 
we were able to identify two key relations: (1) high dependence over a longer 
period and (2) optional relations resulting from friendly or extensive cooperation. 
This perspective mainly reveals the relationships of the predecessor; the 
successor’s relationships to network actors are often still in development but may 
also be high-dependence or optional.  
Where the successor becomes increasingly involved in the family business, his 
contacts will build up over time, as illustrated in these quotes from the 
predecessor and successor in CASE 1. 
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PRE_CASE_1: We are involved in an important network with other car 
dealers. In this network, our conversations are very important (for the use 
of our power as a group). I have an important position in this network 
because I am a friend of the president and vice president of the network. 
SUC 1_CASE_1: The network holds a round table every three or four 
months. I have been there from time to time, but it was not of interest to 
me. Perhaps I will intensify this in the future.  
As the quotes above show, the strength of the tie and the evaluation of its 
importance differ for the two parties. In this case, the predecessor will remain in 
the family business in the coming years. The successor is still at the nurturing and 
development phase and currently has 10% ownership. Here, we observed a step-
by-step business succession process, which is aligned with gradual social capital 
transfer. Modeling network structures, the responses of the most important 
network actors provide information about levels of trust and friendship. From 
these questions, we were able to establish whether the network is used only for 
business relationships or whether there is perhaps a high dependence on a 
particular supplier or customer. For example, one predecessor says that while in 
the case of one supplier, there is close collaboration without dependence 
(PRE_CASE_2), another relationship is “unavoidable” (PRE_CASE_2). The 
following quote clearly indicates a high level of dependency. 
PRE_CASE_1: This one of my new goals: to change, with my son 
(successor), the 100% dependence on the one and only supplier (…). To 
design a new format and so become more independent. 
Based on these statements, we analyzed all interviews to look for dependence 
between network partners. One example of an optional relationship is the 
statement “We have a multitude of suppliers” (SUC_CASE_3). Such statements 
are classified as optional relations “without” dependence. In some interviews, we 
found that optional relationships could result in friendship, and vice versa (e.g., 
CASE 1).  
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To assess the extent to which social capital is already transferred, we analyzed 
predecessors’ and successors’ answers about their first role in the family business 
and their current positions. For example, one predecessor reported that while at 
the beginning of the succession both of them handled customers, over time 
relationships with new customers have been maintained by the successor, and old 
contacts have also for the most part been transferred (PRE_CASE_4). 
After describing the status quo in relation to social capital and predecessors’ and 
successors’ networks, we analyzed the process of transferring social capital; more 
precisely, we focused on the implications of the process of transfer of network 
contacts during the internal business succession. Two overall inferences can be 
drawn from our mapping of the networks. First of all, information asymmetries 
can be identified, in that some predecessors’ network contacts, although relevant 
to the company, were already unknown to their successors. Some successors did 
not know the names of key network contacts, and some were unable to evaluate 
the strength or importance of contacts (CASE 1). A second finding was that 
successors who already hold shares in the company are more integrated in the 
network than those who were currently only members of the management team 
(e.g., CASE 2 and CASE 3). Beyond these overall implications, we were able to 
identify specific phenomena that occur during transfer of network contacts, and 
these will be described in the next section.  
5.4.2 Strategic Reasoning for Business Succession and Success  
In this section, we will develop propositions that can be used for further theory 
building. Our first obvious finding is that, in every case, the network position of 
the bank is emphasized by participants, all of whom worked with only a small 
number of banks. In every case, as confirmed by every predecessor, the most 
interested and engaged partner in the succession process was the bank. As a 
network partner, the bank tries to actively screen the situation of both the 
company itself and of the successor as an individual. At the same time, it is clear 
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that the bank is the network partner closest to the predecessor, and the one that the 
predecessor retains in his control for as long as he can. The quotes in table 7 
provide exemplary evidence of this strong bank tie. 
Table 7: Statements bank 
Case Quote 
SUC_CASE_4 Which are the five important network contacts?  
For me it is clear. First the local bank, I am sure, the local 
bank is very important. 
SUC_CASE_4 Mainly I am responsible for customer and supplier 
maintenance. My father does all the contacts with the banks. 
SUC_CASE_4 The collaboration with the bank, my father does. Sometimes I 
attend, but the contact in the bank is a friend of him. Over the 
years of collaboration they developed a private relationship, 
and my father was on the board of directors in the past.  
PRE_CASE_2 We cannot count on the current customer structure. It is also 
very important to know our former suppliers and the contact 
with the bank. A good, very intensive relationship with the 
bank is important. And these network contacts have already 
asked when my son is going to become my successor.  
Additional_Inter
view_CASE_1 
We are a company of good standing at our local bank. This is 
very important. 
SUC 2_CASE_1 And my brother said to me another day: “Imagine, we two 
together at a bank discussion. We will floor them.” At the 
moment this is only imagined, but this is a good one. 
 
Based on the observed pattern, we propose the following. 
Proposition 1: The bank as a central network contact is retained for as 
long as possible in the predecessor’s network. 
The position of the bank and its relationship with the predecessor was 
acknowledged by all the successors in our study. We also established that 
potential internal successors lack social capital and competence to act in networks 
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to build relationships with the bank or other important network contacts. This 
finding derives mainly from two elements of the adopted approach. First, it 
reflects the selection process; in some cases, there was a pool of candidates, and 
the predecessor could choose an internal successor (CASE 1, CASE 3). In such 
cases, some social capital signals are clearly important. As one of the successors 
mentioned, they have to be similar to their father, especially in communication 
with suppliers: 
SUC 2_CASE_1: We should be like him (Predecessor) (…) He is someone 
who bangs on the table. He has a strong character; everybody knows him, 
and my brother is like him. I think I am more introverted. 
In one of the subcases, the successor reported that her brother was not interested 
in representing the company at marketing events or official dates:  
Additional_Interview_CASE_1: My brother makes his own things. (…) I 
am extrovert and my brother is not. He does not want to go to meetings or 
represent the firm. He does not like it. This is why I am the CEO.  
Because of this disinterest, he would not ultimately become the successor—a 
decision taken by the predecessor and potential successors. From this, we would 
suggest that in a situation where there is a pool of candidates, social capital 
competence is seen as a selection criterion. Predecessors integrate their successors 
step by step into the current network; the object of this action is to maintain that 
network. It also could observed that the predecessor intended to leave his own 
network once the successor was integrated.  
Where there is no pool of candidates, another solution can be identified: the 
reallocation of social capital through key employees who care about the network 
contacts. In CASE 3, for instance, it was interesting that the key employee also 
cared about bank contact; here, the missing social capital of successors will be 
balanced through an external source. This key employee is also responsible for 
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bank contacts and financial affairs. On that basis, the following propositions are 
advanced. 
Proposition 2a: Social capital is a selection criterion in the business 
succession process and is trained through step-by-step integration into the 
network. 
Proposition 2b: If the preferred internal successor lacks social capital, 
this is balanced through an external team member. 
A further aspect that emerged when analyzing the network was that it may be 
important to consider the age of those in the family business network. This is 
necessary in a number of instances; first, if other firms in the network are family 
businesses and already have a business succession process, are planning a 
succession, or are at least alert to it. Second, network actors may be non-family 
businesses, in which management longevity is often less than in family 
businesses, which means that younger actors may become important actors in the 
network. Third, new businesses with young owners or employees may move into 
the market. In these cases, there is the possibility of a generation gap. The 
predecessor in CASE 2 mentioned this as a reason for the necessity of succession:  
PRE_CASE_2: He (my son) has to address the young generation. We are 
in a successor change situation. The youth take over our customers’ 
businesses, and they are the same age as my son. These young people 
understand each other, and sometimes they have totally different opinions. 
I am sure that he is able to handle this situation. 
This predecessor pointed out that his successor must address the new generation, 
given that some of his network contacts had already transferred their businesses to 
that next generation. Another reason is that new ideas related to products or ways 
of working together may prove much easier to advance within convergent points 
of view. One further reason relates to approaches to customer acquisition. To 
build up new network structures the predecessor and successor in CASE 3 visited 
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and exhibited at different fairs. With many potential new network partners at these 
fairs, it could be advantageous to have two generations present as contact persons. 
During the transfer of social capital, it is important that predecessor and successor 
recognize this generation gap and are able to act accordingly. This leads to the 
next proposition. 
Proposition 3: The generation gap is an important issue, as the successor 
must preserve the existing predecessor network and build up his own. 
Factors other than the generation gap may influence the transfer and building of 
new network relationships. Sometimes, for various reasons, business relationships 
within networks are curtailed—for instance, suppliers’ products may change, or 
customers may have new requirements. But it is also possible that relationships 
are curtailed for personal reasons. Within the business succession, the successor 
may be able to renew those relationships, provided that he knows about former 
relations. We discovered that business succession processes can reinforce this 
effect, as reported by one of our participants:  
PRE_CASE_3: A former relationship with a customer, lost because of 
interpersonal problems, was re-established because of changes in both 
management teams. 
By implication, one particular requirement of transferring social capital is to 
inform successors about old contacts and reasons why these might be renewed. In 
everyone’s interests, it is essential to document former relationships and why 
these no longer exist. This must be a structured process, beginning before the 
successor joins the business and continuing until the predecessor leaves. Based on 
the observed pattern, we propose the following. 
Proposition 4: Renewal of networks will only be possible if former 
relationships are known and the successor is capable of reactivating them.  
Another opportunity arising from the generation gap is inherent in the succession 
process. If a customer is closer in age to the successor, this may attract a strategic 
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position in the management team. The need to understand customer needs and 
easier access to people of the same age means that the successor can more quickly 
occupy a key position in the network. This reflects the need for new input for 
innovative ideas, the possibility of exploiting the relevant network because of 
easier access to the target group, and better understanding of customer needs. 
Experience in the market may be balanced by network contacts acquired during 
education, such as university contacts. In CASE 1, father and son saw an 
opportunity to use knowledge of the target group to sell cars to customers closer 
to their own generation. And in CASE 3, the successor described that because he 
studied with the next generation of suppliers, they knew each other and talked 
about the future. The predecessor in CASE 2 underlined the dependence of new 
input on the successor, who had a better education. In this access to university 
through his son, he also saw an opportunity, sensing the need for innovation 
through the young generation. In this case, the successor was totally integrated in 
the company, had a good overview of network contacts, and represented the 
company in the central network. These findings inform the next proposition. 
Proposition 5: Dependence on the successor as spin doctor and 
generation broker influences the timeframe of integration into the network. 
5.4.3 Towards a Process View of Social Capital Transfer in Family 
Businesses 
To summarize our current findings and contributions to the literature, we 
constructed an overall model. Figure 18 visualizes these observations and 
propositions, highlighting the changes in social networks before, during, and after 
business succession. The findings include a specific timeframe for transferring 
network contacts.  
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Figure 18: Overall model of social capital transfer in the business succession  
Source: Author’s illustration. 
In t-1, the successor is seen as a potential candidate, who starts by joining the 
company and gaining management competence. Still in education, the potential 
candidate joins the business with a given responsibility or in a specific 
management position. The relevant private network plays an under representative 
role in the family business at this time.  
In t-0, predecessor and successor are in most cases working in the business at the 
same time. The predecessor begins to shed network contacts to transfer them to 
the successor, who in turn begins to build up relevant network contacts by 
transferring existing network contacts and integrating new ones. We note that, in 
the cases reported here, the kind of contact that is first to be transferred depends 
on the business model, and the heterogeneity of family business underlines this 
observation. In CASE 2 and CASE 3, suppliers were transferred in a more or less 
structured way. In CASE 1, customers were the first network contacts to be 
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transferred to the successor, reflecting the dependence and personal contact with 
one main supplier. On that basis, we would suggest that the starting point for 
phase t-0 is the integration of the successor in the network through a more or less 
structured transfer of relationships considered relevant or important. As the 
successor’s private network becomes more relevant, individual private networks 
of relevance to the family business are reachable but are not the focus of the 
actors’ interest during this time.  
In t+1, the predecessor is leaving the network. As already mentioned, the bank 
remains part of the predecessor’s network as long as he retains part ownership. 
We can conclude that, in cases of founder centricity, the networks of predecessor 
and successor are defined as the important ones for the family business in general. 
Over time, the successor’s network replaces that of the predecessor, who has an 
opportunity to leave the company and parts of the network. The timeframe and the 
opportunity to work together a structured process. 
The propositions we build, are important in different stages of time frame. It has 
to be underlined, that in most cases, there is no event for implementing successors 
in the network through active communication. There is a creeping process, which 
includes knowledge management. There is awareness for social capital transfer, 
but daily business as well as the financial transfer of business is higher ranked in 
the business succession. It is need to mention that proposition 3 is depended from 
the size of business. According to resourced resource- based view, it is not 
possible in every business to integrate external team members in the top 
management team or to redefine the organizational structure to balance missing 
social capital. Additionally, this may not necessarily arise in every business 
succession process, as propositions 2 and 3 are linked with each other.  
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5.5 Discussion 
In this exploratory study, we aimed to improve understanding of the transfer of 
social capital in family business internal succession. Based on interviews with 
family business members, employees and other important network contacts, we 
were able to demonstrate awareness of social networks, the transfer of important 
network contacts over time, and inherent outcomes for the family business in 
general. Based on knowledge of succession in family businesses, we have shown 
that transfer of social capital plays a crucial role in this process. 
The present study extends knowledge of social capital in family firms. To date, 
studies of social capital and networks in family firms have been under-represented 
in the family business literature (Nordstrom & Steier, 2015). There is evidence 
that the social capital of families or family businesses is an important resource - 
for example, in generating positive performance (Arregle, Batjargal, Hitt, Webb, 
Miller, & Tsui, 2015; Bizri, 2016; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Pearson et al., 
2008; Sanchez-Famoso et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Additionally, both family 
business research and innovation management research have identified 
interdependencies between networks and innovation (e.g., Classen et al., 2012; 
Chua et al., 2012; Zahra, 2010). This study extends current knowledge by 
underlining the generation gap effect and the renewal of network effect. Renewal 
of a family firm’s network structure may enable innovation within the network, 
which is fundamental for long-term performance. Entrepreneurial orientation, 
both of the business and of each individual family member, is another possible 
explanation of how proposition 5 (spin doctor and broker) connects with 
proposition 3 (generation gap). As successors must close generation gaps, acting 
as brokers or spin doctors to compensate for structural holes, an entrepreneurial 
orientation can influence the future development of a family business and its 
networks (Burt, 1986; Chirico, Sirmon, Sciascia, & Mazzola, 2011).  
In focusing on social capital transfer in family business internal succession, we 
contribute to the literature on business succession (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; 
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Nordqvist et al., 2013). More specifically, we have confirmed the importance of 
knowledge management as a basis for successful social network transfer (Steier, 
2001). We can also situate our findings on information asymmetries in this 
context, proposing the existence of such asymmetries in relation to important 
network contacts during the internal business succession process. This may be 
explained as an unfinished succession process, and the step-by-step approach 
needed to integrate successors into the network is identified as a hands-on 
process. The timeframes of the cases analyzed reveal differences in level of 
information asymmetries, as they abate with time. It might be expected that the 
information asymmetries in CASE 3 relate mainly to network contacts that the 
successor does not care about. Additionally, principal agent theory may help to 
explain this situation (Madison et al., 2016). If the predecessor is seen as principal 
and the successor is seen as agent, there are inherent information asymmetries 
because both parties are in a signaling game. The succession decision is not 
fulfilled, and during this process, a change in selection becomes a possibility for 
both parties. As a result, the predecessor remains liable until completion of 
ownership transfer. The information asymmetries identified in our cases are well 
known for both parties but are not currently acknowledged as a central problem. It 
remains unclear whether the consequences are realized, as for example in cases of 
sudden unplanned succession. In line with the extant literature (Steier, 2001), we 
propose that most knowledge of social contacts is implicit. Without knowledge of 
former contacts, there is no possibility of exploiting the renewal of network effect; 
a tool to simplify or to accelerate both the process of transfer and easier network 
renewal would therefore be of practical relevance. 
In this context, the bank plays an important role in the evaluation and transfer of 
contacts, perhaps according to the company’s debt ratio. In CASE 3, the debt ratio 
was limited, but they explained the interests of the bank, and communication 
between them, in detail. In this case, dependency did not account for the strong 
relationship. It should be mentioned that, in Western Europe, the respect for banks 
remains high; independent of the debt ratio, there may be a feeling that the 
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potential loss of autonomy also influences the situation, as the family business 
owner tries to retain the network contact. Another explanation may lie in the 
distinction between management and ownership transfer. In most cases, 
ownership transfer is realized following management transfer and often marks the 
closing move in the succession process. Until that point, ownership and 
accountability fall to the predecessor. As a result, regardless of trust in the 
successor, this relationship is influenced mainly by dependency. Another possible 
explanation is that the strength of ties rules the transfer process. In the step-by-
step process, trust between both parties is developed according to willingness and 
ability to succeed. The stronger the trust in a fruitful succession, the more 
information is likely to be shared about contacts.  
In addition to these important findings, the present study confirms the influence of 
social capital transfer on the business succession process at different levels. As 
well as developing a map of the firm´s network structure (Steier, 2001), we have 
added findings about awareness of the network structure among predecessors and 
successors. Our model illustrates the different stages in social capital transfer, 
which is analogous to business succession models. Furthermore, we extend the 
findings of Steier (2001) who identified four modes of succession and developed 
seven means of managing that process. Steier (2001) focused on the question of 
how next-generation entrepreneurs manage social capital residing beyond the 
firm, observing the broad spectrum of relationships and tacit knowledge. In the 
present study, we examined planned succession and the deliberate transfer of 
social capital, with due regard to the role of the previous generation in transferring 
this knowledge over time. We have also demonstrated that if they recognize a 
strategic asset in the network of the successor (renewal of network effect) or in 
their integration into the existing network, predecessors are likely to be more 
proactive. We have shown that beyond determining current criticalities (Steier, 
2001), it is important to transfer important former network contacts that the next 
generation may be able to exploit. While agreeing that attaining legitimacy is 
important, step-by-step integration by the predecessor, where possible, can 
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support that legitimacy. Our findings also align with existing evidence about 
managing ties through delegation and division of labour; to this, we add further 
evidence about social capital as a selection criterion, showing how family firms 
integrate other family members or managers before succession is finalized.  
Our study also finds support for the three elementary conditions identified by De 
Freyman et al., (2006, p. 84): 1) the successor must agree to integrate social 
network in place; 2) the actual leader must agree to create a positive 
environment; 3) stakeholders must agree to substitute these two generations. Our 
research confirms how these conditions can be applied to the succession process. 
We focused on planned successions, in which predecessors and successors are 
willing to transfer the family business and social contacts to preserve the family 
and the firm. Our model encompasses the transfer, integration of the predecessor, 
and the predecessor’s departure. We can also show that the role of the successor 
as spin doctor and generation broker determines the succession timeframe. This 
can impact on stakeholder agreement by forcing the predecessor to integrate the 
successor into the existing network. 
In line with Dou and Li (2013), who studied Chinese firms using guanxi (the 
Chinese version of social capital), we also show that there are different stages in 
social capital transfer. They emphasized the cross-generational role in readjusting 
for guanxi building and management. We show how role changes influence social 
capital transfer (and, in turn, the business succession process), which can be 
crucial both for renewal of the family firm and for innovation.  
Our findings deepen Bizri’s (2016) understanding of social capital in the context 
of Lebanese family firms, focusing on the drivers behind choice of successor and 
impacts on the entrepreneurial behavior of siblings. As well as considering social 
capital as a selection criterion, we also explore the further implications of social 
capital for the business succession process in general, contributing to the selection 
criteria research stream (Chrisman et al., 1998; Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014).  
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Our findings about the importance of likeness of predecessor and successor in 
relation to networking are also important. As already mentioned, social capital is 
among the selection criteria for business succession; as it is seen as a character 
trait, it may be a good idea to measure this trait as a criterion, relative to other 
selection criteria. This could be integrated in certain business succession transfer 
models (e.g., Le Breton Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2004), with emphasis on the 
process of nurturing successors. In every case, the step-by-step integration of 
successors into the network should be analyzed and assessed as a success factor. 
Where social capital is missing, external members can compensate; this finding 
also concurs with the literature relating to external members of top management 
teams and the professionalization literature (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). 
5.6 Limitations and Future Research 
As in any qualitative approach, the present study has some shortcomings, which 
can be fruitful for further research. As mentioned above, qualitative studies could 
yield more interesting findings. The small base of cases prevents generalization, 
and it would be necessary to conduct quantitative studies to check the models and 
propositions advanced here. As all the case businesses are in a specific sector of 
sales, other industries should be investigated to confirm our empirical results. In 
one of the cases, we observed dysfunctional family relationships and had to 
remove this information from our analysis. Our focus on the individual as the unit 
of analysis rather than using a multilevel approach could also be criticized. It is 
another limitation of this qualitative study that not every dyadic relationship was 
covered in the interview, as interview partners did not wish to supply information 
about the counterpart, or counterparts (especially bank contacts) were not allowed 
to divulge information to the research team. One of the studies involved a team 
succession. In such cases, it would be important to discuss who transfers the 
network contacts to whom - for instance, is the first successor responsible because 
he is in the network already? In consortia involving cousins, this process becomes 
increasingly complex. In the present study, only internal successions were 
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analyzed. It might be supposed that external managers are subject to a more 
structured process because of the shorter time frame, but it remains a possibility 
that they are only given network contacts that are evaluated as important. Further 
research is needed to assess this situation. This study also considers external 
network contact, based on the unit of analysis and the assumption of founder 
centricity, and is also influenced by a firm size effect. In bigger or more 
decentralized firms, both the internal network balancing of social capital as well 
as the option to decentralize networking may be important resources in the 
succession process and should inform further research. The network might also be 
viewed as an exit strategy.  
5.7 Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed how social capital transfer within the business succession 
process can be transferred and which details of that process should inform best 
practice. This offers a new conceptual framework in the field of business 
succession and social capital, with implications for long-term corporate success. 
In an increasingly networked world, this study offers family firms a rationale for 
handling this challenge and highlights the importance and opportunities of 
structured transfer for both theory and practice. We hope these findings will 
inspire further research. 
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6 Summary of the Findings of this Dissertation and 
Concluding Remarks  
Business succession in family firms is a complex process that requires further 
research to elucidate its dynamics and offer hints for preservation of the family 
and firm (Nordqvist et al., 2013). To attain the goal of understanding business 
succession, it is logical to reduce complexity and focus on the process itself or 
parts of the process instead of trying to comprehend “everything.” In this context, 
“everything” refers to the dynamics in the family, the dynamics in the firm, and 
the dynamics in the environment. General models are sensitive to all of these 
dynamics, but researchers are forced to de-emphasize the importance of some 
aspects by focusing on different puzzle pieces (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004; 
Nordqvist et al., 2013). To accomplish this, the focus of the dissertation has been 
on identifying how family firms deal with information exchange on a personal 
level during the business succession. 
This dissertation followed their steps and aimed to expand the current state of 
knowledge on the influence factor of information. First, through the identification 
of existing information asymmetries in family businesses during internal business 
succession, the need for further research was underlined. With the focus on the 
selection process and by using signaling theory, one strategy to overcome 
information asymmetries was identified. The study on transferring social capital 
during succession underlined that the long timeframe family businesses have 
allows the process of succession to be understand as a time for renewal more than 
as a time for struggle. Following this basic idea, the different analyses were based 
on one theoretical model focusing on business succession from a principal-agent-
perspective in family business, which was elaborated on in chapter 2.5. This 
helped to shed light on different parts of the succession process and close existing 
gaps in the current state of research.  
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Chapter 3 focused on information asymmetries in family firms. The study showed 
that information asymmetries existing in family firms change, increase, and 
decrease over time. Prior research about succession in this framework particularly 
has referred to the stewardship theory to explain interpersonal problems between 
predecessors and successors. Researchers have argued that predecessors and 
successors act altruistically for the firm and its employees (Davis et al., 1997; 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) and that there are reduced or no agency costs 
associated with opportunism (Davis et al., 2010; Pearson & Marler, 2010). This 
point of view suggests that there are no important information asymmetries but 
ignores that opportunistic succession behavior and significant information 
asymmetries exist within families (Madison et al., 2016). We demonstrated that 
there are in fact information asymmetries in internal family business succession. 
Moreover, we were able to assess psychological and business contracts and 
underline that in both contracting situations, information asymmetries occur. 
However, we also determined that over time, the types and levels of information 
asymmetries change. This offered hints for different kinds of information gaps 
and information problems, as well as ongoing processes in families and family 
businesses to try to reduce overtime in the succession process.  
Chapter 4 focused on the selection of internal successors. By using signaling 
theory, the study tied together the theoretical framework in chapter 2 and the 
empirical findings in chapter 3. In this study, we argued that signaling takes place 
during internal successor selection, and family firms establish their own selection 
processes. Because of the existence of information asymmetries in family firms, a 
structured selection process is needed, and family firms and families try to 
establish such structures. From our observations, we proposed that the signaling 
game begins with the birth of potential successors and ends with a selection event 
for the management position, which is initiated by predecessors, successors, or 
necessity. This long timeframe allows potential successors to send signals that are 
perceived by the predecessor. In relation to the model in chapter 3 and the results 
regarding the development of information asymmetries over time, the signaling 
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game changes over time, too: Whereas costly signals are sent and the signaling 
frequency is low during the childhoods of potential successors, the signaling 
frequency increases from adolescence onward until the selection event, and hard 
to fake signals increase in importance. Thus, a signaling process was identified. It 
is questionable whether all actors who are part of the signaling game are aware of 
this long-term process. To carry out the process effectively, it has to be realized 
by all actors. Moreover, the evaluation and feedback process is important, and this 
is influenced by subjective personal feelings because of the close relationships 
among individuals. Following this reasoning, negative signals are also important 
in this process and should be evaluated and predecessors should be open for 
looking for different exit options, if needed. To summarize the results, in the 
context of family business internal succession from a principal agent perspective, 
signaling is used to overcome information asymmetries related to selection. 
In chapter 5, social capital transfer in family firms during succession was 
analyzed. In this study, we underlined that social capital has to be managed in the 
business succession process. The importance of social capital, as well as a 
likeness of predecessor and successor in relation to networking, represents an 
important finding. Social capital transfer should be integrated into some business 
succession transfer models (e.g., Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004); it also underline 
the nurturing process of successors - especially in relation to the information 
exchange of predecessors and successors in the succession process and the “hand 
over” of important contacts. According to Steier (2001), it is important to develop 
an accurate map of a firm’s network structure. We found out that in most cases, 
there is a feeling for the network structure. In every case, the step-by-step 
integration of successors into the network was analyzed and various chances for 
renewal during this time were identified. Moreover, we found that when social 
capital is missing, external members are integrated into the top management team 
to balance this lack. These findings aligned with the professionalization research 
in family business (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). We also determined that most of the 
network-related knowledge is implicit. As a result, information asymmetries can 
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arise. Furthermore, such asymmetries can result in a struggle for the family 
business if important network contacts are lost. Moreover, without knowing 
former contacts, there is no opportunity to use the renewal of network effect. Thus, 
this study showed that only some information is exchanged in a structured way; 
consequently, this could negatively influence the long-term survival of the family 
firm when the information splits are not sufficient. In contrast, this can have 
positive effects when sufficient information - particularly that which is most 
important - is exchanged. Thus, in this study about social capital, it was found that 
well-informed people can use their information about network contacts as an 
opportunity.  
To conclude the results of the three studies, an overall model based on the model 
in chapter 2.5 was developed. The basic model was enriched with deeper insights 
concerning different aspects of the succession process or effects related to 
information asymmetries and processes to overcome these information 
asymmetries at the different stages. Incorporating these results, figure 19 shows 
an overall model of the findings of this dissertation.  
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Figure 19: Overall model of family business internal succession based on the 
empirical finding of this dissertation  
Source: Author’s illustration. 
The developed model supports the understanding of business succession as a 
long-term, step-by-step process and underlines the notion that there is a time when 
the predecessor and successor are working together. The existence of information 
asymmetries in family businesses was illustrated through the different contracts 
and the underlying understanding of a principal agent situation in family business 
internal succession. These information asymmetries are in part reduced, for 
example, through a signaling process. In this dissertation, the signaling process 
ended with the management succession. In general, it can be stated that succession 
is a process involving different stages. This new model also supports the 
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theoretical idea of Nordqvist et al., (2013), who found that business succession 
can be evaluated as an entrepreneurial process through the results of research on 
social capital. The study showed that social capital transfer is also a long-term 
process and that the time when both actors are working together is an important 
one. Moreover, it underlined that successors add their own social capital to the 
family firm network. Summarizing the current findings and the overall model, it 
can be stated that there are principal agent situations in internal family business 
succession. Because of all these different steps, there are also many different 
points in time when the process can fail. Opportunistic individuals acting in this 
process have different and not completely aligned goals; these much be aligned 
over time to the extent required for a successful succession, but family businesses 
have their own processes in place to prevent the struggles that can result from 
these situations. 
6.1 Theoretical Implications  
Each of the three empirical studies enhanced the existing knowledge about 
business succession from a principal agent theory point of view. Based on the 
implications and results of former studies, this thesis offered various slight 
reconceptualizations of succession as an entrepreneurial process (Nordqvist et al., 
2013). Taken together, they contribute to the understanding of how family firms 
handle processes regarding recognizing information asymmetries, as well as the 
instruments used to overcome them. In this work, engagement with signaling was 
identified in the successor selection process. Moreover, processes for exchanging 
information on contacts and transferring the contacts themselves over time in the 
succession process were delineated. There are procedures that family firms create 
on their own to maintain a greater level of professionalism in the case of 
succession.  
As mentioned above, this dissertation has provided deeper insights into business 
succession from a principal agent perspective. The first study revealed that 
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various levels of information asymmetries exist in family business. This is a 
fundamental finding that was long overlooked in family business research because 
of the assumption that stewardship behavior dominates in family business 
(Madison et al., 2016). Due to this finding, the study can represent a new starting 
point for further research on principal agent behavior in family businesses. The 
results are in accordance with the first hints in the literature to the effect agency 
conflicts and agency costs could occur in family businesses (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2001); furthermore, they reinforce the point of view that asymmetric altruism, 
nepotism, and lack of self-control are all present in family business (Bergstrom, 
1989; Bernheim & Stark, 1988; Madison et al., 2016; Schulze et al., 2001). 
Building on former studies, our findings showed that there are much greater, 
thematically broader information asymmetries than explained by the existing 
theories. Moreover, we found bilateral information asymmetries at every stage of 
succession; these are rarely discussed in the literature. Furthermore, our findings 
showed that these information asymmetries change over time. This was the 
starting point for the further studies in this research, which focused on the 
selection process and social capital transfer.  
By investigating the selection process of family business internal successors, the 
second study contributed to different streams of literature. The study on signaling 
in family business showed that inherent processes in family firms to reduce 
information asymmetries already exist. In fact, family businesses make conscious 
decisions about the question of which candidate best fits the succession 
requirements. Moreover, signaling is used over a long timeframe in a unique 
signaling environment; this long-term process enables family firms to select and 
integrate the best candidate. Furthermore, this study contributed to the signaling 
theory research by developing new insights into the role of negative signals. In 
family firms, negative signals play a crucial role, as potential candidates leave the 
candidate pool by sending such negative signals.  
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The third study investigated social capital transfer during the business succession 
process. This study illustrated the family business members’ awareness of their 
network. Moreover, it showed how the network changes over time through the 
exchange of information about important network contacts and the integration and 
reconceptualization of such family business networks. Following this, it also 
offered theoretical contributions to the research stream that understands 
succession from a principal agent point of view because the information exchange 
about network contacts is connected with power. Furthermore, in this study, we 
were able to show that the integration of successors in the network can offer 
opportunities to renew the network, while it can also force the predecessor to 
transfer network contacts and leave the network. Social capital transfer can help to 
make the agent (successor) the new owner; thus, it can assist in overcoming 
agency problems. 
By integrating the three studies in an overall model, the roles of the different 
succession stages in the business succession process were illustrated. Information 
asymmetries decrease through structured information exchange processes. The 
predecessor and successor use different means to exchange information. Examples 
of these processes include, signaling, direct information, and hands-on training 
through joint meeting with important network partners. The research made 
contributions to the business succession, principal agent literature, and signaling 
theory literature, as well as to the literature about professionalization in family 
firms to a certain extent.  
6.2 Managerial Implications  
Family business owners can find many managerial implications in the modified 
overall model and the discussion section above. It should be underlined that 
information is the basis for decision making. Family businesses have to be aware 
of the blind spots between family members, which can influence the succession 
process itself by creating a more complicated selection process, as well as the 
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long-term success after succession has taken place, because the successor must 
make decisions without all of the required information. Long-term planning and 
realization offer opportunities to transfer implicit information into explicit 
information, for example, through writing down important passwords or network 
contacts. Moreover, periodic team meetings (i.e., between successors and 
predecessors) with the clear goal of succession planning and transfer of 
information offer the possibility to align different goals between the different 
actors over time. This can be represent an opportunity to prevent conflicts 
between family members, which can also be crucial for family business 
succession because it can reduce information asymmetries, thereby diminishing 
problems.  
Awareness of a selection process that is not random or predestined allows active, 
strategic control. Family businesses have the unique chance to select the perfect 
candidate over years, and this results in a competitive advantage. In addition, 
through selection from a pool of candidates, a strategic education is possible that 
fits into the family and the firm. Furthermore, awareness of negative signals 
showing that candidates have missing commitment or willingness to succeed offer 
family business owners the opportunity to think about exit strategies. 
In the area of social capital transfer, there are also opportunities to change implicit 
information into explicit information. Awareness of important network contacts 
and the need of social capital transfer could be supported, for example, by 
advisors. In the family firm, through written documentation, customer relationship 
systems, or strategic meetings that focus on both existing networks and former 
network contacts, successors have the chance to make conscious decisions about 
whether they want to exploit or explore the existing network. Moreover, the 
integration of own network contacts into the existing network could be used as an 
opportunity for renewal of the business succession situation. 
In sum, the overall model can help family firms by showing that there are 
information asymmetries between family members and that there is a need for 
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information exchange on different levels. Awareness of the long-term, step-by-
step process is important when it comes to directing sufficient resources and 
attention to handling this information exchange. Moreover, the alignment of the 
goals of the predecessor (principal) and successor (agent), which can be supported 
through information exchange, can be a success factor for the long-term survival 
of the family firm. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Specific limitations were discussed above for each study in this dissertation. 
However, a few limitations that touch on the study as a whole should be 
emphasized here. All of the studies were conducted with the aim of theory 
building through qualitative research. The goal was to review the extant literature 
in light of the qualitative findings and alternative explanations of the empirical 
research; thus, the intention of this dissertation was not to prove or falsify the 
results of the studies undertaken. Therefore, future research should build on the 
considerations highlighted in the different studies to empirically test their 
propositions. 
The studies included family firms from the same country. This approach allowed 
a comparison of the sampled organization but also meant that cultural factors were 
disregarded. For example, the family and family dynamics can differ according to 
the cultural context, which could promote different agency or stewardship 
behavior. This might impose certain limitations on the generalizability of the 
representative findings in this research. Moreover, as with all qualitative research, 
alternative explanations can exist. Furthermore, some of the case study data 
analyzed here were collected by the co-authors of those studies rather than the 
author of the dissertation. However, while this may be a limitation in one respect, 
from another perspective, the positioning of an external observer allows an 
objective analytical process.  
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The results focusing on the interpersonal relationship between the predecessor and 
the successor can be underlined as a limitation because of the differences in 
family understandings (Klein, 2000). Moreover, it should be mentioned that 
several definitions of family business exist in the literature (Chrisman et al., 2005; 
Chua et al., 1999). This dissertation utilized a definition based on Chua et al., 
(1999) in the different case studies, and it is important to note that other 
definitions exist.  
The dissertation utilized theories from several literature streams, specifically 
family business, principal agent theory, signaling theory, and social capital theory. 
The studies combined these fields, thereby providing methodological strength and 
answering calls for such research (Stewart & Miner, 2011). However, it has to be 
mentioned that such a use of several different literatures also presents challenges. 
Focusing on the theoretical lens of principal agency theory caused stewardship 
behavior in family firms, as another explanation for the phenomena analyzed in 
this dissertation, to be overlooked. 
The dissertation in general and the concrete studies mainly focused on a single 
internal succession. Team succession was included at the sidelines of the research 
but was not addressed as a research topic. There were some hints that team 
succession could include further challenges for the selection process and social 
capital transfer. The addition of the team factor in the developed research 
questions could offer some interesting possibilities for further research. 
Furthermore, the different types of succession (e.g. internal, external, mixed, 
foundation) were not considered in this dissertation.  
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6.4 Conclusion  
“As a general rule, the most successful man in life is the man who has the best 
information.” 
        Benjamin Disraeli  
This dissertation started with a quotation from Jane Austen that described what a 
good company is. It refers to well-informed people and a great deal of 
conversation. This dissertation focused on the individual level (e.g. predecessor 
and (potential) successor(s)). Family firms are known for a high founder 
centricity, and in later generations, the influence of the family; as a result, the 
family centricity is high. Particularly if only one person succeeds, this successor is 
a key factor influencing the company’s sustained success. To be a well-informed 
person, an individual needs to gather as much information as possible. Such 
information allows the decision-making process to occur. Successors of family 
businesses need free space for decision making, and they need information to 
support their decisions. Many of these crucial pieces of information only exist in 
the minds of the predecessors, others are well documented in the firm, and still 
others are in flow between different network partners. It can be assumed that to 
gather all of this information in a coherent way, and then to understand and 
evaluate the data to be able to take good decisions and run the company, takes a 
great deal of conversation - and this takes time. Thus, by focusing on information 
exchange during business succession, this dissertation demonstrated that 
opportunistic individuals also act in family businesses. Moreover, it supported the 
observation of researchers from all over the world to the effect that succession in 
family business is a long-term, step-by-step process that requires planning, 
conversation, and realization. If this is understood by the former generation, the 
next generation can manage good firms and will represent the most successful 
successors due to the lower information asymmetries. 
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Appendix 
Appendix to Chapter 5. 
Questionnaire for the successor 
1. How long have you been working with the (predecessor)? 
 
2. What are your important network contacts? 
a. How often do you talk with these network contacts? 
b. Which are the contacts you most depend on? 
 
3. How important do you think a network is for the success of the business? 
 
4. Have you transferred the following network contacts: bank, lawyer, tax 
consultant? Do you have new network contacts you would regard as 
advisors? 
 
5. How did you handle the transfer? 
a. Did the predecessor transfer it personally—for example, through a 
meeting specifically to introduce you?  
b. Did you review the data in the family firms, such as databases, 
customer bills, and contracts with suppliers, to understand the 
network? 
c. Which former contracts do you use now? Have you integrated your 
own network with the existing one? 
 
6. When do you think the successor was the sole contact person for a 
network contact? 
 
7. How do you establish new contacts? 
 
